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Abstract 
The research in this dissertation explores the complex communication processes 
whereby late-night comedy viewing can produce significant indirect effects on citizen 
engagement in political life.  To this end, the present study introduces a theoretical 
framework, which synthesizes Affective Intelligence theory, the Orientation-Stimulus-
Orientation-Response (O-S-O-R) approach, and the Communication Mediation Model.  
Specifically, three indirect effects models are proposed and tested across two different 
research designs: an online experiment and a mail survey.  The main findings include 
the following.  First, late-night comedy viewing can promote citizens’ political 
engagement indirectly by eliciting their anger and worry.  Second, consuming satirical 
humor can mobilize discursive activities for citizens by provoking their negative 
emotions.  Third, more frequent discussion, the expanded size of a discussion network, 
and greater engagement in online communication activities can mediate and reinforce the 
mobilizing effects of late-night comedy viewing.  Finally, the mediating effects of 
negative emotions and heterogeneous discussion are conditional upon education, such 
that exposure to late-night comedy can encourage political participation of well-educated 
individuals, while the same experiences from satirical humor can demobilize less savvy 
counterparts.  The current research effort provides a range of insights to explore the role 
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of newly emerging media genres that are presumably of less enlightening value and yet 
are more emotionally amusing and provocative.  Primarily, these findings contribute to 
our understanding of various mediation models anchored in the O-S-O-R framework.  
By incorporating emotion as a viable mediator (the second O) between the reception of 
message (S) and its ensuing response (R), the proposed indirect effects models enlarge 
the scope of the mediation model, while capturing the dynamic intervening mechanisms 
above and beyond more conventional cognitive accounts.  Further by introducing 
education as a first O, the current research fully exploits the O-S-O-R framework in 
assessing the impact of political entertainment.  Moreover, investigating multiple facets 
of interpersonal discussion harboring distinct implications for participatory democracy 
extends the purview of mediators that might be employed in the Communication 
Mediation Model. 
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Chapter 1  
Introduction 
Contemporary changes in news content provision and audience behavior have led 
many to wonder whether mass publics will become more or less responsible democratic 
citizens in the future.  As young audiences are turning away from broadcast news or 
print journalism, traditional news companies are challenged by dwindling advertising 
revenues and increased production costs (Jones, 2010).  Concurrently, with new media 
technologies such as blogs and search engine portals, citizens are questioning the top-
down, gatekeeper role of news media.  Instead, citizens seem to desire a more active 
role in the determining what is news and who is permitted to make it.  Particularly 
noteworthy in this trend has been the decline of conventional news sources paired with 
the rise of soft news and infotainment (see, for example, Guthrie, 2010).  Thus, there is 
a good theoretical argument to believe that the latter, to some extent at least, fills the gap 
left by the former. 
Nevertheless, critics doubt that political information delivered in the form of 
entertainment could constructively influence a citizen’s political attitudes, knowledge, 
and behavior.  As Graber (2008) aptly points out, such a disregard of entertainment as a 
source of political information is akin to the Western tradition of thought that tends to 
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polarize reason and emotion: Passion is seen as irrational.  However, recent research has 
demonstrated that emotion is not antithetical to, but could in fact yield beneficial effects, 
for an individual’s knowledge and decision-making (see Neuman, Marcus, Crigler, & 
MacKuen, 2007b for an extensive review).  If so, infotainment harbors the potential to 
empower democracy.  After all, political information no longer has to be dull, 
ponderous, and full of dry and less captivating information; it could be fun and enjoyable 
when it is presented in a more approachable format.  
Motivated by this direction, an array of studies has examined the political 
consequences of entertainment journalism; specific effects include public attention to 
politics (Baum, 2002, 2003b), political knowledge (Baum, 2003a; Prior, 2003), public 
opinion formation (Baum, 2003b, 2005; Moy, Xenos, & Hess, 2005b; Young, 2004), and 
political participation (Moy & Gastil, 2006).  Although scholars have sometimes had 
difficulty agreeing on how to define soft news, there is agreement on a few fundamental 
characteristics.  Soft news tends to be personality driven, focuses on sensationalism and 
drama rather than facts, and conveys less public affairs information to its audience than 
hard news (Delli Carpini & Williams, 2001).  Nonetheless, findings regarding the effect 
of soft news on political attitude and behavior have been mixed.  Many argued that soft 
news threatens the integrity of the democratic process by overemphasizing trivial events, 
downplaying significant public affairs issues, and oversimplifying the complex reality of 
these issues (Fallows, 1996; Kalb, 2001).  For instance, Hollander (2005) found that 
exposure to entertainment-based talk programs artificially inflated viewers’ perceptions 
of their own political knowledge.  
  3 
However, Baum (2002, 2003a, 2003b, 2005) challenged this notion, arguing that 
soft news creates a more knowledgeable citizenry by educating an inattentive public that 
would not otherwise follow traditional hard news.  His research indicated that politically 
inattentive citizens gather valuable information as an “incidental by-product” of exposure 
to soft news, especially regarding significant foreign policy events (Baum, 2003b, p. 30).  
Thus, watching entertainment-based programming can contribute to political learning.  
Baum (2005) also demonstrated that exposure to presidential candidates’ appearances on 
entertainment-based talk shows in the 2000 campaign influenced the evaluation of those 
candidates, particularly among less knowledgeable viewers.  His findings illustrated that 
those who are only passively interested in politics are more likely to warm up to 
presidential candidates from the opposition party when they see those candidates on 
entertainment-based talk shows.  
 
Typology of Soft News 
These inconsistent results may reflect conceptual and operational ambiguity in the 
definition of soft news, given that studies exploring the effects of entertainment-oriented 
programs have not reached an agreement on the operational definition of soft news 
(Kwak, Wang, & Guggenheim, 2004).  Accordingly, the next step should be to examine 
the distinct and unique characteristics in various formats of soft news—e.g., daytime talk 
shows (Oprah, The View), evening news magazines (20/20, 60 Minutes), late-night 
comedy programs (The Late Show with David Letterman, The Tonight Show with Jay 
Leno, The Daily Show with Jon Stewart), and morning news shows (The Today Show, 
Good Morning America) (Baym, 2005). 
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Indeed, studies highlighted distinct features that may underlie diverse forms of 
soft news.  For instance, content analyses of late-night comedy revealed that the tone of 
framing politicians and public affairs in these shows is predominantly negative (e.g., 
Niven, Lichter, & Amundson, 2003; Pfau, Moy, Radler, & Bridgeman, 1998; Young, 
2004).  On the other hand, Benoit, McHale, Hansen, Pier, and McGuire (2003) pointed 
out that candidates have more opportunities to control their interviews on daytime talk 
shows such as Oprah than they do over the jokes and parodies featured in late night 
comedy such as The Daily Show with Jon Stewart.  Therefore, day time talk shows are 
far more likely to present their interview subjects in a favorable light.  In addition, 
daytime talk shows tend to take more of a human interest approach to entertainment, 
whereas late-night talk shows, especially in the monologue segments of the programs, are 
more humor oriented (Baumgartner & Morris, 2006).  
While acknowledging diverse formats of soft news programs, the current research 
centers on the effects of more politically oriented entertainment programs, with a 
particular emphasis on late-night comedy shows.  Specifically, the present study seeks 
to examine the effects of political stories laced with ridicule.  Accordingly, late-night 
comedy is rather narrowly defined as those programs belonging to the political satire 
genre (e.g., The Daily Show with Jon Stewart and The Colbert Report), while excluding 
standard nighttime talk shows (e.g., The Late Show with David Letterman and The 
Tonight Show with Jay Leno).  These programs use satire to convey a coherent political 
message.  Compton and Pfau (2009) highlighted three key elements in late-night 
political content: late-night comedian monologues, political parodies, and candidate 
appearances.  Based on their content, we can expect that late-night comedy will have far 
  5 
more in common with other satiric outlets than they do with shows that happen to air in 
the late evening (Caufield, 2008).   
 
Overarching Goals of the Dissertation 
Despite the narrower, more precise definition of the genre and the increasing 
focus of scholarship, the influence of late-night comedy is a subject of considerable 
scholarly debate, one that mainly lies between two schools of thought—those contending 
that late-night comedy has a harmful or null effect on citizens and those pointing to their 
salutary or constructive role in actually revitalizing democracy.  The current research strives 
to bridge this gap in the existing literature by exploring the more complex communication 
processes whereby late-night comedy viewing can produce significant indirect effects on 
citizen engagement in political life.  With the advancement of such indirect effects models 
of late-night comedy, I seek to address the following two interrelated questions:  
1. What are the impacts of entertainment journalism on political engagement?  
2. How do the impacts of entertainment-oriented programs on citizen attitudes 
and behaviors differ from those derived from more conventional news sources?  
In searching for the answers, I pursue the methodological triangulation of 
blending experimental and survey research.  First, manipulating the exposure to late-
night comedy in an experiment will permit us to examine under a controlled setting the 
precise causal effects of consuming humor on citizen attitude and behavior.  Then, 
employing a secondary analysis of a national survey will assess as to whether the 
observed associations are generalizable to the real-world setting.  By integrating the 
results attained from the experiment and the survey, I seek to uncover the precise causal 
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mechanisms through which late-night comedy affects democracy and also examine 
whether the observed cause-effect processes are generalizable to an actual real-world 
setting. 
 
The Organization of the Dissertation 
To capture the impacts of entertainment journalism more thoroughly and 
precisely, I propose three specific indirect effects models: indirect effects of late-night 
comedy exposure to political participation through emotions (Chapter 3), indirect effects 
of late-night comedy exposure to interpersonal talk through emotions (Chapter 4), and 
indirect effects of late-night comedy exposure on political participation through 
interpersonal talk (Chapter 5). 
In Chapter 2, I start by reviewing the extant literature that examines the potential 
impacts of late-night comedy on political attitudes, knowledge, and behavior.  Previous 
research has hardly been in agreement.  Some studies suggest late-night comedy 
exposure leads to enhancement in some indictors of healthy functioning democracy, such 
as political interest and participation.  Others point to detrimental effects in so much as 
it could produce negative attitudes such as cynicism about the electoral system as well as 
about political candidates. 
In Chapter 3, I introduce a novel affective mediation model by synthesizing 
Affective Intelligence theory (Marcus, Neuman, & MacKuen, 2000) and the Orientation-
Stimulus-Orientation-Response (O-S-O-R) framework (Markus & Zajonc, 1985; J. M. 
McLeod, Kosicki, & McLeod, 1994).  Beyond the long-established mediating role of 
attitudinal and cognitive factors found in traditional media research, emotion is advanced 
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as a viable second O that is situated between the reception of more amusing and 
provocative messages and the resulting political outcomes.  In Chapter 4, I investigate 
the impacts of late-night comedy on citizen engagement in interpersonal talk, while 
extending the already well-established research tradition that examines the link between 
mass media and interpersonal communication.  In Chapter 5, I apply the 
Communication Mediation Model (J. M. McLeod et al., 2001; Sotirovic & McLeod, 
2001) to examine the process wherein the act of consuming satirical humor works in 
concert with interpersonal discussion to spur political participation.  Chapter 6 integrates 
the results of these research efforts and seeks to identify particular causal mechanisms 
that account for the effects of satirical humor programs on democracy.  Specifically, the 
indirect paths through which late-night comedy shows influence citizens’ political 
engagement are juxtaposed with the parallel causal processes for traditional news sources.   
The concluding chapter highlights the implications of major findings in the 
current research in light of existing communication theories. In closing, this final chapter 
discusses the limitations of the current study and sets forth avenues for future research.  
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Chapter 2  
Filling the Gap in the Extant Literature on Late-Night Comedy 
History tells us candidates’ appearances on entertainment shows exerted 
considerable influence on the electorate.  For example, Richard Nixon’s piano solo on 
The Jack Parr Show in 1993 and Bill Clinton’s playing of the saxophone at The Arsenio 
Hall Show in 1992 attracted significant media attention and boosted their popularity.  
More recently, the genre’s considerable political clout was well displayed when President 
Obama appeared on The Daily Show with Jon Stewart on October 27, 2010—the first by 
an incumbent president.  In addition, many construed the Comedy Central’s “Rally to 
Restore Sanity and/or Fear” prior the 2010 midterm election as an important catalyst for 
political mobilization, although the hosts of the event, Jon Stewart and Stephen Colbert, 
insisted that it was not meant to be a political rally (Gold & Steffen, 2010).  Further, 
Seth Meyers’ and Stephen Colbert’s appearances at various White House Correspondents 
dinners and Jon Stewart’s infamous interview on CNN’s political debate program 
Crossfire during the 2004 presidential campaign (Morreale, 2009) have given late-night 
comedy a prominence in modern political discourse that is truly novel. 
Motivated by the rise of political entertainment, a growing body of literature has 
considered the potential for late-night comedy to influence public attentiveness, 
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knowledge, and participation.  Nevertheless, the influence of late-night comedy is a 
subject of considerable scholarly debate, mainly between two schools of thought—those 
contending that late-night comedy has a harmful or null effect and those pointing to the 
salutary role in revitalizing democracy.  In general, findings of previous studies fall into 
three broad categories—attitudinal, behavioral, and informational—of political 
consequences that may accompany the consumption of late-night humor, each of which 
has been the topic of much controversy.   
 
Attitudinal Effects of Late-Night Comedy 
Numerous observers have investigated a wide variety of effects, ranging from 
public attention (Cao, 2010; Feldman & Young, 2008), to evaluative attitudes (Compton 
& Pfau, 2009; Moy et al., 2005b; Young, 2004, 2006), to efficacy and cynicism 
(Baumgartner & Morris, 2006; Cao & Brewer, 2008; Guggenheim, Kwak, & Campbell, 
2011; Hoffman & Thomson, 2009; Holbert, Lambe, Dudo, & Carlton, 2007; Kwak et al., 
2004).  The results of these studies, however, have been mixed: watching late-night 
comedy shows was associated with both positive and negative ramifications.  
Baumgartner and Morris (2006) found that viewing The Daily Show’s ridicule of 2004 
presidential candidates George W. Bush and John Kerry depressed both candidates’ 
images, led viewers to feel more cynical about government and the news media, and 
decreased external political efficacy.  Other work, however, suggests these shows may 
increase internal efficacy—i.e., the confidence in one’s own ability to understand and 
participate in politics (Niemi, Craig, & Mattei, 1991).  Thus, although Baumgartner and 
Morris’s (2006) subjects showed less external efficacy—operationalized as distrust in 
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government institutions—from viewing The Daily Show, they seemed to feel  more 
competent in their ability to do something about it.  Building upon this study, Hoffman 
and Thomson (2009) demonstrated that late-night comedy viewing among adolescents 
predicted a significant increase of internal efficacy with no comparable relationship with 
cynicism.   
On the other hand, Compton and Pfau (2009) argued that distinct content in late-
night comedy programs—e.g., monologues, political paraodies, and candidate 
appearances—could produce divergent attitudinal effects.  Specifically, they 
hypothesized that monologue and political parodies, given negative portrayals, would 
have detrimental effects on feelings and attitudes toward candidates and their images, 
whereas candidate appearances can enhance feelings and attitudes toward candidates.  
However, some findings countered their initial predictions.  It was observed that not 
only candidate appearances but satirical jokes about candidates could also enhance 
perceptions of their competence and character.  Compton and Pfau (2009) reasoned that 
viewing of these programs could lead citizens to feel closer to them because those who 
are ridiculed look more approachable.  The positive influence of satirical jokes may be 
due to the fact that they are frequently accompanied by coverage of issues in the form of 
a news summary (Feldman & Young, 2008).  In fact, the range of topics covered by 
late-night comedy is quite substantial, incorporating those policies concerning Iraq, 
media ownership, same sex marriage, environment, tax, and crime (Jones, 2005).  
Brewer and Marquardt (2007) contend these issue frames could strengthen citizens’ faith 
in their ability to make sense of the political world. 
Conversely, Compton and Pfau (2009) found that monologues derogated feelings 
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toward candidates, and candidate appearances bolstered attitudes, attitude confidence, 
and perceptions of candidate competence, character, and sociability.  Harmful effects 
may transpire, given that monologues often feature sharp political barbs (Davis & Owen, 
1998) and focus on candidate image over issues (Niven et al., 2003).  The results of 
their study are consistent with Jamieson and Waldman’s (2003) argument that late-night 
comedy exposure can undermine the image of the candidate targeted.  Similarly, 
Guggenheim et al. (2011) observed that consuming satirical humor may further aggravate 
distrust in politicians, particularly among those who use newspaper less frequently.  All 
in all, these results are decidedly mixed.  A more comprehensive theoretical approach is 
needed in order to understand the mechanisms that may underlie late night comedy’s 
effects on mass political attitude and behavior. 
 
Informational Effects of Late-Night Comedy 
Many (Brewer & Cao, 2008; Brewer & Marquardt, 2007; Fox, Koloen, & Sahin, 
2007; Jones, 2010) believe that late-night comedy shows contain a considerable amount 
of substantive information sufficient for audiences to make sense of the political world.  
Content analyses reveal that soft news programs, especially late-night comedy shows, 
regularly tackle politics on substantive issues in an information-rich format.  For 
example, soft news programs contained considerable coverage of U.S. policy crises in the 
1990s (Baum, 2003b), and The Daily Show and Saturday Night Live usually present 
humor in the format of a newscast (e.g., Saturday Night Live’s Weekend Update) or an 
elaborate parody of a political debate (e.g., Saturday Night’s widely publicized parodies) 
(Jones, 2005).  Further, recent studies (Brewer & Marquardt, 2007; Fox et al., 2007) 
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demonstrated that Stewart’s parody in The Daily Show was as substantive as the 
broadcast news programs and election stories were longer than those from network news.  
Hence, late-night comedy may be better understood as an alternative form of journalism 
rather than “fake” news or pure entertainment because it can provide audiences with 
information sufficient for them to make sense of the political world (e.g., Baym, 2005; 
Brewer & Marquardt, 2007; Jones, 2005). 
Given the amount of political information in this programming, optimists 
(Brewer & Cao, 2008; Graber, 2008; Hollander, 2005) maintain that greater use of late-
night comedy should be associated with at least some forms of public affairs knowledge.  
There is some survey evidence to suggest viewers themselves believe this is the case.  In 
2000, the Pew Research Center for the People & the Press reported that 47 percent of 
people under thirty years old were “informed at least occasionally” about the campaign or 
candidates by late night talk shows (13 percent regularly and 34 percent sometimes).  In 
2004, the Pew Research Center repeated this survey, this time asking respondents if they 
“learned something” from comedy shows.  Twenty-one percent of people under the age 
of thirty reported learning something from programs such as Saturday Night Live and The 
Daily Show (roughly the same number who learned something from the Internet).  As 
the Pew study notes, “for Americans under 30, these comedy shows are now mentioned 
almost as frequently as newspapers and evening network news programs as regular 
sources for election news.”  Furthermore, the report exclaims, “one out of every two 
young people (50%) say they at least sometimes learn about the campaign from comedy 
shows, nearly twice the rate among people age 30-49 (27%) and four times the rate 
among people 50 and older.”  In 2007, the Pew Research Center further reveals that 
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audiences of late-night comedy shows are consistently in the highest-knowledge group, 
along with newspaper web sites.  Of course, just because people believe they have 
learned from soft news does not make it so. 
More sophisticated survey analyses find correlations between knowledge and 
exposure to soft news. A campaign knowledge test conducted on more than 19,000 
citizens in the summer and fall of 2004 by the University of Pennsylvania’s National 
Annenberg Election Survey indicated that soft news viewers knew more facts than non-
viewers.  The survey reported that “viewers of late-night comedy programs, especially 
The Daily Show, are more likely to know the issue positions and backgrounds of 
presidential candidates than people who do not watch late-night comedy,” noting that The 
Daily Show viewers “have higher campaign knowledge than national news viewers and 
newspaper readers.”  The survey concludes, “traditional journalists have been voicing 
increasing concern that if young people are receiving political information from late-
night comedy shows like The Daily Show, they may not be adequately informed on the 
issues of the day.  The data suggest that these fears may be unwarranted.  However, the 
survey also points out, “these findings do not show that The Daily Show is itself 
responsible for the higher knowledge among its viewers.”1  
Others more closely examined the causal link between late-night comedy 
watching and political knowledge, while documenting that viewing politically oriented 
entertainment programming is associated with at least some forms of learning about the 
political world.  For example, Hollander (2005) concluded that “young people are 
capable of gleaning at least modest amounts of campaign information from such content, 
but how competent it leaves them to participate in a meaningful manner remains an open 
                                                 
1 http://www.naes04.org 
  14 
question” (p. 412).  Focusing on political comedy in the context of political campaigns, 
Brewer and Cao (2006) demonstrated that exposure to appearances by candidates in the 
2004 Democratic presidential primary on late-night comedy programs was significantly 
related to increased factual knowledge about the candidates and familiarity with 
contextual information about the race.  Similarly, Pfau, Houston, and Semmler (2007) 
found evidence of a positive relationship between exposure to late-night comedy 
programs and political expertise in the early phases of the 2004 campaign season.  
These studies illustrate that in addition to entertaining viewers, political comedy also 
appears to play a role in helping some individuals learn about the political world. 
Two mechanisms originally proposed by Baum (2003b) have been exploited to 
explain this positive link between late-night comedy and knowledge.  First, building on 
low-information rationality theories, Baum (2003b) posits that soft news consumers gain 
information about political stories as an “incidental by-product of seeking entertainment” 
(p. 269).  Given the amount of political information embedded in late-night comedy and 
a citizen’s ability to extract minimally sufficient information, viewers should be able to 
assimilate some form of public affairs knowledge, which can range from facts about the 
game of politics, to sociopolitical issues like global warning or education, to fresh insight 
into the crucial issues of the campaign (Graber, 2008). 
Second, Baum (2003b) stresses that there is a tendency among at least some soft 
news consumers to use soft news as a ‘gateway’ to obtaining more information on a topic 
of interest through hard news.  Research evidence suggests that viewing late-night 
comedy is positively associated with traditional news consumption (Feldman & Young, 
2008).  In their focus group study, Rottinghaus, Bird, Ridout, and Self (2008) note that 
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consuming The Daily Show leads numerous young viewers to seek out other “harder” 
sources of news.  Late-night comedy may serve as segues to traditional news by 
providing a simpler context to understand political issues or understanding humor may 
demand further information seeking (Caufield, 2008; Feldman & Young, 2008).  Indeed, 
empirical findings endorsed the ‘gateway’ hypothesis that consuming late-night humor 
facilitates subsequent attention to information in traditional news sources, which could 
educate viewers about politics.  For instance, Young and Tisinger (2006) found that 
watching late-night comedy television is associated with other forms of news exposure, 
including local and national television news.  These authors also found that an increase 
in perceived learning from late-night comedy television was associated with an increase 
in learning from other forms of television news.  While affirming the causal structure of 
gateway effects, Xenos and Becker (2009) showed that exposure to the issue in comedic 
format stimulated attentiveness to that issue in subsequent media consumption, which 
ultimately resulted in greater uptake of political information from conventional news 
sources.  As such, there is little reason to believe that viewing late-night comedy is 
replacing consumption of traditional news.  Instead, the former could be an impetus for 
the latter. 
Nevertheless, a multitude of scholars disagree with the positive enlightening role.  
Above all, people consume soft news programs primarily to be entertained rather than to 
be informed (Prior, 2003).  These programs are not designed expressly to inform their 
audiences.  Jon Stewart, arguably the most well-known figure in this genre, casts doubt 
on the idea that young audiences could gain knowledge from his program, simply 
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because he never purports to provide enough information.2  Further, critics have 
consistently stressed the lack of substance in late-night comedy programs (Niven et al., 
2003; Young, 2004).  For instance, Niven et al. (2003), having analyzed the contents of 
political jokes in late-night comedy programs, demonstrate that the nature of humor in 
this genre is less issue-oriented, with more jokes geared toward personal subjects and 
foibles of political leaders. 
Building upon these criticisms, many have questioned causal inference that 
consumption of humor leads to factual knowledge (J. M. McLeod et al., 1996; Pfau, Cho, 
& Chong, 2001; Prior, 2003).  Parkin, Bos, and Doom (2003) have even discovered 
deleterious effects of watching late-night comedy on political learning.  Young (2008) 
suggests political comedy may undermine knowledge because so much cognitive effort is 
needed for audiences to make sense of a joke that tends to hinder learning from late-night 
humor.  More recently, Baek and Wojcieszak (2009) have observed that the relationship 
of late-night comedy with political knowledge is positive only for low difficulty items 
with little corresponding link to the recognition of complicated issues.  All in all, 
findings in the field are equivocal about the role of late-night comedy in a fully 
functioning democracy. 
Others consider possible uneven effects of late-night comedy viewing on 
citizens’ learning about politics.  Given the increasing variety of channels individuals 
can choose from, Prior (2007) predicted an increase in the knowledge gap between 
apolitical citizens and those who are interested in politics.  He suggested increasing 
media choice would enable apathetic citizens to opt out of traditional news into 
entertainment programs, whereas those who are politically savvy continue to rely on 
                                                 
2 C-Span Newhouse School Forum with Ken Auletta from the New Yorker, Oct. 14, 2004. 
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traditional news for political information.  Those with greater skills and resources are 
more likely to gain from late-night comedy since understanding humor itself requires a 
certain level of knowledge (Landreville, Holbert, & LaMarre, 2010; Young & Tisinger, 
2006), and this might further lends plausibility to the widening knowledge gaps.  
Supporting this view, Cao (2008b) maintained that the positive relationship between 
exposure to political comedy shows and political knowledge is stronger among people 
with high education than among those with lower education. 
On the other hand, the ‘gateway’ hypothesis counters the alleged antithetical 
relationship between hard and soft information sources.  Rottinghaus et al. (2008) 
observed that young viewers who are normally apathetic find the news featured in late-
night comedy simple and easy-to-understand, whereas hard news remains largely dull and 
unappealing.  Moreover, Cao (2008a) demonstrated that the effect of The Daily Show on 
political knowledge is more pronounced among those who infrequently consume 
traditional news, whereas those who tune into conventional news programs on a regular 
basis remain hardly affected.  Although an interaction between late-night comedy and 
political sophistication is not of primary interest in her study, results strongly imply that 
late-night comedy could be a knowledge leveler if it affords greater opportunities to those 
who are otherwise politically inattentive.  If late-night comedy is particularly effective 
in educating those who rarely consume traditional news, while it has less strong influence 
among those who are attentive, the gap between these two groups could diminish.  
Echoing this view, Xenos and Becker (2009) demonstrated that those comedy viewers 
who are less politically interested could acquire information more easily to the extent 
they subsequently encounter additional information from traditional news media.   
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Further complicating our understanding of political comedy’s contribution to the 
knowledge gap, Hollander (2005) discovered a curvilinear effect of viewing late-night 
television on political learning, such that those who watch a moderate amount tend to 
recall the most campaign information, while those who watched either low or high 
amounts tend to recall less.  In short, it is not clear whether consuming satirical humor 
produces greater benefits among politically savvy individuals or less sophisticated 
counterparts. 
 
Behavioral Effects of Late-Night Comedy 
Finally, scores of studies attended to the effects of late-night comedy on 
participatory behaviors.  Some observers (Baumgartner, 2008; Baumgartner & Morris, 
2006; Kwak et al., 2004) argued that consuming satirical humor could undermine 
political participation.  For example, Baumgartner and Morris (2006) suggested that 
exposure to political comedy programs such as The Daily Show “may dampen 
participation…by contributing to a sense of political alienation from the political 
process” (pp. 362-363).  As noted earlier, the authors found that humor consumption 
was associated with increased cynicism and low levels of external efficacy, which could 
depress political participation.  Further, Baumgartner (2008) contended that 
overexposure to comedic frames available online could produce similar negative 
behavioral consequences, given that viewing an online clip that highlight the absurdities 
of the political world tended to lower subjects’ trust in the media and political institutions. 
Nevertheless, Baumgartner and Morris (2006) also found that exposure to The 
Daily Show boosted internal efficacy—i.e., the confidence in one’s own competence to 
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understand and participate in politics.  The authors attributed this finding to (a) the way 
in which The Daily Show simplifies politics, in order to present it in an entertaining 
manner, which may lead viewers to perceive politics as being less complicated than it 
actually is, and (b) the way in which the show may validate viewers’ faith in their ability 
to understand politics when they get the show’s jokes.  Indeed, studies have indicated 
that internal political efficacy can encourage political participation (Finkel & Muller, 
1998).  Moreover, Shingles (1981) and Pollock (1983) found that internal political 
efficacy fostered participation in both conventional and unconventional political activities 
even among citizens with relatively little trust in the political system.  Thus, exposure to 
political comedy shows could increase political participation by fostering internal 
efficacy 
In line with this reasoning, Cao and Brewer (2008) stressed that negative 
information embedded in late-night humor could motivate viewers to participate in 
politics by triggering anxiety about the current political situation and future political 
outcomes as if negative political campaigns would stimulate political participation (see 
e.g., Finkel & Geer, 1998; Geer, 2006; Martin, 2004).  In addition, the authors noted 
that exposure to political comedy shows could propel political participation by building 
an imagined community among viewers and making politics more enjoyable.  Mutz 
(1998) found that the use of mass media could induce perceptions of collective 
experience or collective opinion.  Such shared experience or opinion may, in turn, 
facilitate collective action among the public (Pasek, Kenski, Romer, & Jamieson, 2006).  
Thus, political comedy shows may increase political participation by promoting common 
experiences and opinions among viewers.  Cao and Brewer (2008) also suspected that 
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such programs usually present politics in an entertaining manner, which may lead 
viewers to think that politics is enjoyable, thereby stimulating political participation.  
In support of the hypothesized constructive role, studies have demonstrated 
substantial empirical evidence that exposure to late-night comedy could prompt 
individual’s mobilization to participate in politics (Cao & Brewer, 2008; Dorman, 2007; 
Hoffman & Thomson, 2009).  Based on their reasoning above, Cao and Brewer (2008) 
showed that exposure to political comedy shows was positively associated with two of 
the three time-based activities: attending a campaign event and joining an organization.  
Though the relationship between exposure and contacting an elected official was positive, 
it was not significant.  The authors attributed this relatively weaker link to cynicism 
likely produced by watching late-night humor that could discourage citizens’ intent to 
contact public officials.  Similarly, Young (2007) observed that not only is exposure to 
The Daily Show not exerting a detrimental impact on health democratic behaviors and 
characteristics, but that audiences of these programs are often more participatory, 
efficacious, and engaged in politics than people who don’t watch the show.   
In sum, the issue of whether late-night comedy viewing encourages political 
participation waits for a verdict, with some studies documenting that exposure to late-
night comedy could foster individual’s mobilization to participate in politics (Cao & 
Brewer, 2008; Dorman, 2007; Hoffman & Thomson, 2009) and others casting doubt on 
the positive motivating role of late-night comedy (Baumgartner, 2008; Baumgartner & 
Morris, 2006; Kwak et al., 2004).   
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Toward a Comprehensive Model of Late-Night Comedy 
Extensive literature review above suggests that previous studies produced highly 
incongruent results pertaining to the role of late-night comedy in revitalizing democracy.  
There could be several reasons for the inconsistency in findings.  First, as Kwak et al. 
(2004) acknowledged, the context in which each study was conducted was different, and 
this could trigger incompatible consequences.  For instance, data collections took place 
in different administrations and within completely different economic and political 
contexts.  Many of the differences in findings may therefore simply reflect dissimilar 
circumstances.  Also, studies have employed various research designs to investigate the 
potential implications of consuming late-night humor.  Although most studies relied on 
cross-sectional surveys, others exploited alternative methods including experiments 
(Baumgartner, 2008; Baumgartner & Morris, 2006), focus groups (Rottinghaus et al., 
2008), and content analyses (Fox et al., 2007; Niven et al., 2003).  Another related point 
inquires about the samples exploited in studies and the resulting scope of implications—
i.e., whether findings are generalizable to the general population, or inferences were 
confined within the American youth (e.g., Baumgartner, 2008; Baumgartner & Morris, 
2006; Hoffman & Thomson, 2009).   
The last point, most relevant for the purpose of this study, is that inconsistent 
findings may have highlighted the shortcomings of a direct effect model, suggesting that 
the influence of late-night comedy would not directly result from the reception per se, but 
instead, consequences are more or less indirect via some intervening mechanisms.  As 
some scholars (Holbert, 2005a; J. M. McLeod, Scheufele, & Moy, 1999) rightly argued, 
failure to examine appropriate indirect relationships could lead us to underestimate the 
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influence of an information outlet.  Moreover, Hayes and his colleagues (2009; Hayes, 
Preacher, & Myers, 2011) presented statistical evidence of indirect relationships even in 
the absence of a detectable direct association.  Accordingly, these authors warned that 
the failure to investigate indirect effects due to the absence of direct influence could 
result in the omission of important mediating mechanisms by which the reception of 
information produces outcomes.   
For communication scholars, it becomes particularly important to unravel the 
mechanisms whereby media might produce attitudinal, informational, and behavioral 
consequences, and how those effects occur.  J. M. McLeod and Reeves (1980), among 
others, have called for more research aimed at uncovering the mechanisms of media 
effects.  That is, how or by what means do media effects occur?  The inability of direct 
effects models to account for the lack of a strong relationship between exposure and 
response led mass communication scholars to reconsider their basic approach.  Instead 
of looking for direct effects between exposure and response, mass communication 
researchers, inspired by information processing research, started to explore indirect 
effects models.  Indirect effects models assume that relationships between variables are 
often mediated by other variables.  Numerous studies of media effects have followed 
this line of research.  For instance, in the case of learning from the media, studies have 
shown that exposure and recall are mediated by a consumer’s cognitive processes 
involving attention, depth of processing, or informational utility (Eveland, 2001; Jensen, 
2011).  In addition, mounting evidence has documented the indirect effects of some 
media messages on political and civic engagement via the conduit of interpersonal 
discussion (e.g., Cho et al., 2009; Shah, Cho, Eveland, & Kwak, 2005; Shah et al., 2007; 
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Sotirovic & McLeod, 2001).    
This study adopts the indirect effects approach and contests the simplistic 
position arguing either that late-night comedy programs are the culprits reducing 
participation or instead that these shows are the important catalysts enriching engagement 
in political discourse.  Most previous studies reviewed earlier have assessed the direct 
impact of late-night comedy viewing on political participation, relying solely on the 
reception as the psychological mechanism underlying the effects (cf. Hoffman & 
Thomson, 2009).  While this approach is useful for identifying the overall contribution 
that consuming late-night humor makes to citizen participation, it leaves unexamined the 
communication processes through which political comedy operates within the complex 
communication environment.  Indeed, late-night comedy exposure is not an isolated 
experience.  Rather, it is closely associated with how citizens use news media and 
discuss politics.  Thus, previous theories of late-night comedy effects do not fully 
account for the process through which political comedy is related to participation.  As a 
consequence, work in this area remains hampered by an overreliance on direct effect 
models, when media influence is often contextually dependent and largely mediated 
through diverse cognitive, attitudinal, and affective factors as well as other 
communicative activities including interpersonal conversation and news consumption.  
Hence, this study purports to explore more complex communication processes whereby 
late-night comedy viewing could produce significant effects on citizens’ engagement in 
political life by testing some feasible indirect effects models.   
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Chapter 3  
Affective Mediation Model 
This chapter introduces a novel affective mediation model from the pivotal 
Orientation-Stimulus-Orientation-Response (O-S-O-R) framework (Markus & Zajonc, 
1985; J. M. McLeod et al., 1994) in order to more fully theorize and assess the effects of 
late-night comedy in a participatory democracy.  Beyond the long-established mediating 
role of cognitive factors in traditional media research, emotion is advanced as a viable 
second O situated between the reception of more amusing and provocative messages and 
the resulting political outcomes.  While combining the results from an online 
experiment and a mail survey, this chapter tests the proposition that late-night comedy 
viewing could promote citizens’ engagement in political life indirectly by eliciting their 
emotional responses. 
 
The O-S-O-R Model and Mediators between Media Use and Political Participation 
The introduction of the O-S-O-R model complements the shortcomings 
entrenched in the simple stimulus-response (S-R) perspectives of direct and monolithic 
media effects (Cho et al., 2009).  The model was originally proposed by psychologists 
(Markus & Zajonc, 1985) and was later reinterpreted in political communication as a 
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remedy to overly simplified direct effect models.  The first O refers to an individual’s 
preexisting characteristics that could alter the effect of the stimuli, and the second O 
represents intervening orientations—i.e., “what is likely to happen between the reception 
of message and the response of the audience member” (J. M. McLeod et al., 1994, pp. 
146-147).  Specifically, the second O signifies an array of mediating orientations, 
explaining how audiences respond to or process the received information (Scheufele, 
Nisbet, Brossard, & Nisbet, 2004).   
In accounting for media messages’ effects on political participation, many 
envisioned socioeconomic status (mainly education) as the most critical first O 
determining the level of engagement, given its influence on news media use, efficacy, 
and political knowledge (Cohen, Vigoda, & Samorly, 2001; J. M. McLeod et al., 1996; 
Verba, Schlozman, & Brady, 1995; Wolfinger & Rosenstone, 1980).  Aside from 
socioeconomic status, research has found that gender and age are significantly associated 
with political participation (Jung, Kim, & Gil de Zúñiga, 2011).   
On the other hand, the conventional O-S-O-R approach has considered numerous 
cognitive and attitudinal factors that could serve as the second O supplying citizens with 
incentives for mobilization.  In fact, the tradition has rather strictly confined the role of 
the second O to some cognitive and attitudinal outcomes of news media use that could 
spur political participation (D. M. McLeod, Kosicki, & McLeod, 2002).  For instance, J. 
M. McLeod, Scheufele, and Moy (1999) argued that media use exert influence on 
political participation indirectly by increasing levels of knowledge and efficacy.  
Echoing this view, Scheufele et al. (2004) maintained that the second O predicting 
political participation includes factors such as knowledge, efficacy, and trust.  J. M. 
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McLeod, Scheufele, and Moy (1999) suggested political interest as a primary driver, the 
first O triggering the reception of stimuli, but it could also be viewed as a significant 
second O—i.e., a direct consequence of the reception that could subsequently stimulate 
behavioral response.  In support of this proposition, Boulianne (2011) demonstrated 
based on panel data that political interest was not only an antecedent to media use but 
also an immediate consequence.  Further analyses endorsed the mediating effect of 
political interest between news exposure and participatory behavior (see also, David, 
2009; Shah et al., 2005; Shah & Scheufele, 2006; Xenos & Moy, 2007).  
Indeed, considerable empirical findings have accumulated to substantiate the 
mediating role of cognitive and attitudinal factors.  First, scores of scholars have 
assessed the relationships of media use with efficacy (Delli Carpini, 2004; Kenski & 
Stroud, 2006), knowledge (Chaffee, Zhao, & Leshner, 1994; Hoffman & Thomson, 2009; 
Kenski & Stroud, 2006; Scheufele & Nisbet, 2002), and interest (Guo & Moy, 1998; 
Livingstone & Markham, 2008).  Second, political scientists demonstrated that these 
cognitive components are among the most fundamental predictors of political 
participation.  Most notably, Rosenstone and Hansen (1993) considered various 
resources and skills such as interest in political interest, efficacy, and information that 
could predispose citizens to engage in politics.  Numerous studies have concluded 
political interest is a mobilizing force (Fife-Schaw & Breakwell, 1990; Jeffres, Atkin, & 
Neuendorf, 2002), efficacy (Abramson & Aldrich, 1982; Livingstone & Markham, 2008; 
Pomper & Sernekos, 1991), and knowledge (Conway, Wyckoff, Feldbaum, & Ahern, 
1981; Delli Carpini & Keeter, 1996; J. M. McLeod et al., 1996; Ragsdale & Rusk, 1995; 
Verba et al., 1995).  Finally, evidence supported the mediation of cognitive and 
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attitudinal factors between the reception of information and political outcomes 
(Boulianne, 2011; Finkel & Geer, 1998; Geer, 2006; Jung et al., 2011; J. M. McLeod, 
Scheufele, & Moy, 1999; Scheufele, Nisbet, & Brossard, 2003).  The consumption of 
traditional news can impact political participation indirectly by increasing political 
knowledge (Cho & McLeod, 2007; de Vreese & Boomgaarden, 2006; Eveland & 
Scheufele, 2000; Scheufele & Nisbet, 2002; Scheufele et al., 2004; Sotirovic & McLeod, 
2001).  Political knowledge is an essential antecedent of participation in that political 
information increases the likelihood that individuals vote, because it could provide cues 
regarding where, how, and for whom they vote for (Verba et al., 1995) or it may highlight 
differences between candidates, thereby stimulating campaign interests (Palfrey & Poole, 
1987).  In addition, knowing basic facts about politics helps individuals at least to orient 
themselves in the political world, to connect issues with offices and public officials with 
issues (Popkin, 1994), and further to formulate their political preferences (Zaller, 1992). 
Nevertheless, it seems much less likely that we will observe equivalent effects of 
political humor via cognitive and attitudinal variables.  The effects of late-night comedy 
watching on cognitive and attitudinal factors are inconsistent, as reviewed in the previous 
chapter.  Furthermore, one study (Hoffman & Thomson, 2009) investigating the indirect 
effects of late-night comedy yielded puzzling results concerning the cognitive and 
attitudinal mediation of exposure on participation.  While the relationship between 
humor viewing and civic participation among adolescents was mediated by internal 
efficacy, the hypothesized indirect effect via cynicism was insignificant.  Their study is 
an important scholarly endeavor to examine mechanisms that intervene between late-
night comedy watching and participatory behavior.  However, the mediating routes they 
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assessed did not seem to fully account for the communication environment wherein the 
indirect effects of late-night comedy occur.  Notwithstanding their results, there is a 
good theoretical as well as instrumental reason to believe that cynicism matters in this 
causal structure.  Instrumentally, the lack of mediation by cynicism may reflect its high 
colinearity with efficacy (i.e., the more efficacious, the less cynical, and vice versa) in 
their multiple mediator model.  Theoretically, it is not difficult to imagine that exposure 
to late-night comedy fosters cynicism (Baumgartner & Morris, 2006; Guggenheim et al., 
2011), which in turn dampens citizens’ willingness to participate (Cappella & Jamieson, 
1997; Crotty & Jacobson, 1980; Dennis & Webster, 1975).  If so, the indirect effects via 
internal efficacy and cynicism may tend to cancel each other out.  Consequently, with 
the previous mediating framework, we are less likely to disentangle the unique 
contribution of late-night comedy in a participatory democracy. 
Limitations of cognitive accounts in assessing the indirect effects of late-night 
comedy on political participation warrant a search for a hitherto unexamined 
intermediary mechanism.  Accordingly, this chapter advances a variant of an O-S-O-R 
model for theorizing and investigating how or by what mechanisms (J. M. McLeod & 
Reeves, 1980) late-night comedy influences political participation.  In this model, an 
individual’s emotional state is introduced as a vital mediator between the reception of 
political humor and behavioral outcomes (i.e., the second O).  To submit this indirect 
effect model, the following section will explore the role and structure of emotions, 
followed by the discussion on the motivational role of emotions based on the affective 
intelligence theory (Marcus et al., 2000).  Then, in the ensuing section, accounts will be 
given as to why exposure to late-night comedy is believed to hold a tie to a viewer’s 
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emotional experiences.  
 
Conceptualizing the Role and Structure of Emotions 
In their seminal piece, Verba et al. (1995) developed an explanatory model of 
political participation that hinges on three factors.  That is,  
“They can’t” suggests a paucity of necessary resources—time to take part, 
money to contribute to campaign and other political causes, and skills to 
use time and money effectively. “They don’t want to” focuses attention on 
the absence of political engagement—little interest in politics or little 
concern with public issues, a belief that activity can make little or no 
difference, little or no knowledge about the political process, or other 
priorities. “Nobody asked” implies isolation from the networks of 
recruitment through which citizens are mobilized to politics. (p. 16, italics 
in the original)  
They called each of three factors resources, motivation, and recruitment, 
respectively.  The resource factor stresses the importance of assets like money, time, 
and civic skills that individuals possess.  The motivational factor encompasses more 
comprehensive factors such as individual’s interest, political socialization, fulfillment of 
righteous obligation, and interpersonal network.  The authors believe that network 
recruitment is instrumental in shaping and cultivating the skills and resources for civic 
participation.  Though not directly addressed in the original work, Brader and Corrigan 
(2006) suggested that emotions are chiefly motivational forces promoting individual’s 
attention, thought, and action (Lazarus, 1991; Zajonc, 1998).  Supporting this view, 
Collins (1990) proposed that the more intense short-term or dramatic emotions, such as 
fear, anger, and joy are tantamount to spikes superimposed on a tonic or baseline level of 
emotional energy that is characteristic for the person.  Furthermore, historical insights 
suggest that political revolts or social movements in the street or institutions have been 
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triggered by a citizen’s anger about the political or economic system and high hope for a 
better life.  In short, emotions can supply energy with which to undertake actions, and 
empirical evidence generally supports the role of emotions in motivating political 
behavior (e.g., Brader, 2006; Marcus et al., 2000; Valentino, Brader, Groenendyk, 
Gregorowicz, & Hutchings, 2011). 
However, scholars disagree on the structure of emotions. Neuman, Marcus, 
Crigler, and MacKuen (2007a) identified three most commonly employed models of the 
affect system: (a) a bipolar-unidemensional model, which arrays emotional states along a 
single bipolar dimension of positivity and negativity; (b) a circumplex-multidimensional 
model, which extends the valence models into multidimensional spaces; and (c) a discrete 
model—sometimes a simple list with little structure, sometimes a complicated structured 
model of emotional responses, according to the appraisals of diverse conditions. 
 
Bipolar-Unidimensional Model 
The bipolar model, a traditional simple structure model, holds that emotion is, in 
most circumstances, unidimensional and bipolar.  One of the underlying premises 
suggests that positive and negative emotions are mutually exclusive—i.e., as an 
individual’s negative emotion increases, positive emotion decreases.  Accordingly, 
when a person has a happy feeling about a situation and/or an object, he or she cannot 
have an unhappy feeling about it at the same time.  Various types of emotions can be 
projected onto a one-dimension vector, with positive (or pleasant) emotion at one end, 
negative (or unpleasant) emotion at the other end, and neutral emotion in the middle.  
Tradition and common sense have assumed bipolarity in emotions.  For example, 
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researchers who incorporate emotion as a predictor or dependent variable in their 
research often measure affective feelings in terms of bipolar dimension—e.g., pairs such 
as pleasure and pain, happy and sad, tension and relaxation, depression and elation, or 
positive and negative in general (Cacioppo & Berntson, 1994).  Feeling thermometers 
are the most well published application of the bipolarity model of emotion, which assess 
feelings elicited by candidates and by groups, parties, organizations, and economic 
classes (Marcus, 1988). 
 
Circumplex-Multidimensional Model 
A multitude of observers now see that the structure of emotions could be 
parsimoniously summarized by two orthogonal “positive” and “negative” affective 
dimensions (Abelson, Kinder, Peters, & Fiske, 1982; Marcus et al., 2000; Rudolph, 
Gangl, & Stevens, 2000; Russell, 1980).  In the earlier version of the two dimension 
model, the space was described by a bipolar “valence (i.e., pleasant-unpleasant)” 
dimension that is orthogonal to a bipolar “arousal (i.e., activation-deactivation)” 
dimension (Russell, 1980).  Later, Watson and colleagues (1988; 1999) turned these two 
dimensional valence-arousal axes forty-five degrees to form two orthogonal “positive” 
and “negative” emotion dimensions, each of which now runs from low to high arousal.  
According to this multidimensional scheme, positive and negative emotions can occur 
independently of each other, with enthusiasm and anxiety falling at the high arousal 
endpoints of the “positive” and “negative” emotion dimensions, respectively (Marcus et 
al., 2000).   
While relying on evidence in neuroscience, Gray (1987, 1990) suggests that the 
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positive (approach) and negative (avoidance) response of organisms might have distinct 
roots in physiological systems reflecting different foci in the brain.  The independence 
of the positive and negative emotions tended to show the operation of two broad, 
evolutionary adaptive motivational systems that mediate the goal-directed approach and 
withdrawal behaviors.  The withdrawal system was called the behavioral inhibition 
system, while the approach system was dubbed the behavioral activation system (Carver, 
2004).  The former referred to a “stop, look, and listen system” redirecting attention 
toward the environmental stimuli, especially novel and unfamiliar circumstances that 
could potentially signal danger.  The behavioral inhibition system also promotes a 
vigilant scanning of the environment for potential threats and motivates the organism to 
move cautiously until safety is assured.  In contrast, the behavioral activation system 
provides active feedback on our ongoing behavior and directs organisms toward 
situations and experiences that could yield pleasure and reward.  Adopting these two 
emotion systems, Marcus et al. (2000) proposed the surveillance system serving as a 
warning against unusual and/or threatening circumstances, and the disposition system, 
which functions to manage learned behavior, and preexisting habits and predispositions. 
 
Discrete Model 
The discrete model decries the simplicity and parsimony embedded in the two 
dimensional models summarized above, and assumes that specific emotions (e.g., fear, 
anger, hope, and pride) hold distinguishing characteristics and roles.  Furthermore, the 
model highlights a risk that when discrete emotions fall on certain regions of circumplex 
or on a bipolar continuum, qualitatively different demotions can appear as if the same. 
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For instance, fear, anger, and disappointment may share identical moods and fall in 
identical places in the circumplex or bipolar structure, yet emerge from different 
situations and have different behavioral consequences.  As Lazarus (1991) noted, 
emotions in the same dimension are the products of different generating conditions, and 
further, they are experienced differently under different conditions.  Echoing this 
concern, Kinder (1994) maintained that an aggregation of emotional responses 
“obliterated the more nuanced and revealing results produced by taking up the emotions 
one by one” (p. 296). 
Many supporters of the discrete emotion model share the cognitive appraisal 
theory that stresses the preceding role of cognition in yielding distinct emotions (Abelson 
et al., 1982; Kinder, 1994; Lazarus, 1991; Mutz, 1998; Roseman, 1984; Roseman, 
Abelson, & Ewing, 1986).  Lazarus (1991) defined appraisal as “a continuing evaluation 
of the significance of what is happening for one’s personal well-being” (p. 144) and 
assumes that the appraisal of a situation—e.g., whether it is goal satisfying or 
frustrating—determines a specific emotion produced.  For instance, the loss of 
something valuable leads to sadness, while the introduction of injustice, injury, or 
obstacle may engender anger (Brader, 2006).  Similarly, Roseman (1984) argued that “it 
is interpretation of events rather than the events per se that determine which emotions 
will be felt” (p. 14, italics in the original).  Thus, the appraisal theory of discrete emotion 
focuses on cognitive antecedents of emotions.  One of the premises of the theory is that 
different emotions arise from distinct social situations. 
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Affective Intelligence and Political Participation 
Among those models conceptualizing the structure of emotions, the present study 
mainly relies on the two factor (negative and positive) model, although subtle distinctions 
across various discrete emotions are recognized as the cognitive appraisal theory suggests.  
The reason for this approach is twofold.  First, the primary goal of the current research 
revolves around whether emotions mediate between late-night comedy consumption and 
participation above and beyond cognitive and attitudinal accounts, and therefore, 
discussing every nuance of each emotion type is beyond the scope of this study.  Second, 
many students of political psychology have demonstrated that the structure of emotions 
could be parsimoniously summarized by two affective dimensions (e.g., Marcus et al., 
2000; Rudolph et al., 2000; Russell, 1980; Watson et al., 1988; Watson et al., 1999). 
The most prevailing two factor model was proposed by the affective intelligence 
theory (Marcus et al., 2000), which articulated the processes whereby emotions promote 
citizens’ participatory behaviors.  Drawing on Gray’s (1987, 1990) work in 
neuroscience, Marcus et al. (2000) contended that both positive and negative emotions 
could boost political participation.  Positive emotions, which are likely when goals are 
fulfilled, tend to reinforce existing behaviors (the disposition system).  On the other 
hand, negative emotions experienced when individuals encounter unfamiliar, threatening 
stimuli are likely to disrupt normal patterns of behavior and prompt novel forms activities 
to address the source of a threat (the surveillance system).   
Indeed, a large body of empirical evidence has accumulated to support the theory, 
while demonstrating that both negative and positive emotions can encourage political 
participation.  Anxiety has been shown to stimulate interest in electoral politics 
(Rudolph et al., 2000), and further to promote attention to news and participatory 
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behaviors beyond voting (Marcus et al., 2000).  Evidence also illustrated that fear and 
worry can induce citizens to contact political candidates and public officials (Brader, 
2006; Brader, Valentino, & Suhay, 2004).  Building upon the constructive role of 
emotions, Martin (2004) argued that negative advertising can encourage political 
participation by triggering anxiety within the public.  In addition, literature supported 
the motivational role of positive emotions.  As reviewed earlier, Gray (1987, 1990) 
initially conceptualized that only positive emotions were linked to the behavioral 
activation system, which governs an individual’s tendency to take action.  For example, 
Marcus et al. (2000) found that enthusiasm predicted higher levels of political interest 
and participation.  Similarly, Brader (2006) observed that enthusiasm appeals elicited 
the desire to participate in the election campaign to the extent those cues satisfied 
individuals’ existing goals and predispositions.  While comparing the motivational roles 
of positive and negative emotions, the author further posited that the impact of the former 
was broader and more general, whereas the influence of the latter was more concentrated 
and confined to specific activities.  More recently, Valentino and his colleagues (2011) 
demonstrated that both negative (anger more than worry) and positive emotions 
explained substantial variance in participation above and beyond more conventional 
accounts of political mobilization including individual orientations and cognitive 
resources.   
 
Late-Night Comedy and Emotions 
Late-night comedy shows not only ridicule the arrogance, ineptitude, and foibles 
of public officials and political candidates, but they also harshly lambast, albeit 
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humorously, the artifice and fakery of parties, institutions, programs, and policies 
(Caufield, 2008; Holbert, 2005b; Jones, 2005).  Furthermore, content analyses of 
political comedy shows (Duerst, Koloen, & Peterson, 2001; Hess, 2001; Niven et al., 
2003; Young, 2004) find that most jokes are directed at the personal characteristics of 
public figures rather than the issues.  Indeed, many agree that the tone of late-night 
humor is decidedly aggressive and critical; politicians are often caricatured by their most 
obtrusive faults, and the system is typically portrayed to be incompetent (Compton & 
Pfau, 2009; Duerst et al., 2001; Hess, 2001; Jamieson & Waldman, 2003; Moy & Pfau, 
2000; Niven et al., 2003; Sarver, 2004; Young, 2004).  These biased depictions of the 
public discourse could taint the viewer’s evaluations of public officials and government 
institutions.   
Past research on the traditional media had well established that negatively 
framed political cues and character-based campaigns could result in cynicism and distrust 
among the public (Ansolabehere & Iyengar, 1995; Cappella & Jamieson, 1997; Patterson, 
1994; Valentino, Beckmann, & Buhr, 2001).  While expecting late-night comedy to 
possess a similar effect, Baumgartner and Morris (2006) argued frequent viewers of late-
night comedy tended to report more negative perceptions of political candidates as well 
as less faith in the electoral system.  The authors conclude that these programs could 
exert detrimental effects on a healthy democracy by stirring political cynicism among 
viewers.  Late-night humor runs the risk of creating an negative reaction among viewers 
while leaving them feeling detached (J. Gray, Jones, & Thompson, 2009).    
However, as reviewed earlier in the previous chapter, a multitude of research 
findings challenged the deleterious effect of late-night comedy on a citizen’s perception 
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and attitude toward public figures and the political system (Cao & Brewer, 2008; Dorman, 
2007; Feldman & Young, 2008; Rottinghaus et al., 2008; Young, 2004; Young & 
Tisinger, 2006).  For instance, Compton and Pfau (2009) show that not only candidate 
appearances on late-night talk shows but satirical jokes about candidates could also 
enhance perceptions of their competence and character, and viewing the programs can 
lead citizens to feel closer to them because those who are ridiculed look more 
approachable.  In addition, coverage of issues frequently accompany the jokes targeted 
at the personal characteristics in the form of a news summary (Feldman & Young, 2008).  
In fact, the range of topics covered by late-night comedy is quite substantial, 
incorporating those policies concerning Iraq, media ownership, gay marriage, 
environment, tax, and crime (Jones, 2005).  As Brewer and Marquardt (2007) contend, 
these issue frames could strengthen citizens’ faith in their ability to make sense of the 
political world. 
The aggressive tone in late night comedy may thus lead to consequences 
conceptually distinct from cynicism and may prove beneficial for functioning democracy 
(Brewer & Marquardt, 2007; Jones, 2010; Morreale, 2009).  Rather than merely 
emphasizing the failings of the public discourse, late-night comedy utilizes satirical wit 
and humor to highlight the unmistakably visible gap “between vice and virtue, between 
good and bad, between what man is, and what he ought to be” (Young & Tisinger, 2006).  
Talk show hosts first rebuke politicians, elections, and the political process as a whole, 
yet they also encourage the viewers’ confidence that they can rectify perceived social ills 
by signaling “disappointed idealism” (Jones, 2005, p. 121).  The combination of 
criticism and idealism embedded in late-night comedy may introduce what Schutz (1977) 
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has called the “positive negativity” of political humor. 
Perhaps contrary to what critics of late-night humor maintain, political satire 
may not produce cynicism.  Cynicism toward the political system refers to a lack of 
confidence in and a feeling of distrust toward the political system (Dennis & Webster, 
1975).  Cappella and Jamieson (1997) suggest that the center of political cynicism is the 
absence of trust in political actors, to whom the primary goal is their self-interest and the 
common interest is secondary at best or is utilized only for a political advantage.  
Cynicism represents a cognitive state that is essentially closed to new information.  
Echoing this perspective, Crotty and Jacobson (1980) observe that cynical citizens have 
essentially given up on the political process, viewing it as irrelevant to their lives.   
On the other hand, studies have demonstrated that late-night comedy could 
stimulate political interest (Cao & Brewer, 2008; Dorman, 2007; Young, 2004) and 
further prompt citizens to obtain more information from hard news sources (Feldman & 
Young, 2008; Rottinghaus et al., 2008; Young & Tisinger, 2006).  If so, viewers’ 
attitude when they encounter satirical attacks in late-night humor may be something more 
like skepticism, which many consider a boon to democracy (Brewer & Marquardt, 2007).  
Indeed, skepticism is characterized by an openness to additional information, and 
skeptical citizens may seek information to confirm or disconfirm the veracity of 
previously received messages (Austin & Pinkleton, 1995; Wilkins, 2000). 
While sarcastic humor appears to create cynical attitudes toward politics among 
viewers, one could logically postulate that findings advocating the causal link between 
late-night comedy and cynicism (e.g., Baumgartner & Morris, 2006; Compton & Pfau, 
2009) may instead point to the late-night comedy’s contribution to the viewer’s critical 
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perspective toward politics, not necessarily the cynicism.  Morreale (2009) maintains 
that while cynicism seems to be a plausible response, late-night comedy well blends 
comedic wit with incisive social criticism not only to combat cynicism but to teach the 
skills of critical reasoning and assessment that are essential to participatory democracy.  
Similarly, Jones (2010) contends that satire and humorous criticism inherent in late-night 
comedy would rather invite a firm insistence that politics and public affairs indeed matter 
and both deserve our primary concern.  In short, late-night comedy with its mischievous 
but penetrating criticism is thought to produce critical, though not cynical, viewers.  
Viewed in this light, consuming incisive criticism in late-night humor may invite 
viewers’ affective responses. Bennett (2007) characterized soft news, including late-night 
comedy, as being more immediate and emotional.  Along this line, Jones (2010) 
contended that late-night comedy provides programming that fulfills numerous emotional 
needs, feelings, and desires in citizen-viewers, including pride, anger, retribution, 
superiority, joy, celebration, playfulness, and belonging.  Jon Stewart, arguably the most 
well-known host in the genre, represents an individual who is angry about the 
contradiction between official pronouncements and his common sense (Douglas, 2003).  
As Cao and Brewer (2008) aptly pointed out, caricatures and innuendos embedded in 
late-night humor may elicit anxiety about politics, which could serve as a consequential 
impetus for greater mobilization.  After all, sarcasm contained in late-night comedy is 
well positioned to summon up affective responses that could engage viewers with 
substantive meanings of politics on an emotional level, and it could yield “healthy” 
negative emotions.   
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Essentially, exposure to late-night comedy may trigger negative emotional 
reactions toward the current political situation and possible future outcomes.  Scholars 
concur that high levels of cynicism detract citizens from public discourse and dampen an 
individual’s motivation to participate (Cappella & Jamieson, 1997; Crotty & Jacobson, 
1980; Dennis & Webster, 1975).  In contrast, students of political psychology have 
consistently demonstrated that negative emotions such as anxiety and anger can prompt 
individuals to participate in politics (Brader, 2006; Marcus et al., 2000).  If audience 
members feel angry or worried as a result of watching, late-night comedy possesses the 
potential to stimulate political participation. 
On the other hand, the relationship between comedy viewing and positive emotion 
is less clear. On the plus side, certain attributes of political humor prompt us to believe 
that frequent viewing of late-night comedy can draw positive emotional resonances from 
audiences.  For example, these comedy shows usually present politics in an amusing 
manner that provides audiences with the pleasure of watching (Cao & Brewer, 2008).  It 
can also mean that these shows are more effective at engaging viewers and urging them 
to consider significant issues, rather than diverting and distracting from them (Baym, 
2005).  In addition, satirists are adept at translating negative emotions such as anger and 
resentment into great impulses for positive change (J. Gray et al., 2009).  The 
presentation of substantive issues in an amusing manner could create a sense of assurance 
among viewers that they could correct malfunctions of society and produce better 
political prospects, thereby promoting more positive emotional states.  
Nevertheless, the evidence discussed herein clearly demonstrates that the tone of 
satirical humor is predominantly negative.  Furthermore, the norm of negativity bias 
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suggests that negative information as compared to its positive counterpart tends to be 
more salient and influential (Johnson-Cartee & Copland, 1991; Rozin & Royzman, 2001) 
and commands more attentive and thoughtful processing (Baumeister, Bratslavsky, 
Finkenauer, & Vohs, 2001).  After reviewing extensive literature, Taylor (1991) 
concluded that negative stimuli that are potentially threatening and harmful evoke greater 
emotional reactions than positive events.  Moreover, it has been shown that even a well-
balanced combination of negative and positive information yields the biased appraisal 
leaning toward a more negative perception (Cacioppo, Gardner, & Berntson, 1997; 
Kahneman & Tversky, 1979; Rozin & Royzman, 2001).  It can be inferred from this 
premise that, although late-night comedy features negative as well as positive information, 
viewers are more likely to assimilate negative components rather excessively, giving 
greater weight to appreciably negative criticisms embedded in satirical humor.  In fact, 
research in political communication consistently supports the asymmetrical influence of 
negative information on an individual’s attitude and behavior (Campbell, Converse, 
Miller, & Stokes, 1960; de Vreese, Boomgaarden, & Semetko, 2011; Holbrook, Krosnick, 
Visser, Gardner, & Cacioppo, 2001; Lau, 1985; Soroka, 2006).  Furthermore, previous 
studies indicated that political media content is more likely to elicit negative emotions 
than positive responses (Chang, 2001; Cho et al., 2003).  All in all, the negative tone of 
humor whose impact might be accelerated by negativity bias renders it difficult to make 
an explicit prediction about the role of late-night comedy, despite some encouraging 
components, in evoking positive emotion. 
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Conditional Indirect Effects of Late-Night Comedy 
Discussion thus far has focused on the S (late-night comedy viewing) - O 
(emotion) - R (political participation) causal chain, while leaving out the first O.  
According to J. M. McLeod et al. (1994), the first O denotes “the set of structural, 
cultural, cognitive, and motivational characteristics the audience brings to the reception 
situation that affect the impact of the message” (p. 146).  Thus, the first O includes 
individual factors such as political sophistication and partisanship that could, in due 
course, moderate the influence of the stimulus.  In the context of the current research, a 
handful of studies noted that the effects of satirical humor may hinge upon political 
sophistication.  However, findings have been inconsistent, with some arguing that the 
constructive role of political entertainment is more pronounced among sophisticates 
(Moy, Xenos, & Hess, 2005a; Young, 2008), while others speak to the stronger influence 
among those who are less savvy (Baum, 2003a; Landreville, Holbert, & LaMarre, 2008).  
Furthermore, little is known about how this conditional relationship occurs. 
Recent findings in political psychology indicating that the mobilizing influence of 
negative emotion is contingent upon political sophistication (Brader, 2006; Rudolph et al., 
2000; Valentino et al., 2011; Valentino, Gregorowicz, & Groenendyk, 2007) may help us 
identify the mechanism by which individual expertise moderates the effect of consuming 
late-night humor.  Briefly, these studies found the mobilizing role of negative emotion is 
unevenly concentrated among those who are high in their civic skills and resources.  
When this possible interaction between negative emotion and expertise in accounting for 
political engagement is combined with insights about the direct linkage between late-
night comedy watching and negative emotion, we can posit a conditional indirect (or 
moderated mediation) relationship.  That is, the indirect effect of late-night comedy 
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viewing on political participation via the conduit of negative emotion is conditional upon 
political expertise such that the benefits of consuming satirical humor through angry and 
worried responses are more pronounced among those who are highly sophisticated. 
 
Disentangling Distinct Negative Emotional Responses 
As reviewed earlier, the discrete emotion model proposes that specificity of 
emotions accounts for distinguishable characteristics and roles.  In particular, 
proponents of the cognitive appraisal theory (e.g., Lerner & Keltner, 2001; Smith & 
Ellsworth, 1985; Smith & Kirby, 2001; Tiedens & Linton., 2001) have been arguing that 
anger and anxiety (or worry), though not mutually exclusive but closely intertwined, 
differ in their origins and consequences.  Hence, research on emotion differentiates 
between two forms of negative emotions, suggesting that anger and fear represent 
discrete affective states stemming from dissimilar appraisals of certainty about and 
control over an external threat (Huddy, Feldman, & Cassese, 2007; Lerner & Keltner, 
2001; MacKuen, Wolak, Keele, & Marcus, 2010; Smith & Ellsworth, 1985).   
From this perspective, anger occurs when individuals are certain about the cause 
of a threat. It provides the perceived control over a jeopardizing event.  On the other 
hand, anxious and worried responses are more likely when the source of a threatening 
situation seem unfamiliar and uncontrollable.  It may logically follow that anger and 
anxiety entertain multifaceted behavioral ramifications, with the former producing an 
aggressive threat-coping approach behavior and the latter leading to a passive risk-
avoiding behavior (Carver, 2004; Lerner, Gonzalez, Small, & Fischhoff, 2003; Mackie & 
Smith, 2003; Weiner, 2006).  While bolstering this line of reasoning, a handful of 
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studies demonstrated that anger rather than anxiety is more likely to promote vigorous 
engagement in political activities (Huddy et al., 2007; Valentino et al., 2011; Weber, 
2007).  For instance, Valentino et al. (2011) observed that anger is more powerful than 
fear in mobilizing participation and that the latter motivates “easier” and more immediate 
modes of mobilization, whereas the former boosts “harder” and more costly participatory 
activities.  Similarly, Weber (2007) has validated with both the experimental and survey 
results that negative emotions do not produce uniform effects on political participation.  
He demonstrated that anger provokes an individual’s campaign interest, consequently 
attaching a greater importance to the act of voting relative to other negative emotions. 
Further extending the discrete approach to emotion, Dunlop, Wakefield, and 
Kashima (2008) suggested that identical emotions could produce diverse consequences 
depending on the referent of emotions—i.e., who or what the emotion is about or refers to.  
For instance, an emotional reaction arising from the relevance to one’s self (e.g., “I am 
angry about the way economy affects me”) is very different from an affective response 
that is directed to a message-implied issue (e.g., “I am angry about the current state of 
economy”).  Dunlop et al. (2008) proposed three classes of emotions that are 
conceptually distinguished by the referent, message-referent (emotional response to the 
message itself), plot-referent (response to the target implied by the plot), and self-referent 
(response to the self), and maintained that self-referent emotion could trigger an 
individual’s behavior most directly and effectively by increasing perceived personal risk.  
In support of this proposition, Houser-Marko and Sheldon (2006) showed that the “self-
as-doer” construct in a message augmented its influence on an individual’s behavior. 
However, not all types of self-referent emotions seem to motivate action to the 
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same degree.  In fact, some evidence suggests that negative emotions may yield more 
passive responses unless the assurance of efficacy accompanies the appeals (Rogers, 
1975; Witte & Allen, 2000).  Meanwhile, fear and worry tend to be associated with 
lower degrees of efficacy due to the lack of confidence in individual control and certainty 
over an external threat (Gamson, 1968; Valentino et al., 2007; Weber, 2007).  In this 
case, self-referencing may not enhance the motivational role of fear and worry; instead, it 
may augment the avoiding tendency already inherent in these emotions.  Perhaps, when 
self-referencing triggered by fear or worry raises the perception of risk in the absence of 
efficacy, individuals may find a distasteful situation more burdensome and subsequently 
seek to avoid it (see also, Heatherton & Baumeister, 1991; Heatherton, Striepe, & 
Wittenberg, 1998; Sherman & Cohen, 2002).  Thus, although it can be argued that self-
referent anger could boost political participation more than plot-referent or message-
referent emotions, it is less clear that self-referencing of fear or worry could play an 
equivalent role in extending the mobilizing effects of these negative emotions.  In short, 
the present study acknowledges the differences embedded in discrete emotions the effects 
of which may also hinge upon diverse referents of emotions. 
 
Hypotheses and Research Questions 
Late-night comedy is marked by a coupling of attack and judgment with play and 
laughter (Jones, 2010).  A dark picture of current public affairs is well balanced with the 
optimism that ordinary citizens could fix broken pieces of society.  Thus, 
notwithstanding the paucity of empirical evidence, late-night comedy appears to be able 
to provoke negative emotions (e.g., anger, worry) given the widespread criticism in 
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political satire.  On the other hand, the presentation of substantive issues in an amusing 
and accessible fashion may elicit positive emotions (e.g., enthusiasm, hope).  However, 
overwhelmingly negative tone of humor and the principle of negativity bias (Baumeister 
et al., 2001; Rozin & Royzman, 2001; Taylor, 1991) raise doubts about the role of late-
night comedy in evoking positive emotions.  In fact, evidence in political 
communication (e.g., Lau, 1985) also supports the asymmetrical influence of negative 
information.  Furthermore, previous studies indicated that political media content tends 
to elicit negative emotions more strongly than positive responses (Chang, 2001; Cho et 
al., 2003).  Thus, the following hypothesis and research question are proposed. 
Hypothesis 3.1 (H3.1): Late-night comedy viewing will be positively associated 
with negative emotions. 
Research Question 3.1 (RQ3.1): Does late-night comedy viewing predict positive 
emotions? 
Affective intelligence theory has underscored the effects of two significant 
emotional dimensions in spurring citizens’ participatory behaviors (Marcus et al., 2000).  
Indeed, a good deal of scholarly evidence indicates that both negative and positive 
emotions could encourage political mobilization (Brader, 2006; Brader & Corrigan, 2006; 
Brader et al., 2004; Rudolph et al., 2000; Valentino et al., 2011). 
Hypothesis 3.2a (H3.2a): Negative emotions will predict a higher level of 
political participation.   
Hypothesis 3.2b (H3.2b): Positive emotions will predict a higher level of 
political participation. 
A synthesis of literature from the O-S-O-R approach to examine indirect 
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influence of media use (Markus & Zajonc, 1985; J. M. McLeod et al., 1994; J. M. 
McLeod, Scheufele, & Moy, 1999), research on the contents of political humor, and 
political psychology enables us to propose an affective mediation model which inquires 
about the mediating role of emotion (the second O) between the viewers’ consumption of 
the late-night comedy programs (S) and their participatory behaviors (R).  Implied in 
this model is that late-night comedy programs may fall short of providing citizens with 
cognitive skills and resources facilitating their political participation, as critics argue.  
However, late-night comedy could draw ample emotional experiences among frequent 
viewers, which could in turn spur their greater engagement in various political activities.  
Specifically, it is arguable that late-night comedy could draw negative emotions among 
frequent viewers, which could in turn spur their greater engagement in various political 
activities.  Meanwhile, the mediating effects of positive emotions remain less clear, 
primarily due to the lack of our confidence in the link between late-night comedy viewing 
and positive emotions. 
Hypothesis 3.3 (H3.3): Negative emotions will positively mediate the effect of 
late-night comedy exposure on political participation. 
Research Question 3.2 (RQ3.2): Do positive emotions mediate the effect of late-
night comedy exposure on political participation? 
As J. M. McLeod et al. (1994) noted, a range of individual differences can 
moderate the influence of the stimulus (i.e., first O).  Hence, not all audience members 
are equally likely to benefit from the indirect causal chain of late-night comedy.  
Particularly, given the well-substantiated interplay between negative emotions and 
expertise in explaining political participation (Brader, 2006; Rudolph et al., 2000; 
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Valentino et al., 2011; Valentino et al., 2007), political sophistication can be viewed as a 
first O the audience bring to the reception of satirical humor that could enhance the 
constructive influence of late-night comedy viewing.  It would mean that political satire 
is more effective for more sophisticated respondents since they are much more likely to 
quickly understand Stewart’s or Colbert’s inside jokes and backhanded jabs at candidates.  
Specifically, it is hypothesized that the indirect effect of late-night comedy viewing 
through negative emotion is conditional upon the audience member’s level of education.3 
Hypothesis 3.4 (H3.4): The indirect effect of late-night comedy viewing on 
political participation through negative emotions will be conditional upon education such 
that the effect is stronger for those who are highly educated. 
The cognitive appraisal approach identifies distinct causes and effects of anger 
and worry and suggests that the former is more motivational compared to the latter 
because of the improved sense of certainty and control over a threatening situation 
(Huddy et al., 2007; Lerner & Keltner, 2001; MacKuen et al., 2010; Smith & Ellsworth, 
1985).  Synthesizing the implications from research on the referencing of emotions 
(Dunlop et al., 2008), it seems reasonable to expect that self-referent anger can produce 
the greatest mobilizing influence, whereas self-referencing of worry may even decrease 
political behavior.  However, empirical evidence supporting this claim is sparse.  In 
addition, little research has investigated the specific type of negative emotion (e.g., anger 
or worry) and the particular referent of emotion (e.g., self, message, or plot) that late-
                                                 
3 Of course, others propose alternative operationalization of political sophistication such as ideology, 
interest, and knowledge (for review, see Krosnick, 1990).  Yet reasons for employing education as a 
measure of sophistication are twofold.  First, J. M. McLeod et al. (1994) emphasized the role of education 
as a first O augmenting the message influence in their original O-S-O-R framework.  Second, education 
affords more advanced cognitive capacity (Rosenberg, 1988), which is key to processing and understanding 
political humor (Young, 2008).   
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night comedy viewing delivers to audiences.  Accordingly, the following research 
questions are posed to assess the mediating effects of discrete negative emotions between 
the stimulus and the response. 
Research Question 3.3a (RQ3.3a): Which discrete negative emotion more likely 
follows the consumption of late-night humor? 
Research Question 3.3b (RQ3.3b): Which discrete negative emotion has a greater 
mobilizing potential? 
Research Question 3.3c (RQ3.3c): Which discrete negative emotion mediates 
more strongly the relation between exposure to late-night comedy and political 
participation? 
 
Methods 
The design of this study is twofold: an experiment and a survey.  First, 
manipulating the exposure to late-night comedy in an experiment will permit us to 
examine under a controlled setting the precise causal effects of consuming humor on 
emotions and political participation.  Then, employing a secondary analysis of a national 
survey (Principal Investigator: Dr. Nojin Kwak at the University of Michigan) will assess 
whether the observed associations are generalizable to the real-world setting.  
Eventually, integrating the results from the experiment and the survey will uncover the 
causal structure of the relationships among the core variables of the affective mediation 
model embedded in our mundane life.  
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Study 1: The Online Experiment 
 
Participants 
The experimental data came from an online experiment conducted in February 
2011.  Participants were recruited from a census representative panel maintained by the 
research firm Qualtrics.  The company draws a panel using the stratified quota sampling 
method.  In exchange for participating in studies, panelists receive cash value rewards 
that are credited to their online accounts.  A total of 2,301 adult citizens aged 18 and 
older were randomly selected from their panel and were invited via email to participate in 
an online study; 861 members agreed to participate, and 768 individuals successfully 
completed the study.  This represents a cooperation rate of 33.4%.   
 
Procedure 
Those who agreed to participate were randomly assigned to one of three 
conditions: late-night comedy, television hard news, or a control.  Upon reading a brief 
description of the study and signing the informed consent form, participants were asked 
for demographic information.  They were then directed to the page showing a video clip. 
The first group (n = 256) viewed a short video clip from The Daily Show comprising 
several segments concerning the government’s bailout of big companies.  The second 
group (n = 254) was exposed to a compiled video from NBC Nightly News; this clip also 
featured selected coverage of the government’s bailout of big companies.  To maintain a 
control across the conditions, the hard news and late-night comedy clips were of equal 
length and focus; both clips lasted approximately four minutes and featured the Congress’ 
hearing of Timothy Geithner (Treasury Secretary) testifying about the bailout.  The 
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most notable difference was the tone of coverage; the late-night comedy clip was 
humorous and sarcastic as Jon Stewart, in typical form, entertained and provoked 
audiences, whereas the hard news clip remained serious in tone.  The third group (n = 
258) viewed a clip about a Disney Resort in Orlando; this served as a control, providing a 
baseline comparison for the effects of late-night comedy viewing.  Once participants 
finished viewing the video clips, they all completed the same questionnaire measuring 
their emotions, attitudes, and behavioral intentions regarding the economy. 
 
Measures 
 
Political Participation 
Participation measures in the experiment tapped the respondents’ behavioral 
intention rather than actual behavior due to the difficulty of measuring the latter in a 
controlled setting.  Specifically, respondents were asked about their intent to participate 
in three forms of political activities: attending a political meeting, rally, or speech; 
contacting a public official or a political party; and displaying a bumper sticker or yard 
sign on a political issue (see Appendix for question wording).  The Respondents 
reported the likelihood of engagement in each type of activity on a 7-point scale, ranging 
from Extremely unlikely to Extremely likely.  The responses were averaged to form an 
index of political participation (M = 3.68, SD = 1.74, α = .88). 
 
Emotional Responses 
In order to measure emotional responses, respondents were asked to express their 
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anger, worry, and excitement about the government’s bailout of big companies.  Using 
Dunlop, Wakefield, and Kashima’s (2008) suggestion that three broad classes of 
emotional responses yield distinct behavioral consequences, each type of emotion was 
differentiated further by message-, plot-, or self-referent emotions, thereby constituting a 
total of nine emotion variables.  Respondents were asked to report how strongly they 
felt the corresponding emotion on a 7-point scale, ranging from not at all to extremely.  
The present study adopts the view shared by many students of political psychology (e.g., 
Abelson et al., 1982; Marcus et al., 2000; Rudolph et al., 2000; Russell, 1980; Watson et 
al., 1988; Watson et al., 1999) that the structure of emotions could be parsimoniously 
summarized by two affective dimensions—negative and positive—each of which now 
runs from low to high arousal.  Accordingly, an index of “negative” emotion was 
created by averaging responses on the three items measuring different classes of anger 
and the three parallel measures of worry (M = 5.09, SD = 1.61, α = .96).  Responses on 
the message-, plot-, and self-referent enthusiasm items were averaged to form an index of 
“positive” emotion (M = 2.23, SD = 1.52, α = .97). 
 
Demographics 
Descriptive statistics for the demographic information are as follows: age (M = 
47.27, SD = 14.13); gender (51% female); household income (Median: $35,000-
$59,999); education (Median: ‘some college or associate degrees’); and party affiliation 
(34% Republican, 36% Democrat).  The effectiveness of the random assignment was 
assessed by comparing the three groups on these demographic variables.  One-way 
ANOVA results indicated that there were no significant between-group differences on 
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these demographic measures (all ps > .46).  Chi-square tests on age, gender, household 
income, education, and party affiliation showed no significant association between 
demographic measures and group (all ps > .36).  
 
Cognitive and Attitudinal Factors 
The experiment incorporated cognitive and attitudinal variables that could also 
mediate between late-night comedy exposure and political participation.  An index of 
internal efficacy was created by averaging responses on three items measured on a 7-
point scale (M = 3.93, SD = 1.36, α = .75).  Political interest was measured with a single 
item asking respondents to report on a 7-point scale to what extent they were interested in 
politics (M = 4.29, SD = 1.80).  The experiment did not include any knowledge 
measures.  Instead, an index for the willingness to learn was used as a proxy for political 
knowledge.  This index was created by averaging responses on three items measured on 
a 7-point scale (M = 5.01, SD = 1.23, α = .81).  Finally, an index of cynicism was 
created by averaging responses on four items measured on a 7-point scale (M = 5.31, SD 
= 1.03, α = .73). 
 
Results 
 
Manipulation Check 
To investigate if participants perceived the intended discrepancies in the tone of 
coverage, manipulation check items were included in the questionnaire asking about their 
overall impression of the video clip.  In particular, participants were asked to report on a 
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7-point scale, ranging from strongly disagree to strongly agree, the extent to which they 
agreed with the following statements: The clip was “sarcastic”, “funny”, and 
“concerning.”  A one-way ANOVA on the mean scores of the clip being “sarcastic” 
found significant between-group differences, F(2, 765) = 464.18, p < .001, η2 = .55.  
Scheffe post-hoc tests demonstrated that participants indeed perceived the late-night 
comedy clip (M = 5.60, SD = 1.45) as being significantly more sarcastic compared the 
control (M = 1.81, SD = 1.21) and hard news (M = 2.88, SD = 1.66) clips (all ps < .001).  
Likewise, a one-way ANOVA showed significant between-group differences in the 
degree to which participants perceived the clip as “funny”, F(2, 765) = 299.80, p < .001, 
η2 = .44.  Scheffe post-hoc tests indicated that participants exposed to late-night comedy 
scored a higher mean score (M = 5.13, SD = 1.71) compared to the hard news (M = 1.87, 
SD = 1.28) and control (M = 3.07, SD = 1.54) groups (all ps < .001).  On the other hand, 
participations in the hard news condition reported the highest mean score on the item 
assessing how “concerning” the clip was (M = 5.69, SD = 1.16), followed by the late-
night comedy clip (M = 5.25, SD = 1.28), and the control condition showed the lowest 
rating (M = 3.14, SD = 1.84), F(2, 765) = 216.77, p < .001, η2 = .36.  Scheffe post-hoc 
tests showed that the difference between the hard news and late-night conditions comedy 
as well as the difference between the late-night comedy and control groups were highly 
significant (all ps < .001).  Taken together, these results suggest that both late-night 
comedy viewing and hard news exposure raised concerns, but participants clearly 
perceived the discrepancies in the tone of coverage. 
 
Direct Effects of Late-Night Comedy on Emotions 
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The indices of negative emotion and positive emotions were subject to one-way 
ANOVAs to assess the results concerning H3.1 and RQ3.1.  Significant between-group 
differences in the degrees of negative emotions, F(2, 765) = 6.37, p < .01, η2 = .02, 
support H3.1, while clearly illustrating that exposure to late-night comedy provoked 
participants’ negative emotion.  Specifically, post-hoc Scheffe tests revealed that the 
late-night comedy group (M = 5.35, SD = 1.48) reported a higher level of negative 
emotions than the control group (M = 4.85, SD = 1.70), p < .001, although the 
comparison with the television news group was not significant (M = 5.08, SD = 1.59), p = 
n.s.  Meanwhile, little was observed for the link between consuming late-night humor 
and positive emotions (RQ3.1), when manipulation failed to produce significant between-
group contrasts in the level of positive emotion, F(2, 765) = 1.28, p = n.s., η2 = .00, with 
the late-night comedy group (M = 2.17, SD = 1.52) yielding little difference than the 
television news (M = 2.15, SD = 1.45) and control (M = 2.35, SD = 1.58) groups.  On 
the other hand, post-hoc Scheffe tests on the differences of the television news and 
control groups suggest that exposure to hard news did not prompt the respondents to feel 
negative about the government’s bailout of big companies nor did it alter the level of 
positive emotions (all ps = n.s.). 
 
Effects of Emotions on Participation  
The effects of emotions on political participation (H3.2a and H3.2b) were 
assessed by regressing the index of political participation on the scales of negative and 
positive emotion, controlling for the independent variable (i.e., the late-night comedy 
group dummy and the hard news group dummy).  Findings support the mobilizing role 
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played by negative emotions (H3.2a: b = .408, SE = .036, p < .001) and positive emotions 
(H3.2b: b = .298, SE = .038, p < .001). 
 
Mediating Effects of Emotions  
The current chapter asked whether emotions significantly mediate the influence 
of late-night comedy viewing on political participation.  In order to assess such 
mediating effects, Baron and Kenny (1986) suggested that the following conditions must 
hold: (a) the independent variable must significantly affect the mediator; (b) the mediator 
must significantly affect the dependent variable, controlling for the independent variable; 
(c) the independent variable must significantly affect the dependent variable; and (c') if 
all these conditions hold, then the effect of the independent variable must be significantly 
reduced when the mediator is controlled for.   
 
 
Note. Unstandardized regression coefficients are reported with standard errors in 
parentheses.  Estimates were calculated using Preacher and Hayes’ (2008) indirect SPSS 
macro.  
#p<.10; *p<.05; **p<.01; ***p<.001 
 
Figure 3.1. Mediation model of media exposure, emotions, and political participation 
(Experiment, N = 768) 
Late-Night 
Comedy 
Exposure 
Television 
News 
Exposure 
 
Negative 
Emotions 
R2 = .016 
 
 
Positive 
Emotions 
R2 = .003 
 
 
Political 
Participation 
R2 = .188 
.408*** 
(.036) 
 
.501*** 
(.140) 
 
.227 
(.141) 
 
-.197 
(.134) 
 
.298*** 
(.038) 
 
.321* 
(.140) 
 
.264# 
(.139) 
 
-.171 
(.133) 
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Preacher and Hayes’ (2008) indirect SPSS macro allows for testing of these 
mediating effects by first regressing respective mediators (negative emotions and positive 
emotions) on the independent variables (late-night comedy exposure dummy and 
television news exposure dummy) and, subsequently by regressing the dependent 
variable (political participation) on the mediators controlling for the independent 
variables.  The computed regression coefficients and corresponding standard errors are 
reported in Figure 3.1.4 
Preliminary analyses based on Baron and Kenny’s (1986) approach indicate that 
late-night comedy viewing did not yield an indirect mobilizing effect through positive 
emotions.  Confirming the direct relationships discussed above, Figure 3.1 shows that 
exposure to late-night comedy failed to produce a significant change in the index of 
positive emotions—i.e., the (a) condition above, although the latter was positively 
associated with political participation—i.e., the (b) condition above.  In contrast, 
findings advocate the significant mediation by negative emotions.  First, the significant 
effect of late-night comedy exposure on negative emotions presents support for the (a) 
condition, while confirming the ANOVA results above.  Additionally, negative 
emotions predicted greater intent to participate, thereby supporting the (b) condition.  
Moreover, as summarized in Table 3.1, the significant total effects of late-night comedy 
exposure—i.e., the (c) condition above—became insignificant after accounting for the 
                                                 
4 For a categorical independent variable with k categories, Preacher and Hayes (2008) recommend to 
construct k-1 dummy variables and then run analyses k-1 times.  With each run, make one dummy 
variable the independent variable and the other one(s) the covariate(s).  Since the independent variable of 
the present study had three categories (late-night comedy, hard news, and control), I created two dummy 
variables (late-night dummy and hard news dummy) and ran an analysis twice.  The first test (independent 
variable: late-night dummy; covariate: hard news dummy) captured the indirect effect of late-night comedy 
viewing on political participation relative to the control condition, whereas the second run (independent: 
hard-news dummy; covariate: late-night dummy) estimated the indirect effect of hard news exposure as 
compared to the same baseline. 
  58 
indirect influence via emotional responses—i.e., the (c') condition above (from .475 
to .321).   
In regard to assessing mediation, Hayes (2009) criticized Baron and Kenny’s 
(1986) causal-steps approach because it requires running several regression analyses, can 
be inconsistent, and often is not powerful enough to detect indirect effects.  For more 
rigorous testing of mediating effects, the current study employed the Sobel test (Sobel, 
1982) and the bootstrap analysis (Hayes, 2009).  As the data in Table 3.1 show, the 
Sobel test bolstered the indirect effects of late-night comedy exposure on political 
participation through viewers’ affective responses.  The Sobel test (Sobel, 1982) 
examines mediation more directly by computing the product of the direct effect from 
some independent variable to its mediator, and from that mediator to the dependent 
variable, which is then compared to the normal-theory standard error.  However, the 
distribution is often skewed, so this test is also not ideal.   
 
Table 3.1. Mediation of the association between late-night comedy exposure and political 
participation through emotions (Experiment, N = 768) 
Note. CIs are bias-corrected and -accelerated 95% confidence interval (Bootstrap N = 
5,000). 
#p < .10; *p < .05; **p < .01; ***p < .001 
 
For the statistical analysis of mediating effects, Hayes (2009) recommends the 
use of bootstrapping (i.e., nonparametric resampling of the observed dataset) and the 
 Total, Direct, and  Formal Tests of 
 Indirect Effects  Indirect Effects 
 Total Direct Indirect  Sobel z CI 
Late-night  .475*** .321* .154*  
2.265 .031 to .293 
comedy exposure (.153) (.140) (.068)  
        
Television  .298# .264# .034  .266 -.088 to .170 news exposure (.153) (.139) (.128)  
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interpretation of resulting confidence intervals beyond the Sobel test, which assumes 
normality that is often violated in the sampling distribution of indirect effects.  
Following his suggestion, the bias-corrected 95% confidence interval estimating the 
indirect influence of late-night comedy exposure on political participation via emotional 
responses was computed based on the bootstrapping of 5,000 samples.  The confidence 
interval did not include 0, further bolstering confidence in the idea that late-night comedy 
viewing can indirectly spur political participation by eliciting viewers’ emotional 
experiences. 
Meanwhile, findings based on the tests of indirect effects demonstrated that the 
relationship between traditional media use and participation was weakly mediated by 
emotions (Table 3.1).  As illustrated in Figure 3.1, this lack of indirect effects from 
television news exposure onto political participation via emotions was mainly due to the 
absence of the relationships between the independent variable and the mediators.  
Instead, television news viewing produced a considerable direct effect on participation (b 
= .264, SE = .139, p < .10), and it is not significantly different from the direct mobilizing 
influence of late-night comedy (b = .321, SE = .140, p < .05).5 
To examine respective indirect paths through negative emotions and positive 
emotions, the point estimates and corresponding confidence intervals were estimated 
separately, and the results are summarized in Table 3.2.  In regard to H3.3, the Sobel 
test and the bootstrap confidence interval clearly indicated that the influence of late-night 
comedy on political participation was significantly mediated by negative emotions.  Yet, 
                                                 
5 Contrasting the effect of late-night comedy with the hard news influence was achieved by running an 
additional analysis where the late-night dummy is the independent variable and the control dummy is the 
covariate, and findings show that the difference between late-night comedy and television news in their 
direct effects on participation (i.e., b = .321 as compared to b = .264) was not statistically significant (b 
= .057, SE = .140, p = n.s.). 
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little is shown regarding RQ3.2 for the mediating effect of positive emotions between 
late-night comedy viewing and participation.  Further, the results confirmed that the 
relationship between traditional media use and participation was weakly mediated by 
either emotion type 
Table 3.2. Specific indirect effect of media exposure on political participation through 
negative emotion and positive emotion (Experiment, N = 768) 
Note. L: late-night comedy exposure; T: television news exposure; NE: negative 
emotions; PE: positive emotions; P: political participation; CIs are bias-corrected and -
accelerated 95% confidence intervals (Bootstrap N = 5,000).  
#p < .10; *p < .05; **p < .01; ***p < .001 
 
Accounting for Rival Explanations: Cognitive and Attitudinal Factors.   
As noted earlier, most conventional indirect effect models advance cognitive and 
attitudinal factors as mediators (second O) between the stimuli (S) and some behavioral 
responses (R).  In order to account for possible cognitive mechanisms, an additional 
model incorporated cognitive and attitudinal variables such as internal efficacy, political 
interest, and willingness to learn (as a proxy for political knowledge) whose mediating 
roles have been frequently examined (J. M. McLeod, Scheufele, & Moy, 1999; Scheufele 
et al., 2004).  This model also examined the mediating influence of cynicism between 
exposure to late-night comedy and participation, as suggested by some scholars 
(Baumgartner & Morris, 2006; Hoffman & Thomson, 2009).  Findings based on the 
bootstrapping of 5,000 samples show that the indirect effects via negative emotions 
Specific Indirect Effect Point Estimate Boot SE Sobel z CI 
L → NE → P   .205*** .061 3.361  .089 to .329 
L → PE → P   -.051 .041 -.444  -.133 to .030 
T → NE → P   .092# .060 1.533  -.024 to .215 
T → PE → P   -.059# .041 -1.439  -.141 to .019 
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survived the possible mediating effects of cognitive and attitudinal factors (b = .150, Boot 
SE = .046, CI = .066 to .248).  In fact, none of these measures yielded a comparable 
mediating effect (internal efficacy: b = -.001, Boot SE = .044, CI = -.085 to .087; political 
interest: b = .024, Boot SE = .037, CI = -.045 to .103; willingness to learn: b = .015, Boot 
SE = .020, CI = -.022 to .060, and cynicism: b = -.002, Boot SE = .007, CI = -.030 
to .006).  Hence, the results clearly indicate that negative emotions mediated the effects 
of exposure to late-night comedy on political participation above and beyond 
conventional cognitive accounts.   
 
Conditional Indirect Effect 
The current section investigates the conditional indirect effect proposed by H3.4.  
Estimates were calculated using the Mplus code corresponding to Model 3 of the 
moderated mediation analysis technique recommended by Preacher, Rucker, and Hayes 
(2007).  Technically, this assessment comprises two regression models.  The mediator 
model predicts negative emotions (the mediator of interest) from late-night comedy 
exposure (the independent variable) controlling for television news exposure, while the 
dependent variable model predicts political participation (the dependent variable) from 
negative and positive emotions (the mediators) and the interaction between negative 
emotion and education (the mediator of interest * the moderator) controlling for late-
night comedy exposure and television news exposure.  
The interaction term between negative emotions and education (the indicator of 
political sophistication) tests the hypothesized conditional indirect effect.  The results 
support H3.4, demonstrating that education significantly moderated the indirect effect of 
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late-night comedy viewing on participation through negative emotions (b = .136, SE 
= .049, p < .01).  Table 3.3 summarizes the degree of conditional indirect effect at 
specific levels of education.  Findings illustrate that the indirect effect of late-night 
comedy viewing via the conduit of negative emotion becomes stronger as the level of 
education increases.  Further, the CI that contains 0 for those who have “some high 
school or less” implies that the reception of satirical humor may have no mobilizing 
effect among them through an indirect path of negative emotion.  Taken together, the 
moderated mediation analysis indicated that political sophisticates tend to derive greater 
participatory benefits from late-night comedy viewing via the indirect path of negative 
emotions. 
Table 3.3. Conditional indirect effect of late-night comedy exposure on political 
participation through negative emotion at specific levels of education  
(Experiment, N = 768) 
Note. Estimates are calculated using the Mplus code provided by Preacher et al. (2007, 
Model 3) based on the bootstrapping of 5,000 samples.  CIs are bias-corrected 95% 
confidence intervals.  The output displays the conditional indirect effect at four levels of 
education: Some high school or less (n = 53); High school diploma (n = 158); Some 
college or associate degree (n = 391); and Post-graduate education (n = 166) 
 
Unfolding Discrete Negative Emotions 
The current chapter posed a series of research questions concerning discrete 
negative emotions.  In order to test these questions, each of the nine component 
variables representing discrete emotions was regressed on late-night comedy exposure 
     Education Point Estimate Boot SE     CI 
Some high school or less .087 .059  -.006 to .230 
High school diploma .155 .053  .067 to .278 
Some college or associate degree .223 .067  .102 to .362 
Post-graduate education .291 .091  .129 to .486 
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while controlling for hard news exposure.  The political participation index was then 
regressed on those nine discrete emotion measures while controlling for the late-night 
comedy and hard news dummy variables.  To mitigate issues of multicolinearity, the 
model was trimmed by removing paths that were far from significant (p > .10).  Then, 
the modification indices (above 5) were used to improve the model.  The results of this 
multiple mediator model were assessed using Mplus.  Table 3.4 reports computed 
regression coefficients in conjunction with corresponding standard errors. 
The findings regarding RQ3.3a show that late-night comedy viewing was a 
stronger predictor of anger than worry.  In particular, it elicited message-referent anger 
(.540) more powerfully compared to the other six negative emotion elements.  The 
relationships between discrete negative emotions and participation (RQ3.3b) suggest that 
only self-referent anger and message-referent worry exerted significant influence on 
stimulating respondents’ likelihood of political activities.  Interestingly, plot-referent 
anger without self-referencing predicted an even lower level of participatory intent, 
although the relationship was not significant.  On the other hand, self-referencing of 
worry seemed to reduce its mobilizing effect as it failed to yield a considerable 
mobilizing effect, whereas the comparable association for message-referent worry was 
highly significant.  Taken together, these findings regarding RQ3.3c highlight the key 
source of mediation, demonstrating that late-night comedy viewing powerfully elicited 
respondents’ self-referent anger, which subsequently predicted a higher level of political 
participation.  In order to assess individual indirect effects, point estimates were 
computed separately for discrete emotions, and corresponding bias-corrected and -
accelerated 95% confidence intervals (CIs) were calculated based on the bootstrapping of 
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5,000 samples.  As shown in Table 3.4, the results suggested that only self-referent 
anger exerted a significant mediating effect between exposure to late-night comedy and 
the likelihood of political participation. 
Table 3.4. Effects of late-night comedy exposure on political participation through 
discrete emotions (Experiment, N = 768) 
Note. Estimates were calculated using Mplus; The best fitting model was identified by 
removing all the paths that were far from significant (p > .10) and then, the modification 
indices (above 5) were used to improve the model.  Overall, this model fits the data 
well, with a chi-square value of 8.109 with 6 degrees of freedom.  Other goodness-of-fit 
indices also provide evidence of the adequacy of the model (p = .230; RMSEA = .021, 
90% CI for RMSEA = .000 to .055; SRMR = .014, CFI = 1.000, and TLI = .997); 
Unstandardized coefficients are reported with standard errors in parentheses; IV: Late-
night comedy exposure; DV: Political participation; Direct effect of IV on DV after 
controlling for mediators: b = 359, SE =.142, p < .05; R2 for the DV model = .197; 
Though not shown here, analyses controlled for message-referent enthusiasm, self-
referent enthusiasm, and hard news exposure, ; CIs are bias-corrected 95% confidence 
intervals (Bootstrap N = 5,000).  
#p<.10; *p<.05; **p<.01; ***p<.001 
 
Study 2: The Mail Survey 
 
 Direct Effects  Indirect Effects 
Mediators 
IV Mediator  Point Bootstrap 
on Mediator on DV  Estimate CI 
Message-Referent 
Anger  
.540*** 
(.126)  
   
Plot-Referent 
Anger  
.397** 
(.118) 
-.107 
(.067) 
 -.043 
(.029) 
 -.118 to .002 
Self-Referent 
Anger  
.496*** 
(.129) 
.213*** 
(.056) 
 .106** 
(.039) 
 .045 to .204 
Message-Referent 
Worry 
.170 
(.135) 
.263*** 
(.049) 
 .045 
(.037) 
 -.021 to .131 
Plot-Referent 
Worry  
.283* 
(.129)  
   
Self-Referent 
Worry  
.339* 
(.135)  
   
Plot-Referent 
Enthusiasm   
.262*** 
(.037) 
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Sample 
The survey data came from a national mail survey conducted immediately 
following the 2006 mid-term elections.  The research firm Synovate collected the data. A 
large body of individuals was contacted via mail and asked to indicate the willingness to 
participate in mail, telephone, or online surveys; individuals who were interested were 
asked to provide basic demographic information.  A balanced sample was then drawn 
from among more than 500,000 people who agreed to participate in the pre-recruited 
“mail panel.”  In order to ensure representativeness, the sample was drawn to reflect 
demographic distributions within the five U.S. Census designations of household income, 
population density, panel member’s age, gender, and region.  By relying on this 
stratified quota sampling method, approximately 2,000 mail survey respondents were 
selected.  Overall, 777 individuals responded, representing a response rate of 38.9%.  
This sampling method largely differs from more conventional probability sample 
procedures yet produced highly comparable data (Putnam & Yonish, 1999). 
 
Measures 
 
Political Participation   
Respondents were asked about their frequency of involvement in four types of 
political activities: attending a political meeting, rally, or speech; contacting a public 
official or a political party; circulating a petition for a candidate or issue; and working on 
behalf of a social group or cause (see Appendix for question wording).  Responses were 
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recorded on an 8-point scale (ranging from never in the last 2 months to every day) and 
were averaged to form an index of political participation (M = 1.33, SD = .70, α = .80). 
 
Emotional Responses  
Respondents were asked to report their emotional responses toward the two major 
parties using four types of emotions for each party: anger, worry, hope, and excitement.  
Respondents were asked to report the extent to which they agreed with each emotion item 
on a 6-point scale (ranging from definitely disagree to definitely agree).  An index of 
“negative” emotion was formed by averaging “angry” and “worried” responses toward 
the two parties (M = 3.22, SD = 1.01, α = .38).  Likewise, “hopeful” and “excited” 
responses toward the two parties were averaged to create a measure of “positive” emotion 
(M = 3.02, SD = .78, α = .20).  Combining responses toward the two parties in a single 
index resulted in low reliability figures, but this is an appropriate option to measure 
general emotions across targets (Valentino et al., 2011), and this technique is standard in 
research on emotion (Marcus et al., 2000; Rudolph et al., 2000).6 
 
Late-Night Comedy Viewing  
Respondents were asked to report how often they viewed The Daily Show with 
Jon Stewart and The Colbert Report on a 5-point scale (never, once in a while, 
sometimes, often, or regularly).  The responses on these two items were averaged to 
form an index of late-night comedy viewing (M = 1.33, SD = .76, α = .85). 
 
                                                 
6 In the experiment section of the current research, emotions were measured without reference to a specific 
party and we believe that it is a superior practice to capture emotional responses following stimuli as 
opposed to affective assessments of political parties. 
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Conventional News Use  
The model incorporated measures of conventional news uses.  To measure 
television news exposure, respondents were asked to indicate how often they viewed 
nightly national news and local television news on the same 5-point scale as the previous 
measure.  Responses on these two items were averaged to form an index (M = 3.73, SD 
= 1.26, α = .79).  One item measured on the same 5-point scale measured daily 
newspaper use (M = 3.78, SD = 1.42).  
 
Control Variables 
The analyses controlled for a host of demographic variables, including age (M = 
51.86, SD = 13.25), gender (46% female), race (75% white), household income (median: 
$55,000), and education (median: “some college or associate degree”).  The model also 
controlled for party affiliation (33% Republican, 31% Democrat) and political interest 
measured on a 6-point scale (M = 3.50, SD = 1.71).  In addition, the model incorporated 
political interest, knowledge, and internal efficacy that could also explain variance in 
media use, emotional responses, and interpersonal talk.  Political interest was measured 
by asking respondents to report on a 6-point scale to what extent they were interested in 
politics (M = 3.50, SD = 1.71).  For the measure of political knowledge, we counted the 
number of correct answers to four questions asked about current public affairs (M = 2.25, 
SD = 1.43, KR-20 =.75).  An index of internal efficacy was created by averaging 
responses on two items measured on a 6-point scale (M = 2.83, SD = 1.22, α = .60). 
 
Results 
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Model Specification and Modification  
A path model was specified using AMOS.  Before fitting the model to the data, 
all variables in the model were residualized for the previously discussed control variables 
to avoid any confounding results (see Table 3.5).  ).  The analyses were then conducted 
with the covariance matrix of unstandardized error terms obtained from this 
residualization procedure.  To identify the best fitting model, a saturated model was 
assessed with all structural paths freed up to be estimated.  As suggested by standard 
refinement approaches of structural equation models (Bollen, 1989; Kline, 2005), the 
model was then trimmed by removing non-significant paths (p > .05).  This 
modification process generates a more parsimonious and better fitting model without 
substantially changing the theorized relationships.7  
 
Model Fit 
Figure 3.2 presents unstandardized coefficients from the path model of media 
uses, emotions, and political participation.  Overall, this model fits the data well, with a 
chi-square value of 1.30 with 3 degrees of freedom.  Other goodness-of-fit indices also 
provide evidence of the adequacy of the model (p = .73; RMSEA = .00, 90% CI for 
RMSEA = .00 to .05; GFI = 0.99; AGFI = 0.99; and NFI = 0.96). 
 
                                                 
7 The different analytical approaches in the two research designs reflect distinct foci.  The purpose of the 
experiment was to examine, in a controlled setting, every detailed consequence of manipulation.  To this 
end, it seems more reasonable to look at all the possible casual links including those failing to reach 
statistical significance.  The exploited macro by Preacher and Hayes (2008) allows for more exhaustive 
assessments of causal paths.  Meanwhile, the goal of the survey revolves around identifying mundane 
relationships among media use, emotions, and political engagement.  AMOS enabled us to remove 
insignificant paths that may suggest null relationships in the real world and investigate whether the 
proposed model as a whole fits the data well. 
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Table 3.5. Results from regressing exogenous and endogenous variables of the path model on control variables (Survey, N = 777) 
Note. Unstandardized regression coefficients calculated by SPSS are reported along with corresponding standard errors in parentheses.   
#p < .10; *p < .05; **p < .01; ***p < .001 
 
 
 
Political Negative Positive Late-Night Television Newspaper 
Participation Emotions Emotions Comedy Use News Use Use 
Age .003* (.002) -.011** (.004) .000 (.002) -.006** (.002) .015*** (.004) .014*** (.004) 
Gender (female=1) .051 (.053) .031 (.109) .161** (.058) .003 (.057) .299** (.095) .057** (.110) 
Race (White=1) -.118# (.066) -.154 (.133) -.037 (.070) .133# (.071) -.277* (.117) -.228 (.134) 
Household income -.001 (.001) -.000 (.001) -.001 (.001) -.001# (.001) .001 (.001) .001# (.001) 
Education .016 (.027) .001 (.056) -.060* (.030) .109*** (.029) -.142** (.049) -.008 (.055) 
Party ID (Dem=high) -.017 (.023) .558*** (.046) .072** (.024) .125*** (.024) .065 (.040) .088# (.046) 
Internal efficacy .107*** (.026) .039 (.054) .176*** (.029) .054# (.028) -.004 (.047) .026 (.054) 
Political knowledge .040# (.022) .189*** (.046) -.016 (.024) .021 (.024) .080* (.040) .168*** (.046) 
Political interest .069*** (.019) -.012 (.040) .005 (.021) .040# (.021) .036 (.035) -.046 (.040) 
R2 (%) 13.3 20.2 9.4 9.0 7.3 6.0 
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Note. Unstandardized path coefficients are reported with standard errors in parentheses. 
Estimates were calculated by AMOS based on the Maximum Likelihood Estimation 
method.  The effects of demographics (age, gender, race, household income, education, 
and party affiliation) and cognitive variables (internal efficacy, political interest and 
knowledge) on endogenous and exogenous variables have been residualized.  
Newspaper use was in the initial model, but it was excluded from the final model because 
it failed to produce a significant path. 
#p<.10; *p<.05; **p<.01; ***p<.001 
 
Direct Relationships between Late-Night Comedy and Emotions   
The relationships observed from the survey also support H3.1, illustrating that 
exposure to late-night comedy is associated with viewers’ negative emotions (b = .252, 
SE = .073, p < .001).  This implies that frequent viewers of late-night comedy programs 
are more likely to feel angry and worried toward both parties.  However, findings of the 
survey show that exposure to late-night comedy is not tied to respondents’ positive 
emotions (RQ3.1).  On the other hand, the consumption of television news is related to 
positive emotions (b = .063, SE = .023, p < .01). 
 
Negative 
Emotions 
R2 = .017 
 
Positive 
Emotions 
R2 = .011 
 
-.046* 
(.018) 
.063** 
(.023) 
 
.096** 
(.035) 
.039# 
(.021) 
 
.013 
(.038) 
 
Political 
Participation 
R2 = .022 
.252*** 
(.073) 
 
-.017 
(.033) 
 
Late-Night 
Comedy 
Use 
 
Television 
News 
Use 
 
Figure 3.2. Path model of media uses, emotions, and political participation  
(Survey, N = 777) 
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Relationships between Emotions and Participation  
Findings concerning H3.2a suggest that negative emotions predicted lower levels 
of political participation (b = -.046, SE = .018, p < .05), while positive emotions failed to 
produce a comparable relationship (H3.2b).  At first glance, these findings seem to 
counter the mobilizing role of negative emotions discovered in the experiment.  
However, as implied in H3.4, negative emotions may interact with civic skills such as 
internal efficacy and education to produce uneven outcomes in different segments of the 
public, and the observed inverse relationship may exist only among those who are less 
educated.  Such interactions will be examined later.  
 
Mediating Effects of Emotions 
The pattern of the relationships examined above presents support for the 
proposed indirect effect of late-night comedy consumption on political participation via 
the conduit of negative emotions (H3.3), whereas little data show the mediating influence 
of positive emotions (RQ3.2).  Assessments based on the Baron and Kenny’s (1986) 
approach indicate that late-night comedy consumption was little associated with positive 
emotions—i.e., the (a) condition, which did not predict a significant change in the degree 
of political participation—i.e., the (b) condition.  In contrast, findings support the 
significant mediation role of negative emotions.  First, the significant relationship 
between late-night comedy consumption and negative emotions presents support for the 
(a) condition, while the latter’s meaningful link to political participation bolsters the (b) 
condition.   
 
 72 
 
Table 3.6. Mediation of the association between late-night comedy consumption and 
political participation through emotions (Survey, N = 777) 
Note. CIs are bias-corrected 95% confidence interval (Bootstrap N = 5,000). 
#p < .10; *p < .05; **p < .01; ***p < .001 
 
Interestingly, Table 3.6 reports that the significant total effects of late-night 
comedy consumption—i.e., the (c) condition—became even stronger after accounting for 
the indirect influence via negative emotions—i.e., the (c') condition (from .084 to .096); 
the results that appear to contradict the mediating role of negative emotion according to 
Baron and Kenny (1986).  However, a closer examination reveals that these results 
mainly arise from the thwarting indirect influence via negative emotions and the 
mobilizing direct effect that are operating in opposite directions.  In theory, the direct 
effect and indirect effect might be equal in size, but they could work in opposite 
directions.  In this case, these two paths can cancel each other out, thereby leaving the 
total effect close to zero, while both direct and indirect effects remain significant.  In 
line with this notion, many (e.g., Hayes, 2009; Hayes et al., 2011; MacKinnon, Krull, & 
Lockwood, 2000; Shrout & Bolger, 2002) now advise that researchers should not impose 
Baron and Kenny’s (1986) causal steps concerning the direct relationship between the 
independent variable and the dependent variable—i.e., (c) and (c') conditions—prior to 
the assessments of the indirect effects through mediators.  
 Total, Direct, and  Formal Tests of 
 Indirect Effects  Indirect Effects 
 Total Direct Indirect  Sobel z CI 
Late-night  .084* .096** -.012*  
2.000 -.025 to -.003 comedy 
consumption (.034) (.035) (.006)  
        
Television  .039* .039* —  — — news use (.021) (.021)   
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Parallel to analytical approaches employed in the experiment, the investigation 
incorporated the Sobel test (Sobel, 1982) and the bootstrap analysis (Hayes, 2009) for 
more powerful testing of indirect effects.  As presented in Table 3.6, the Sobel test 
supports the significant indirect influence of late-night comedy consumption on political 
participation through negative emotions (p < .05).  Moreover, the confidence interval 
based on the bootstrapping of 5,000 samples presents support for H3.3, while illustrating 
that late-night comedy was significantly associated with political participation indirectly 
by viewers’ negative emotions toward the two major parties.   
By contrast, television news use was not tied to participation indirectly via the 
conduit of emotions (see Table 3.6).  Instead, as was shown in Figure 3.2, frequent 
viewing of television news showed a marginally significant direct relationship with a 
higher level of political participation (b = .039, SE = .021, p < .10).  Bootstrapping 
suggests that this direct association (CI = .000 to .080) may not significantly differ from 
the corresponding direct relationship for late-night comedy (b = .096, SE = .035, CI 
= .028 to .166), since the two estimated confidence intervals overlap.  
 
Conditional Indirect Relationships  
H3.4 posited that the indirect relationship between late-night comedy 
consumption and political participation via negative emotions is conditional upon an 
individual’s education.  Hayes (2009) suggests that we could investigate such 
interactions “by estimating a mediating model in two or more groups and then compare 
models in which equality constraints are imposed or relaxed across groups on one or 
more of the effects defining the indirect and direct effects” (p. 416).  Accordingly, the 
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path model observed in the full sample was estimated within three levels of education.  
All the structural paths were imposed to be equal across groups, with only the path from 
negative emotions to political participation freed up to be estimated.  
The results showed the direct relationship between negative emotions and 
participation was conditional upon education such that the inverse relationship among 
those with low education (b = -.102, Boot SE = .028, CI = -.156 to -.045) became 
insignificant within the mean group (b = -.026, Boot SE = .026, CI = -.077 to .025) and 
the sign turned positive, though insignificant, among those who were highly educated (b 
= .010, Boot SE = .055, CI = -.099 to .114).  Further supporting the conditional 
relationship between negative emotions and participation, chi-square tests of nested 
models revealed that the low education group was marked by an association that is 
marginally different from the high education group (χ2 = 3.32, df = 1, p < .10) and 
significantly different than the mean group (χ2 = 3.94, df = 1, p < .05).  
Table 3.7. Conditional indirect effect of late-night comedy viewing on political 
participation through negative emotion at specific levels of education (Survey, N = 777) 
Note. Estimates were calculated using AMOS based on the bootstrapping of 5,000 
samples.  CIs are bias-corrected 95% confidence intervals.  The output displays the 
conditional indirect effect at the following three levels of education: the mean, one 
standard deviation lower than the mean, and one standard deviation higher than the mean.  
Consequently, the low group refers to those who have “high school education or less” (1 
– 3), the mean group consists of those who attained “college education” (4 – 5), and the 
high group includes those who received “post-graduate education” (6). 
 
Table 3.7 summarizes the point estimates of conditional indirect associations and 
95% biased-corrected confidence intervals (CIs) based on the bootstrapping of 5,000 
Education Point Estimate Boot SE     CI 
Low -.026 .011  -.051 to -.009 
Mean -.007 .007  -.024 to .005 
High .002 .014  -.026 to .032 
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samples.  Results support H3.4 with the mediating effects of anger and worry positively 
moderated by education such that the inverse indirect relationship via the conduit of 
negative emotions exists only among those with low education.  The corresponding 
indirect association for the mean group became insignificant and turned positive for the 
high education group.  In short, findings illustrate that the indirect inverse associations 
between late-night comedy consumption and political participation via negative emotions 
are confined among those who were poorly educated. 
 
Discussion 
The results of this study presented substantial support for the proposed affective 
mediation model, specifically highlighting the mediating effect of negative emotions 
between exposure to late-night comedy and political participation.  In the experiment, 
negative emotions mediated and reinforced the effects of exposure to late-night comedy 
on the respondents’ intent for future political activities (H3.3), with the manipulation of 
humor provoking their anger and worry (H3.1) and the stimulated negative emotions 
subsequently predicting a higher level of participation (H3.2a).  On the other hand, 
findings of the survey demonstrate that frequent use of late-night comedy was associated 
with a higher level of negative emotions (H3.1), which in turn, was tied to decreased 
participation (H3.2a).  Thus, negative emotions seemed to play an attenuating mediating 
role between consuming satirical humor and participating in politics (H3.3).  In both 
designs, the affective mediation model added little to assessing the effects of traditional 
news media.  Nowhere did consuming conventional news yield an equivalent indirect 
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linkage via emotions.  Instead, the intersection of results from the experiment and the 
survey revealed that television news use was directly associated with an increase in 
political participation no less strongly than late-night comedy viewing. 
Besides the main hypotheses, the current chapter posed a series of research 
questions inquiring about possible distinct causes and effects of discrete negative 
emotions.  First, the findings suggest that late-night comedy viewing elicited message-
referent anger most powerfully (RQ3.3a).  Second, self-referent anger and message-
referent worry exerted considerable influence on stimulating respondents’ likelihood of 
political activities (RQ3.3b).  Finally, the findings highlight the key source of mediation, 
demonstrating that only self-referent anger significantly mediated the association 
between late-night comedy viewing and political participation (RQ3.3b).   
Overall, these results lend credence to the subtle differences embedded in 
discrete emotions while highlighting the peculiar characteristics and roles of anger and 
worry, which have drawn a great deal of scholarly attention especially from the 
proponents of the cognitive appraisal theory (e.g., Lerner & Keltner, 2001; Smith & 
Ellsworth, 1985; Smith & Kirby, 2001; Tiedens & Linton., 2001).  Furthermore, the 
analysis endorses the perspective that the identical emotion could yield distinctive 
consequences depending who or what the emotion concerns (Dunlop et al., 2008).  In a 
nutshell, the results suggest that anger seems to play a greater motivational role, 
mediating the relation between exposure to late-night comedy and political participation 
(Huddy et al., 2007; Valentino et al., 2011; Weber, 2007), and further that self-
referencing tends to boost the mobilizing effect of anger (Dunlop et al., 2008), whereas it 
could augment the inherent avoidance tendency of worry (Heatherton & Baumeister, 
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1991; Heatherton et al., 1998; Sherman & Cohen, 2002). 
It is worth noting that findings from the two study designs seem at odds with 
each other concerning the mediating effects of negative emotions.  The implications of 
these inconsistent results are twofold.  First, analyses of conditional indirect effects 
could fill the gap in ostensibly conflicting findings.  In both the experiment and survey, 
the mediating effects of negative emotions were positively moderated by education 
(H3.4).  In particular, the evaluation of conditional indirect effects in the survey 
indicates that the observed inverse association between late-night comedy consumption 
and political participation via the conduit of negative emotions existed only among 
poorly educated citizens, whereas the equivalent assessment in the experiment shows that 
highly educated citizens tend to derive unevenly greater motivational benefits from 
negative emotions stirred by satirical humor.  Taken together, analyses of conditional 
indirect effects suggest that education moderates the mediating relationships such that 
exposure to late-night comedy can encourage the participatory intent of well-educated 
individuals rather excessively by provoking negative emotions, while the same emotional 
experiences from satirical humor can disproportionately demobilize poorly educated 
counterparts.  These results bolster the idea that those with greater skills and resources 
are more likely to extract benefits from political satire since understanding humor itself 
requires a certain level of expertise (Moy et al., 2005a; Young, 2008; Young & Tisinger, 
2006).  Hence, findings may highlight a caveat against unduly optimistic views to the 
extent that late-night comedy viewing could widen the participation gap between haves 
and have-nots.   
The second implication of inconsistent results may refer to inherent differences 
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in short-term and long-term effect models.  As Valentino et al. (2011) aptly contend, the 
role of emotions in participatory democracy is circumscribed, being inherently short-term 
motivational.  The causal relationships observed in the experiment tend to capture this 
short-term nature.  Although an additional analysis ruled out alternative cognitive 
accounts, it is still plausible that emotions, in the long run, can influence an individual’s 
more stable cognitive attitudes by stimulating his/her attention and thought (Lazarus, 
1999; Zajonc, 1998).  In light of the survey results, it could well be that provoked 
negative emotions, when accumulated over time without any positive feedback, could 
result in increased cynicism, and the observed inverse indirect association between 
consuming humor and participating in politics, via the conduit of negative emotions, may 
reflect this long-term joint working of emotion and cognition.  However, the cross-
sectional nature of the survey makes it difficult to assess the sequential (or perhaps 
reciprocal) relation.  Future studies should employ a time-series survey design (e.g., 
panel survey) that investigates the long-term interrelatedness between emotions and other 
cognitive measures that could intervene between the reception and the final outcome.  
Incorporating a time-based study will also improve our understanding about the 
temporal precedence between comedy exposure, emotions and participation.  For 
instance, it is arguable that those who are angry and worried about politics tend to watch 
highly critical satire programs in the first place.  Further, there might be a reciprocal 
relationship between humor consumption and emotional responses.  Motivated by the 
similar concern, Schemer (in press) recently examined the reciprocal relationship 
between the reception of media content (particularly political advertisements) and 
affective response.  His analysis of a panel data revealed that the effect of reception on 
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response is stronger than the influence of the latter on the former, supporting the temporal 
sequence conceptualized in this study (see also Cho et al., 2003).  Moreover, random 
assignment in the experiment ruled out the confounding effect of the participants’ 
frequency of late-night comedy watching prior to their participation in the study.  That 
is, since random assignment ensured that the participants’ pre-consumption of political 
humor was constant across conditions, any posterior effects should reflect the immediate 
consequence of manipulation beyond the audiences’ habitual media uses.  Nevertheless, 
given that the consequence of media use can also determine the selection of and attention 
to specific media content in the real world (Slater, 2007), emotion is not just a result of 
exposure to late-night comedy shows, but also an important antecedent to the selection of 
and attention to these programs, thereby creating a reinforcing spiral effect.  The current 
design leaves this mutually reinforcing process unexamined.  Carefully designed 
longitudinal modeling with repeated measures of both reception and response would help 
us identify and capture this snowballing effect. 
Another related issue pertains to the temporal order between emotion and 
participation, since emotion and intent to participate were measured simultaneously even 
in the experiment.  One possibility is that exposure to late-night comedy drives changes 
in both, thereby making the observed link between emotions and participation spurious.  
However, this alternative explanation for the relationship is less likely, given that a post-
hoc examination of correlations revealed that the measure of negative emotion and the 
participation index were strongly correlated (r = .301, p < .001), even when the 
manipulation condition was held constant (i.e., within the late-night comedy group).  
Another more serious confounding issue is the prospect of reverse causal direction.  It is 
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likely that manipulating the tone in the experiment immediately triggered emotions and 
then, respondents’ intent to participate was likely to follow.  However, over an extended 
time period, emotions might also become the effects of participation.  For instance, 
steadfast participation in an election may boost emotions about it (Valentino et al., 2011), 
or participation may reinforce prior emotional states (Bem, 1972).  Exploiting a time-
bound experimental study (e.g., pretest-posttest design) will enable us to address these 
reverse and reciprocal orders that may be inherent in the real-life relationships.   
As with the overall design, measures employed in the current research are not 
without limitations.  In particular, more can be done to improve the measures of positive 
emotions.  In both the experiment and survey, positive emotions failed to produce 
significant mediating effects (RQ3.2).  In the experiment, late-night comedy watching 
did little to influence positive emotions (RQ3.1), whereas in the survey, positive 
emotions were not attached to participation (H3.2b).  In a way, little role of positive 
emotions is consistent with prior work illustrating that positive emotions are less 
powerful than negative ones (e.g., Coleman & Wu, 2010; Miller, 2007; Petty & Wegener, 
1998).  Further, these results may reflect predominantly negative tone of humor and the 
principle of negativity bias that individuals tend to pay greater attention to negative and 
threatening information (Baumeister et al., 2001; Rozin & Royzman, 2001; Taylor, 1991).  
However, the absence of mediating effects and inconsistent results may be attributable to 
weak operationalization of the measures.  The positive emotion index in the experiment 
was measured by enthusiasm about the government’s policy, whereas the corresponding 
scale in the survey summarized respondents’ hopeful and excited responses toward the 
two major parties.  Thus, the types as well as the references of positive emotions 
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exploited in the two study designs differ, and these inconsistencies may have produced 
confounding results.   Although subtle distinctive consequences among different types 
of positive emotions have received much less scholarly attention, future study can 
contribute by employing a greater number of positive emotion items while specifying 
their respective causes and effects.  
 
Conclusion 
Findings of this study primarily contribute to our understanding of various 
mediation models anchored in the O-S-O-R framework.  By incorporating emotions as a 
viable mediator (the second O) between the reception of message (S) and ensuing 
response (R), the proposed affective mediation model extended the scope of the 
mediation model, while capturing the dynamic intervening mechanisms above and 
beyond more conventional cognitive accounts.  Further, the present chapter introduced 
education as a first O and showed that the mobilizing effect of late-night comedy viewing 
was conditional upon political sophistication.  Taken together, the advanced model fully 
exploited the O-S-O-R framework in assessing the impact of political entertainment by 
introducing the following causal chain: education (first O) - late-night comedy viewing 
(S) - negative emotion (second O) - political participation (R) (see Figure 3.3). 
However, the purpose of introducing the affective mediation model is neither to 
gainsay nor to downplay the merit of prevailing mediation models based on cognitive and 
attitudinal elements (e.g., J. M. McLeod, Scheufele, & Moy, 1999; Scheufele et al., 2004).  
Rather, it should be understood as a meaningful addition, while expanding the current 
area of the O-S-O-R framework.  As observed earlier, this affective mediation model 
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did little in accounting for the processes wherein traditional news media produce 
attitudinal and behavioral consequences.  Though looking at a different criterion 
measure than political participation, Y. M. Kim and Vishak (2008) find that conventional 
news media tend to influence policy evaluations by offering factual knowledge to the 
audiences, whereas late-night comedy promotes a processing style based on overall 
affective impressions.  Hence, the well-established cognitive mediation models appear 
more suitable for assessing the indirect effects of traditional news media. 
 
Although the value and breadth of the applicability of the model is a topic for 
future research, the affective mediation model is particularly useful for analyzing the 
effects of new media channels the cognitive processes of which have been seriously 
challenged.  For instance, critics of soft news have consistently criticized late-night 
comedy programs for insufficient substance (e.g., Niven et al., 2003).  Nevertheless, the 
results based on the proposed affective mediation model suggested that the lack of 
substance in late-night humor should not be equated with its inability to motivate the 
active citizenry since humor and satire are able to grab viewers’ attention by offering 
Late-Night 
Comedy 
Viewing 
(S) 
Negative 
Emotions 
(Second O) 
 
 
Education 
(First O) 
Political 
Participation 
(R) 
Figure 3.3. Summary of the affective mediation model based on the O-S-O-R framework 
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them rich emotional experiences.  Supporting this view, Jones (2010) contended that 
late-night comedy shows, though falling short of fulfilling the goals of the informed 
electorate, could invigorate the participatory souls of citizens while inviting viewers to 
talk and play with their affective qualities inherent in sarcastic humor.  Moreover, the 
affective mediation model resonates well with a recent finding that frequent use of 
citizen-oriented journalism predicts a higher level of political participation without 
producing a meaningful link to knowledge (Kaufhold, Valenzuela, & Gil de Zúñiga, 
2010).  Thus, the theorized mediation model should provide a range of insights to 
explore the role of newly emerging media that are presumably of less enlightening value 
yet are more emotionally amusing and provocative.   
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Chapter 4  
Talking about What Provokes Us 
Since the introduction of the concept of a “two-step flow” (Katz & Lazarsfeld, 
1955) of media influence via interpersonal communication, scholars have been exploring 
the theoretical underpinnings of the role of mass media in stimulating discussion among 
citizens.  For example, the agenda-setting framework (McCombs & Shaw, 1972) 
suggested that the news media could raise the importance of an issue, placing it on the 
public and personal agenda, thereby triggering discussion among citizens.  On a 
somewhat different note, uses and gratification research (Greenberg, 1975) identified an 
individual’s motivation to exploit the content of mass media to collect information fit for 
use in arguments or conversations with others. 
Indeed, mounting research supports the idea that news media provide a resource 
for political discussion and create opportunities for exposure to conflicting viewpoints, 
encouraging political talk that might not otherwise occur (Mutz, 2002; Mutz & Martin, 
2001).  For instance, J. Kim, Wyatt, and Katz (1999) observed that both newspaper 
reading and television watching could increase the amount of political talk, while Jones 
(2005) indicated that attention to content in various media was a significant predictor of 
interpersonal discussion of politics.  Moreover, Pan, Shen, Paek, and Sun (2006) found 
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that during a time period near an election, even the use of less politically oriented 
programs could prompt higher levels of talk about public affairs due to the media’s 
elevated focus on election coverage. 
Nevertheless, late-night comedy is not often considered to be a critical 
component of deliberative democracy, primarily due to its nature as entertainment 
programming.  Although some scholars (e.g., Landreville et al., 2010; Moy et al., 
2005a) have examined the link between political entertainment and discussion, little is 
known about the processes wherein consuming humor can promote interpersonal talk 
about politics.  In fact, late-night comedy shows may be insufficiently substantive, as 
critics of soft news maintain (e.g., J. M. McLeod et al., 1996; Parkin et al., 2003; Pfau et 
al., 2001; Prior, 2003; Young, 2008), yet the scarcity of information may not hinder 
viewers’ deliberate behaviors as suggested by the theory and practices of low-information 
rationality (e.g., Lupia, 1994; Popkin, 1994; Sniderman, Brody, & Tetlock, 1991).  
Motivated by this direction, the present chapter explores the likelihood that late-night 
comedy, albeit less enlightening, could spur a citizen’s engagement in interpersonal talk 
indirectly by eliciting emotions.  Briefly, it will be argued that emotions mediate and 
reinforce the association between late-night comedy viewing and engagement in 
interpersonal talk about politics.   
 
Conceptualizing Interpersonal Talk 
Normative political theorists (e.g., Barber, 1984; Bryce, 1973; Dewey, 1927; 
Fishkin, 1992; Gutmann & Thompson, 1996; Habermas, 1989; Manin, 1987) envisioned 
interpersonal talk as a vital component of rational political discourse that enhances the 
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legitimacy and accountability of the government, while yielding a more responsible and 
informed citizenry.  These scholars conceptualize interpersonal talk as a formal 
deliberation practice, where each participant is respected and the process is fair, public, 
and reasonable (Burkhalter, Gastil, & Kelshaw, 2004), which has been shown to facilitate 
schema integration (Gastil & Dillard, 1999), structure attitudes and opinions (Fishkin, 
1996, 1999), generate more equitable distribution of resources (Sulkin & Simon, 2001), 
promote consensus and smooth conflict resolution, and encourage tolerance (Price, 
Cappella, & Nir, 2002).  Further highlighting the deliberative nature of interpersonal 
talk, Benhabib (1996) notes, “when presenting their point of view and position to others, 
individuals must support them by articulating good reasons in a public context to their 
co-deliberators.  This process of articulating good reasons in public forces the individual 
to think of what would count as a good reason for all others involved” (pp. 71–72, italics 
in original).  As Southwell and Yzer (2007) suggest, political conversation is a reasoned 
and consequential behavior, particularly when it is viewed as a part of the larger 
campaign communication process, where information is reconsidered, elaborated, and 
clarified. 
While some scholars (e.g., Schudson, 1997) distinguish between formal 
deliberation and casual talk, and contend that the latter is not conducive to the enrichment 
of a democratic society, many believe the constructive role of discussion is not limited to 
a formal deliberation discourse (e.g., Cottle & Rai, 2006; J. Kim et al., 1999; Pan et al., 
2006; Walsh, 2004; Wyatt, Katz, & Kim, 2000).  Instead, the relevant forms of 
interpersonal communication can subsume everyday conversations including casual talk, 
informal deliberation, and spirited argumentation (Wyatt et al., 2000) or impasse, petty 
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griping, and political jokes (Walsh, 2004), as long as the conversations are voluntary and 
without specific purpose or predetermined agenda (J. Kim et al., 1999).  Such ordinary 
conversations are no less important for a functioning democracy, in that these 
occurrences provide a social context for formal discussion to occur (Pan et al., 2006), 
while enhancing citizens’ opinion quality (J. Kim et al., 1999) and facilitating rational 
voting decisions (Richey, 2008) by encouraging them to organize and articulate their 
thoughts (Eveland, 2004).  In addition, informal political talk is a key impetus for 
creating social networks and maintaining social trust (Putnam, 2000), which can further 
contribute to resolving racial conflicts among citizens (Walsh, 2004).  Indeed, previous 
literature clearly indicates that engagement in interpersonal talk affords an array of 
opportunities to promote rational political discourse, whether it refers to formal 
deliberation processes or casual conversations among family, friends, and co-workers.  
Hence, the present study adopts the view that conceptualizes an individual’s talk as 
constituting a crucial part of a reasoning process (Cho et al., 2009). 
While recognizing these merits, theories have identified a multitude of structural 
features embedded in interpersonal talk that may have distinct implications for more 
enlightened political practices (for a review, see Eveland & Hively, 2009; Kwak, 
Williams, Wang, & Lee, 2005).  The most commonly investigated aspects of talk 
include discussion frequency, network size, heterogeneity of discussion, and online 
interaction.  First, scores of studies stress the significant role of discussion frequency in 
increasing citizens’ political knowledge (Eveland & Hively, 2009; Eveland & Thomson, 
2006; Holbert, Benoit, Hansen, & Wen, 2002; Kwak et al., 2005; J. M. McLeod, 
Scheufele, & Moy, 1999).  Further, discussion frequency contributes to opinion quality 
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(J. Kim et al., 1999), cognitive complexity (J. M. McLeod et al., 2001), identity (Walsh, 
2004), and efficacy (Scheufele et al., 2003), and it could also promote an individual’s 
representation of the public’s interests in a formal deliberative process (Pan et al., 2006). 
The size of a discussion network—i.e., “the number of people with whom an 
individual discusses politics” (Eveland & Hively, 2009, p. 206)—is yet another important 
structural aspect of interpersonal communication that may prove beneficial for rational 
public discourse.  The importance of network size was acknowledged as early as 
Granovetter’s (1973) idea of weak ties, which posited that expanded discussion networks 
permit a broader span of independent information sources.  The diversity and richness of 
information inherent in a larger discussion network should prompt individuals to acquire 
various resources and skills, and individuals with larger networks are more likely to 
interact with political experts (Lake & Huckfeldt, 1998).  Further, conversing with 
larger number of people may provide increased opportunities to communicate with 
“marginals” who could serve as important sources of novel information (Weimann, 1982).  
Indeed, previous literature suggests that a larger network can facilitate more informed 
and rational citizenry (Eveland & Hively, 2009; Huckfeldt, Mendez, & Osborn, 2004; 
Kwak et al., 2005; Moy & Gastil, 2006). 
In addition, we may assess the potential values of interpersonal communication 
in light of the extent to which individuals are engaged in heterogeneous discussion.8  
MacKuen (1990), for instance, differentiated an interaction among those who hold 
noncongruent opinions from a conversation with others harboring similar views, and 
                                                 
8 Eveland and Hively (2009) succinctly summarized the inconsistencies in past literatures surrounding the 
conceptualization and operationalization of network heterogeneity.  The current study attends to the most 
commonly employed conceptual and operational definition of heterogeneous discussion—i.e., level of 
discussion with other individuals holding dissimilar views than self (E. Kim, Scheufele, & Han, 2011; 
Kwak et al., 2005; Mutz, 2002, 2006; Scheufele et al., 2004). 
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argued that only the former fulfills the soul of deliberative democracy while enabling a 
bona fide exchange of ideas.  Although the influence of heterogeneous discussion on 
political participation is a topic for much scholarly debate (for a review, see Eveland & 
Hively, 2009; Kwak et al., 2005; Mutz, 2002, 2006; Scheufele et al., 2004), conversing 
with non-likeminded people could yield other profitable outcomes such as careful 
processing of information (J. M. McLeod & Becker, 1974), enhanced cognitive activity 
(Levine & Russo, 1995), understanding and tolerance of oppositional views (Duchesne & 
Haegel, 2010; Mutz, 2002, 2006), refinement of own issue positions (MacKuen, 1990; J. 
M. McLeod, Scheufele, Moy, et al., 1999; Scheufele et al., 2003), awareness of public 
opinion (Huckfeldt, Beck, Dalton, & Levine, 1995), discernment of ideologically distinct 
ideas (Price et al., 2002), and political learning (Gastil, Black, & Moscovitz, 2008; 
Scheufele et al., 2004). 
Online interaction via web-based communication technologies such as e-mail, 
instant messaging, electronic bulletin boards, and online chats has further expanded the 
scope of political talk among citizens (Price & Cappella, 2002).  Various modes of 
communication about politics via the Internet permit citizens to share their views, while 
exposing them to alternative perspectives, thereby facilitating rational arguments.  By 
reducing time and costs, these forms of online interaction about public issues have 
extended the scope of positive implications from offline discussion (Ho & McLeod, 
2008; Matei & Ball-Rokeach, 2002; Shah et al., 2007; Valenzuela, Park, & Kee, 2009).  
More specifically, Min (2007) demonstrated that online deliberation played no less 
significant role than an offline counterpart in boosting individuals’ issue knowledge and 
political efficacy.  As Berger (2009) argued, rewards from online interaction may even 
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outweigh the merits of offline talk, given that the textual nature underlying the former 
communication method tended to produce a more attentive and goal-oriented exchange of 
ideas.  
 
Emotion as a Mediator between Late-Night Comedy Viewing and Interpersonal 
Talk 
Critics of late-night comedy often comment on its lack of substance.  Null 
findings concerning the hypothesized causal relationship between soft news and political 
knowledge (e.g., J. M. McLeod et al., 1996; Parkin et al., 2003; Pfau et al., 2001; Prior, 
2003; Young, 2008) have discounted its role as an alternative source of hard information.  
According to this rather pessimistic view, late-night comedy programs may be 
insufficiently substantive, thereby making them unable to enlighten viewers and prompt 
interpersonal discussion often encapsulated by thoughtful and rational deliberation (Cho 
et al., 2009).  Although numerous observers have underscored the critical value of 
political knowledge for the production of a responsive electorate (e.g., Junn, 1991; 
Williams & Edy, 1999), the deficiency of hard knowledge among citizens has become 
conventional wisdom (Campbell, Gurin, & Miller, 1954; Converse, 1964), and its level 
has been further declining (Delli Carpini & Keeter, 1996).  Nonetheless, political 
knowledge constitutes only one ingredient for rehabilitating democracy, and it does not, 
in and of itself, refer to an ideal democratic citizen (Richey, 2008).  Furthermore, 
Neuman (1986) argues that the democracy in America is working fine although its 
electorate seems hardly enlightened.  
As such, the democratic principle of an informed citizenry has been challenged 
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by proponents of low-information rationality (e.g., Lupia, 1994; Popkin, 1994; 
Sniderman et al., 1991) both theoretically and empirically, who have demonstrated that 
even poorly informed citizens are capable of sophisticated political thought and rational 
behavior in so much as informational shortcuts and heuristics are available.  For 
example, Lupia (1994) found that relatively ignorant voters could emulate the behavior of 
well-informed counterparts as the former, while relying on information shortcuts, were 
able to cast their votes maximizing their own interests.  An inference from the theories 
and practices of low-information rationality is that late-night comedy could promote 
viewers’ deliberative behaviors anchored in reasoning to the extent that the consumption 
of humor endows them with informational shortcuts and heuristics.  Baum and Jamison 
(2006) advocated the role of soft news in low-information rationality when their study 
demonstrated that those who watch daytime talk shows featuring candidates were more 
likely to vote correctly since the programs offer them opportunities to learn about the 
candidates’ beliefs.  
In this chapter, emotion is proposed as a viable mediating mechanism of low-
information rationality, suggesting that that late-night comedy can trigger political talk 
among citizens indirectly by stimulating their emotional responses, although programs of 
this genre per se may be insufficiently substantive.  Traditionally, however, Western 
thought has discounted the role of emotion in political discourse, which is reflected as 
early as in Plato’s (1974) “cave” where human beings constantly struggle to overcome 
their emotional desires and march into the realm of reasoning.  Democratic ideals 
stipulate that emotion poses a serious threat to cool and reasoned discussion because the 
theory suggests that emotional individuals are less likely to reach rational decisions (Janis, 
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1982; Janis & Mann, 1977).  Being emotional about politics is often equated with 
distraction, distortion, extremity, and irrationality.  Marcus et al. (2000) have identified 
four pathologies that could buttress the zero-sum relationship between emotion and 
reason: (a) the displacement pathology, which posits that emotional states stymie or 
displace calm reasoning; (b) the distraction pathology, which presumes that emotional 
symbols distract attention away from relevant considerations; (c) the intransient 
pathology, which leads us to expect that emotionally charged individuals are unwilling to 
compromise or to update their views according to new waves of information; (d) the self-
absorption pathology, which presupposes that emotional individuals are self-oriented and 
pay scant attention to collective interests.  Again, these pathologies rest on the idea that 
emotion is detrimental to rational calculation.  While dismissing emotion in the public 
sphere, Western tradition has exclusively focused on cognition, and this emphasis has led 
to what Tomkins (1981) called “cognitive imperialism,” the tendency to reduce all mental 
states to the cognitive processing of information.  Consequently, this view of democratic 
theory has warned against the perils of human passion and applauded emotion-free 
reasoning (Marcus, 2003).   
Nevertheless, the hypothesized oppositional relationship has been seriously 
challenged by more recent work in political psychology which came to acknowledge that 
emotional experiences do not exist outside of or in opposition to the reasoning process, 
but are a critical component required to invoke reasoning (e.g., Abelson et al., 1982; 
Brader, 2006; Isbell & Ottati, 2002; Kinder, 1994; Marcus et al., 2000).  Marcus et al. 
(2000) observe that emotions enhance citizen rationality in so much as they could 
motivate citizens to reconsider their political judgments.  In particular, anxiety 
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encourages individuals’ more effortful processing of information, while reducing their 
reliance on habits and predispositions.  Others believe that emotion is an integral part of 
political attitudes and behavior.  For instance, Abelson et al. (1982) demonstrated that 
individuals’ feelings toward the candidates were strongly associated with candidate 
preferences.  In a similar vein, Kinder (1994) observed that emotions help individuals to 
consolidate their political views and further, such emotional responses are traceable in 
systematic ways to variations in social location, involvement in public affairs, and 
development of a political outlook, findings that suggest emotions are not irrational 
eruptions.  On a somewhat different note, Brader (2006) shows that emotional appeals 
are more effective among those who are interested and knowledgeable about politics.   
Dealing specifically with functions of emotion in the low-information rationality 
research, Sniderman et al. (1991) contend that emotion—when appropriately arranged—
could facilitate the efficiency of reasoning.  Especially, these scholars introduce what 
they called the “likability” heuristic and observe that citizens estimated with an 
astounding accuracy the issue positions of a particular group with two types of feelings: 
(1) their own feelings about the issues and (2) feelings about the group.  All in all, these 
studies lend credence to the renewed conceptualization of emotion as a cognitively rich 
tool for reasoned calculation and deliberation (Marcus, 2003).  Although little 
agreement has yet been reached regarding the temporal order and priority between 
emotion and cognition (see Lazarus, 1999; Zajonc, 1984 for the debate on the topic), 
mounting evidence indicates that emotion is not divorced from political cognition and is 
certainly not antithetical to it. 
Reviewing these studies should help us situate the role of emotion in an indirect 
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effect model of late-night comedy.  In particular, emotion is proposed as a viable 
mediating mechanism of low-information rationality, suggesting that late-night comedy 
can indirectly promote a reasoning process that encompasses interpersonal talk (see, e.g., 
Cho et al., 2009) by eliciting viewers’ emotional responses, although programs of this 
genre per se may be insufficiently substantive,  In support of this view, Y. M. Kim and 
Vishak (2008) demonstrated that exposure to late-night comedy facilitates citizens’ 
political judgments based on overall affective assessments, although little hard 
knowledge might be retained from viewing.  In fact, the significance of emotions in 
media processes and effects has been recognized, and some evidence demonstrates that 
emotional experiences from media use, in turn, produce significant consequences in 
citizens’ behavior and attitudes (Cho et al., 2003; Nabi & Wirth, 2008).  That studies of 
political behavior and attitudes in recent years (Marcus et al., 2000) have consistently 
demonstrated the working of emotions may highlight the significance of this inquiry into 
indirect effects of late-night humor on political discussion via the conduit of emotions.  
Moreover, some observers (e.g., Hwang, Pan, & Sun, 2008; Kelly & Edwards, 1992) 
point to the intervening role of emotion between the reception of media content and the 
resulting discursive activities, such as individuals’ discussion and expressions of their 
opinions. 
Building upon these ideas, the current study inquires about the mediating role of 
emotion in translating the influence of late-night comedy into an individual’s deliberation.  
In the preceding chapter, it was shown that exposure to late-night comedy could promote 
viewers’ emotions.  The subsequent section explores the relationship between emotion 
and interpersonal talk.  These two suggested causal links, when conjoined, should 
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present strong support for the hypothesized mediating role of emotion between exposure 
to late-night comedy and interpersonal talk about politics. 
 
Emotion and Interpersonal Talk 
Several scholars have investigated the causal linkage between an individual’s 
emotion and deliberative behavior.  Rosenberg (2007) asserted that deliberative 
democracy requires not only citizens’ cognitive capacity, but also conditions that could 
stimulate their emotional attachment.  Pfau (2007) contended that emotions—
particularly fear and fear appeals—could positively influence political debate and 
deliberation.  As he has recognized, Aristotle’s political theory laid the framework for 
the reinforcing relationship between emotion and deliberation; in the Rhetoric, Aristotle 
(as cited in Pfau, 2007) emphasized the civic utility of emotions in deliberative 
democracy.  While reviewing Gordon’s (1980) essay on fear, Pfau (2007) suggested 
“propositional” fear, which normally involves cognition and attitude, needs to be 
distinguished from a state of fear that is “primitive” and “instinctive.”  He further 
argued that, although the latter may lead to irrational and counterproductive action, the 
former could constitute a series of rational and strategic responses to danger that could 
initiate political debate and deliberations.  Accordingly, there seems to be a distinction 
between spontaneous, panic-stricken “action done out of fear” and deliberative, 
reasoning-driven “fear-motivated action” as in “I flee from a dog out of fear” or “I could 
stand and stare at it for fear that the dog would otherwise bite me” (Pfau, 2007, p. 219).  
Likewise, fear about an unwanted policy or candidate could motivate a citizen to be 
engaged in a series of political debates and deliberation in order to preclude the 
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distasteful consequence.  The present study recognizes the civic utility of emotions 
suggested by philosophers as early as Aristotle, and of particular interest is the role of 
negative emotions (e.g., fear and worry) in deliberative democracy.  
Recent studies (e.g., Heath, Bell, & Steinberg, 2001; Hwang et al., 2008; Luminet, 
Bouts, Delie, Manstead, & Rimé, 2000) have more closely examined the direct linkage 
between negative emotion and interpersonal talk, although not in political contexts.  
While acknowledging the stress-affiliation relationship that negative emotional states 
such as fear and distress tend to elicit affiliation with others (see, for example, Cottrell & 
Epley, 1977; Schachter, 1959; Shaver & Klinnert, 1982), Luminet et al. (2000) have 
observed in their experiments that participants who were assigned to the intense 
emotional condition were more likely to converse about their experience than those who 
were exposed to the mild or non-emotional stories.  In a similar vein, Heath et al. (2001) 
attended to the emotional selection hypothesis, positing that stories would propagate if 
they evoke strong emotions; findings from their studies indicated that people were more 
likely to pass along the stories that elicited higher levels of negative emotions (e.g., 
disgust, anger, and sadness).  In addition, Hwang et al. (2008) demonstrated that media 
indignation (i.e., a specific type of negative emotion toward media bias) is associated 
with an increase in a citizen’s discursive activities, such as expressing one’s criticisms of 
the media, voicing one’s own views, and discussing one’s opinions with others.  Taken 
together, these findings speak to the pervasiveness of interpersonal talk across negative 
emotional states. 
The constructive role of emotion is not confined to anxiety and anger; positive 
emotion, could also contribute to deliberative democracy.  It could be that, unless 
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individuals possess a prospect of a bright future, they may opt to remain silent even if 
they are uneasy about the current state of public affairs.  In this regard, it is worth 
quoting a passage from Rhetoric (as cited in Pfau, 2007, p. 224): “[For fear to continue,] 
there must be some hope of being saved from the cause of agony.  And there is a sign of 
this: fear makes people inclined to deliberation, while no one deliberates about hopeless 
things.”  Implied here is that positive emotion such as excitement and hope may also 
function as a catalyst for political talk.  Supporting this view, Heath et al. (2001) 
demonstrated that citizens were more likely to share their experience with others when 
stories evoked positive emotional states (e.g., interest and amazement).  Similarly, 
Luminet et al. (2000) observed that stories eliciting positive emotion encouraged social 
sharing among citizens no less strongly than the stimuli eliciting negative emotion.  
Murphy, Frank, Moran, and Patnoe-Woodley (2011) recently found that those who are 
experiencing positive emotion were more likely to talk to others in order to maintain their 
affective state.  As such, Hafstad and Aaro (1997) demonstrated that both positive and 
negative affective responses increased the likelihood of discussion and debate with others. 
 
Hypotheses and Research Questions 
Although some observers found that late-night comedy viewing was associated 
with the elevated inclination of political talk (e.g., Landreville et al., 2010; Moy et al., 
2005a), little is known about the processes wherein late-night comedy viewing 
encourages interpersonal talk about politics.  Motivated by this gap in the extant 
literature, the current research proposes an indirect effect model specifically suggesting 
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that consuming satirical humor promotes interpersonal discussion via the conduit of 
emotional experiences. 
Indeed, a clear reason exists to expect that emotion is a vital component for a 
citizen’s engagement in interpersonal talk about politics.  Political scientists (e.g., Pfau, 
2007; Rosenberg, 2007) have recognized that emotion, whether negative or positive, can 
exert considerable influence on an individual’s cognitive and deliberative behavior.  In 
addition, the prediction that emotions propel an individual’s tendency to undertake 
interpersonal talk has received a good deal of empirical support from the literature on the 
social sharing of emotions (e.g., Heath et al., 2001; Luminet et al., 2000; Rimé, Philippot, 
Boca, & Mesquita, 1992).  Furthermore, studies showed that the intensity of emotion 
increased the amount of conversation (Rimé, Mesquita, Boca, & Philippot, 1991) and the 
number of people with whom an individual shared their experiences (Christophe & Rimé, 
1997).  Hence, we should expect positive relationships between emotional responses 
and various features of interpersonal talk.  
Hypothesis 4.1a (H4.1a): Negative emotions will predict greater engagement in 
interpersonal political talk.  
Hypothesis 4.1b (H4.1b): Positive emotions will predict greater engagement in 
interpersonal political talk.  
Although critics of late-night comedy stressed the lack of substantive issues (e.g., 
Niven et al., 2003), some observers found the link between consuming satirical humor 
and engaging in interpersonal talk (e.g., J. Gray et al., 2009; Landreville et al., 2010; Moy 
et al., 2005a).  Moreover, Jones (2010) observed that followers of late-night comedy 
programs continued their deliberative behaviors with strangers or virtual acquaintances 
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they encounter in cyberspace, the results suggesting that frequent use of political satire 
may yield the higher level of online interaction, while enlarging the size of a discussion 
network.  Furthermore, a larger discussion network, by and large loosely connected (i.e., 
weak ties), may refer to the greater diversity and richness of information (Granovetter, 
1973; Huckfeldt et al., 1995).  Thus, individuals engaged in more frequent talk within a 
larger discussion network should imply the increasing likelihood of exposure to a 
multiplicity of viewpoints.  Then, exposure to late-night comedy should add to 
opportunities for heterogeneous discussion.  In short, consuming late-night humor could 
boost various structural aspects of interpersonal talk, thereby producing more deliberate 
and rational citizenry.  
The literature on low-information rationality (e.g., Lupia, 1994; Popkin, 1994; 
Sniderman et al., 1991) in conjunction with studies highlighting the significance of 
emotion in a reasoning process (Brader, 2006; Isbell & Ottati, 2002; Marcus et al., 2000) 
suggest that consuming political satire (often emotionally arousing) could promote a 
deliberate and rational behavior even with a limited amount of information.  Given the 
association between late-night comedy viewing and negative emotions demonstrated in 
the preceding chapter, an indirect effect model of political humor could be proposed 
wherein negative emotions play a significant mediating role transmitting the influence of 
provocative information into political deliberation.  However, we remain less clear 
about the mediating effect of positive emotions, primarily due to the lack of our 
confidence in the link between late-night comedy viewing and positive emotions.  
Hypothesis 4.2 (H4.2): Negative emotions will positively mediate the relationship 
between late-night comedy viewing and engagement in interpersonal talk about politics. 
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Research Question 4.1 (RQ4.1): Do positive emotions will mediate the 
relationship between late-night comedy viewing and engagement in interpersonal talk 
about politics? 
 
Methods 
Hypotheses were tested using the data from the online experiment and the mail 
survey that were introduced in the preceding chapter.  First, manipulating participants’ 
exposure to late-night comedy in an experiment permitted us to examine, in a controlled 
setting, the precise causal effects of consuming humor on emotions and interpersonal talk.  
Then, by replicating the results in a national survey, it was assessed whether the observed 
associations are generalizable to the real-world setting.  Ultimately, combining the 
results from the experiment and the survey uncovered the causal structure of the 
relationships among late-night comedy exposure, emotional responses, and various 
structural features of interpersonal talk.  
 
Study 1: The Online Experiment 
 
Measures 
 
Interpersonal Talk   
The present study employs multiple structural features of interpersonal talk.  As 
in the participation index, talk measures in the experiment captured discursive intention 
in the future instead of actual behavior.  To measure discussion frequency, respondents 
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were asked to report on a 7-point scale (ranging from extremely unlikely to extremely 
likely) their likelihood to engage in a conversation about the government’s bailout with 
three groups of individuals—namely, neighbors, friends, and family.  Reponses were 
averaged to form an index (M = 4.55, SD = 1.71, α = .92).  In addition, the experiment 
incorporates the level of online interaction by measuring the respondents’ inclination to 
take part in three types of communicative activities via web-based technologies on the 
same 7-point scale above.  The three activities were (1) reading or posting a comment 
about the government’s bailout of big companies, (2) discussing the bailout online with 
people over email, in chat rooms, using message boards, forums or instant messaging 
services, and (3) forwarding any emails, audio, or video concerning the bailout.  
Responses were averaged to form a composite index (M = 4.08, SD = 1.79, α = .89).   
In order to operationalize heterogeneous discussion, participants were first asked 
about their opinion pertaining to the expansion of the government’s stimulus plan.  Then, 
participants reported on a 7-point scale (ranging from extremely unlikely to extremely 
likely) their inclination to discuss the issue with four hypothetical types of individuals: a 
friend supporting the expansion of the stimulus plan; a stranger supporting it; a friend 
opposing the expansion; or a stranger opposing it.  For those who supported the 
expansion (n = 384), the level of heterogeneous discussion was computed by averaging 
their responses to indicate the likelihood of discussions with a friend or a stranger who 
opposed it (M = 4.49, SD = 1.54, α = .83).  For the participants who opposed the 
expansion (n = 253), the degree of heterogeneity summarized their intents to converse 
with a friend or a stranger who supported it (M = 4.27, SD = 1.65, α = .82).  For the 
participants who neither supported nor opposed it (n = 131), the tendencies to discuss 
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with all four groups of discussants were averaged to indicate discussion heterogeneity (M 
= 3.68, SD = 1.21, α = .93).  Since there should be intrinsically no between-group 
overlap, the scores from these three groups of differing opinions were merged into a 
single variable to constitute an index of heterogeneous discussion (M = 4.28, SD = 1.55). 
 
Emotional Responses   
The statistical model in this chapter incorporates two independent indices of 
emotional responses that were exploited in the preceding chapter: the ‘negative’ emotion 
index (M = 5.09, SD = 1.61, α = .96) and the ‘positive’ emotion index (M = 2.23, SD = 
1.52, α = .97). 
 
Results 
 
Effects of Emotions on Interpersonal Talk  
The effects of emotions on interpersonal talk (H4.1a H4.1b) were assessed by 
regressing each measure of talk on the indices of negative and positive emotions, 
controlling for the independent variable (i.e., the late-night comedy group dummy and the 
hard news group dummy).  Findings reveal the significant role of both negative and 
positive emotions in motivating interpersonal talk.  Negative emotions predicted greater 
likelihood of frequent discussion (b = .367, SE = .037, p < .001), more willingness to 
discuss with those holding heterogeneous opinions (b = .221, SE = .035, p < .001), and 
increased intent to engage in online discursive activities (b = .391, SE = .038, p < .001).  
In addition, positive emotions raised the levels of three structural features of interpersonal 
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talk: discussion frequency (b = .137, SE = .039, p < .001), heterogeneous discussion (b 
= .122, SE = .037, p < .001), and online interaction (b = .214, SE = .040, p < .001), 
respectively.  
 
 
Note. Unstandardized regression coefficients are reported with standard errors in 
parentheses. Estimates were calculated using Preacher and Hayes’ (2008) indirect SPSS 
macro.  
#p<.10; *p<.05; **p<.01; ***p<.001 
 
Mediating Effects of Emotions   
Preacher and Hayes’ (2008) indirect SPSS macro allows for the statistical 
assessment of the mediating effects of emotions (H4.2 and RQ4.1) by first regressing 
respective mediators (negative emotions and positive emotions) on the independent 
variables (late-night comedy exposure dummy and television news exposure dummy) and, 
Figure 4.1. Mediation model of media exposure, emotions, and interpersonal talk 
in experiment (Experiment, N = 768) 
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subsequently by regressing individual dependent variables (structural features of 
interpersonal talk) on the mediators controlling for the independent variables.  The 
computed regression coefficients and corresponding standard errors were reported in 
Figure 4.1.  First, analyses based on the Baron and Kenny’s (1986) causal steps 
approach suggested that positive emotions did not seem to play a significant mediating 
role primarily due to the lack of direct relationship between late-night comedy exposure 
and the positive emotion index—(a) condition, although the latter predicted considerable 
increases in features of talk—(b) condition.  
 
Table 4.1. Mediation of the relationships between late-night comedy exposure and 
structural features of interpersonal talk through emotions (Experiment, N = 768) 
Note. CIs are bias-corrected and -accelerated 95% confidence interval (Bootstrap N = 
5,000). 
#p < .10; *p < .05; **p < .01; ***p < .001 
 
On the other hand, findings endorsed the hypothesized indirect effects of late-
night comedy viewing on interpersonal talk through negative emotions.  The results 
showed the significant effect of late-night comedy exposure on negative emotions—(a) 
condition, while confirming the close relationships between negative emotions and 
various components of interpersonal talk—(b) condition.  The remaining Baron and 
 Discussion Online Heterogeneous 
  Frequency Interaction Discussion 
Total, direct, and    
indirect effects: coefficient (SE)    
    Total effect of IV on DV .428** (.150) .486** (.157) .219 (.137) 
    Direct effect of IV on DV .267# (.142) .326* (.148) .129 (.134) 
    Indirect effect of IV on DV .161** (.057) .160** (.061) .090** (.038) 
    
Formal tests of the indirect effect    
    Sobel z value 2.825 2.623 2.368 
    Bootstrapping CI .058 to .278 .044 to .283 .024 to .174 
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Kenny’s (1986) conditions were met, when Table 4.1 illustrated that the total effects of 
late-night comedy exposure on discussion frequency, online interaction, and 
heterogeneous discussion—i.e., (c) condition—became significantly smaller after 
accounting for the indirect influence via emotional responses—i.e., (c') condition 
(from .428 to .267; .486 to .326; and .219 to .129, respectively).  The Sobel test (Sobel, 
1982) and the bootstrap analysis (Hayes, 2009) results summarized in Table 4.1 further 
demonstrated that late-night comedy exerted significant indirect effects on the three 
structural features of interpersonal talk through negative emotions.   
Meanwhile, it is worth noting that the total effect of late-night comedy on 
heterogeneous discussion was insignificant, whereas its indirect influence through 
emotional responses was highly significant by any standards (e.g., Sobel z = 2.368, p 
< .01, and bootstrapping CI = . 024 to .174).  According to Hayes (2009), it is likely to 
occur when “two or more indirect paths carry the effect from X through Y, and those 
paths operate in opposite directions” (p. 414).  As can be inferred from Figure 4.1, 
indirect paths through negative emotions and positive emotions worked in opposition 
directions, which rendered the total effect insignificant.   As this example clearly 
illustrates, we may find an indirect effect even in the absence of a significant direct effect 
(a.k.a. total effect).  Thus, many (e.g., Hayes, 2009; Hayes et al., 2011; MacKinnon et 
al., 2000; Shrout & Bolger, 2002) now suggest that a significant direct effect—a key 
prerequisite according to Baron and Kenny (1986)—should not be imposed for the 
assessments of indirect effects. 
To further disentangle these indirect effects, the point estimates and confidence 
intervals were computed for specific indirect paths, and the results are summarized in 
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Table 4.2.  The Sobel test and the bootstrap confidence interval results clearly indicate 
that late-night comedy exposure increased diverse components of interpersonal talk 
indirectly via the conduit of negative emotions including discussion frequency, online 
interaction, and heterogeneous discussion.  By contrast, none of the indirect paths 
through positive emotions were significant.  Combined results imply that late-night 
comedy consumption indirectly encourages engagement in various forms of discursive 
participation by stimulating negative emotions.  In addition to this indirect influence, 
consuming late-night humor also directly propelled an increase in online interaction (b 
= .326, SE = .148, p < .05), as shown in Figure 4.1.  Meanwhile, exposure to television 
news directly increased discussion frequency (b = .429, SE = .141, p < .01) and online 
interaction (b = .289, SE = .147, p < .05) without any comparable indirect link via 
emotions. 
 
Table 4.2. Specific indirect effects of late-night comedy exposure on discussion 
frequency, online interaction, and heterogeneous discussion through negative emotions 
and positive emotions (Experiment, N = 768) 
Note. D: Discussion frequency; O: Online interaction; H: Heterogeneous discussion 
NE: Negative emotions; PE: Positive emotions; CIs are bias-corrected and -accelerated 
95% confidence intervals (Bootstrap N = 5,000).  
#p < .10; *p < .05; **p < .01; ***p < .001 
 
Accounting for Rival Explanations: Cognitive and Attitudinal Factors 
Specific Indirect Effect Point Estimate Boot SE Sobel z CI 
L → NE → D .184*** .057 3.228 .080 to .303 
L → NE → O .196*** .059 3.322 .088 to .319 
L → NE → H .111** .038 2.921 .046 to .200 
L → PE → D -.023 .057 -0.404 -.069 to .011 
L → PE → O -.036 .030 -1.200 -.096 to .021 
L → PE → H -.021 .018 -1.167 -.064 to .007 
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In order to account for possible cognitive and attitudinal mechanisms, an 
additional model incorporated attitudes and resources such as internal efficacy, political 
interest, and willingness to learn (as a proxy for political knowledge), which might 
mediate between exposure to late-night comedy and engagement in interpersonal talk.  
Findings from the bootstrapping of 5,000 samples show that even after controlling for the 
possible mediation by cognitive attitudes and resources, exposure to late-night comedy 
exerted indirect influence via negative emotions on discussion frequency (b = .111, Boot 
SE = .036, CI = .048 to .190), heterogeneous discussion (b = .060, Boot SE = .025, CI = 
.021 to .118), and online interaction (b = .130, Boot SE = .041, CI = .057 to .220).  
Hence, the results clearly speak to the mediating role that negative emotions play 
between exposure to late-night comedy and engagement in interpersonal talk, above and 
beyond more conventional cognitive and attitudinal accounts.   
 
Study 2: The Mail Survey 
 
Measures 
 
Interpersonal Talk 
Consistent with the experiment, the survey investigates multiple structural 
features of interpersonal talk.  For the measure of discussion frequency, respondents 
were asked to report on an 8-point scale (ranging from never in the last 2 months to every 
day) how often they discuss politics with neighbors, friends, and family and responses 
were combined to form an index (M = 2.98, SD = 1.71, α = .84).  Heterogeneous 
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discussion was operationalized by a single item asking on a 6-point scale (ranging from 
definitely disagree to definitely agree) to what extent respondents believe that most 
people they talk to have different political views than their own (M = 3.56, SD = 1.38).  
For the measure of network size, respondents were asked on an open-ended question to 
report the number of people with whom they talk about politics and public affairs (M = 
5.00, SD = 4.55). 
 
Emotional Responses 
As with the preceding chapter, the structural model for the survey exploited two 
independent indices of emotional responses: the ‘negative’ emotion index (M = 3.22, SD 
= 1.01, α = .38) and the ‘positive’ emotion index (M = 3.02, SD = .78, α = .20). 
 
Late-night Comedy Viewing 
Late-night comedy consumption was operationalized in the same manner as in 
the previous chapter (M = 1.33, SD = .76, α = .85). 
 
Conventional News Use  
The model incorporated measures of conventional news uses: television news use 
(M = 3.73, SD = 1.26, α = .79) and newspaper use (M = 3.73, SD = 1.26, α = .79). 
 
Control Variables 
Analyses controlled for a host of demographic variables, including age (M = 
51.86, SD = 13.25), gender (46% female), race (75% white), household income (Median: 
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$55,000), education (Median: ‘some college or associate degrees’), and party affiliation 
(33% Republican, 31% Democrat).  In addition, the model incorporated political interest 
(M = 3.50, SD = 1.71), knowledge (M = 2.25, SD = 1.43, KR-20 =.75), and internal 
efficacy (M = 2.83, SD = 1.22, α = .60) that could also explain variance in media uses, 
emotional responses, and interpersonal talk.   
 
Results 
 
Model Specification and Modification   
A path model was specified using AMOS.  Before fitting the model to the data, 
all variables in the model were residualized for the previously discussed control variables 
to avoid any confounding results (see Table 4.3).  The analyses were then conducted 
with the covariance matrix of unstandardized error terms obtained from this 
residualization procedure.  First, a saturated model was estimated, with all structural 
paths left free.  The model was then trimmed by removing non-significant paths (p 
> .05).   
 
Model Fit 
Figure 4.2 reports unstandardized coefficients from the path model of media uses, 
emotions, and interpersonal talk.  Overall, this model fits the data well, with a chi-
square value of 16.49 with 14 degrees of freedom.  Other goodness-of-fit indices also 
provide evidence of the adequacy of the model (p = .28; RMSEA = .02, 90% CI for 
RMSEA = .00 to .04; GFI = 0.99; AGFI = 0.99; and NFI = 0.96).  
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Relationships between Emotions and Interpersonal Talk   
Findings support H4.1a that negative emotions predicted increases in discussion 
frequency (b = .215, SE = .039, p < .001), heterogeneous discussion (b = .143, SE = .033, 
p < .001), and network size (b = .219, SE = .103, p < .05).  However, positive emotions 
did not yield comparable relationships with components of interpersonal talk (H4.1b).  
 
Note. Unstandardized path coefficients are reported with standard errors in parentheses. 
Estimates were calculated by AMOS based on the Maximum Likelihood Estimation 
method.  The effects of demographics (age, gender, race, household income, education, 
and party affiliation) and cognitive factors (internal efficacy, political interest and 
knowledge) on endogenous and exogenous variables have been residualized. 
 
Figure 4.2. Path model of media exposure, emotions, and interpersonal talk 
(Survey, N = 777) 
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Table 4.3. Results from regressing exogenous and endogenous variables of the path model on control variables (Survey, N = 777) 
Note. Unstandardized regression coefficients calculated by SPSS are reported along with corresponding standard errors in parentheses.   
#p < .10; *p < .05; **p < .01; ***p < .001 
  
Discussion Network Heterogeneous Negative Positive Late-Night Television Newspaper 
Frequency Size Discussion Emotions Emotions Comedy Use News Use Use 
Age 
.006  
(.004) 
.001  
(.011) 
.005 
(.004) 
-.011**  
(.004) 
.000  
(.002) 
-.006**  
(.002) 
.015***  
(.004) 
.014***  
(.004) 
Gender(female=1) 
-.068  
(.118) 
-.644* 
(.306) 
-.039  
(.105) 
.031  
(.109) 
.161** 
(.058) 
.003  
(.057) 
.299**  
(.095) 
.057**  
(.110) 
Race(White=1) 
-.333*  
(.145) 
-.771* 
(.376) 
-.027  
(.128) 
-.154  
(.133) 
-.037  
(.070) 
.133#  
(.071) 
-.277*  
(.117) 
-.228  
(.134) 
Household income 
.002  
(.001) 
.005  
(.003) 
.000  
(.001) 
-.000  
(.001) 
-.001  
(.001) 
-.001#  
(.001) 
.001  
(.001) 
.001#  
(.001) 
Education 
.034  
(.060) 
.094  
(.160) 
-.211*** 
(.054) 
.001  
(.056) 
-.060*  
(.030) 
.109***  
(.029) 
-.142**  
(.049) 
-.008  
(.055) 
Party ID 
(Dem=high) 
-.080  
(.050) 
-.054  
(.129) 
.121** 
(.044) 
.558***  
(.046) 
.072**  
(.024) 
.125***  
(.024) 
.065  
(.040) 
.088#  
(.046) 
Internal efficacy 
.342***  
(.059) 
1.053*** 
(.152) 
.153** 
(.052) 
.039  
(.054) 
.176***  
(.029) 
.054#  
(.028) 
-.004  
(.047) 
.026  
(.054) 
Political knowledge 
.171** 
(.050) 
.394** 
(.130) 
-.067 
(.044) 
.189***  
(.046) 
-.016  
(.024) 
.021  
(.024) 
.080*  
(.040) 
.168***  
(.046) 
Political interest 
.123**  
(.043) 
.501***  
(.112) 
-.047  
(.038) 
-.012  
(.040) 
.005  
(.021) 
.040#  
(.021) 
.036  
(.035) 
-.046  
(.040) 
R2 (%) 21.5 27.8 5.7 20.2 9.4 9.0 7.3 6.0 
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Mediating Effects of Emotions 
Consistent with the findings of the experiment, the relationships retained in the 
survey bolster the hypothesized indirect effect of late-night comedy consumption on 
interpersonal talk via the conduit of negative emotions, whereas little is found for the 
mediating influence of positive emotions.  Evaluating the causal steps suggested by 
Baron and Kenny (1986) reveals that late-night comedy consumption was little 
intertwined with positive emotions—i.e., (a) condition, which did not show a significant 
relationships with any feature of talk examined—i.e., (b) condition.  In contrast, 
findings advocate the significant indirect effects through negative emotions.  First, the 
significant relationship between the measure of late-night comedy consumption and the 
index of negative emotions presents support for the (a) condition, while the latter’s 
meaningful links to various components of interpersonal talk sustains the (b) condition.  
Table 4.4. Mediation of the relationships between late-night comedy exposure and 
structural features of interpersonal talk through emotions (Survey, N = 777) 
Note. CIs are bias-corrected 95% confidence interval (Bootstrap N = 5,000). 
#p < .10; *p < .05; **p < .01; ***p < .001 
 
 Discussion Network Heterogeneous 
  Frequency Size Discussion 
Total, direct, and    
indirect effects: coefficient (SE)    
    Total effect of IV on DV .054** (.019) .055* (.032) .036** (.014) 
    Direct effect of IV on DV — — — 
    Indirect effect of IV on DV .054** (.019) .055* (.032) .036** (.014) 
    
Formal tests of the indirect effect    
    Sobel z value 2.842 1.719 2.571 
    Bootstrapping CI .022 to .099 .007 to .136 .014 to .068 
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The results fulfill the remaining Baron and Kenny’s (1986) conditions, when 
Table 4.4 shows that the total effects of late-night comedy consumption on discussion 
frequency, network size, and heterogeneous discussion—i.e., (c) condition—disappeared 
after accounting for the indirect influence via emotional responses—i.e., (c') condition.  
Consistent with analytical approaches employed in the experiment, the investigation 
incorporated the Sobel test (Sobel, 1982) and the bootstrap analysis (Hayes, 2009) for 
more rigorous testing of indirect effects.  The results summarized in Table 4.4 clearly 
demonstrate that late-night comedy consumption was indirectly associated with 
discussion frequency, network size, and heterogeneous discussion through negative 
emotions.   
Further in line with the experiment results, the linkages between conventional 
news uses and structural components of talk were not mediated by either emotion type. 
Figure 4.2 illustrates that instead of comparable indirect relationships via emotions, the 
use of newspaper showed only a direct association with expanded network size (b = .311, 
SE = .104, p < .01).  The consumption of television news was attached to positive 
emotions (b = .063, SE = .023, p < .01), yet positive emotions did not predict any feature 
of interpersonal talk, thus failing to show an indirect relationship.  
 
Discussion 
The findings of the current research support the hypotheses concerning the 
mediating effects of negative emotions on the relationship between exposure to late-night 
comedy and engagement in interpersonal talk.  In the experiment, it was observed that 
negative emotions mediated and enriched the effects of exposure to late-night comedy on 
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the respondents’ intended engagement with interpersonal talk (H4.2), with the 
manipulation of humor provoking their anger and worry and the stirred negative emotions 
predicting higher levels of discussion frequency, heterogeneous discussion, and online 
interaction (H4.1a).  By and large, the results of the survey replicate those of the 
experiment, testifying to the generalizability of the observed relationships in the real-
world setting.  In the survey, frequent use of late-night comedy was associated with a 
higher level of negative emotions, which in turn, was tied to increases in discussion 
frequency, heterogeneous discussion, and network size (H4.1a).  Thus, late-night 
comedy consumption seemed to have an indirect relationship with higher levels of talk 
via the conduit of negative emotions.  Further, the bootstrapping results from both study 
designs clearly indicate that negative emotions played a significant reinforcing mediating 
role between consuming satirical humor and engaging in interpersonal political talk 
(H4.2).  Given the strengths of the experiment and the survey, the present study clearly 
evidenced that late-night comedy watching could promote viewers’ engagement in 
interpersonal talk about politics indirectly by stimulating their negative emotions. 
In contrast, conventional news uses did not seem to produce comparable indirect 
associations with interpersonal talk via emotions.  Instead, the combined results from 
the experiment and the survey suggest that the links between conventional news uses and 
interpersonal talk were mostly direct.  In the experiment, exposure to television news 
yielded direct increases in potential discussion frequency and online interaction, whereas 
the results of the survey indicate that frequent use of newspaper was directly associated 
with an expanded discussion network size. 
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On the other hand, the present study found little data supporting the mediating 
role of positive emotions.  Although the results of the experiment showed the expected 
relationships between positive emotions and structural dimensions of interpersonal talk 
(H4.1b), the consumption of late-night comedy failed to produce a significant link to 
positive emotions in both research designs.  Muffled effects of positive emotions 
observed in this chapter may have warranted the prominence of negative emotions when 
it comes to more careful and attentive processing of information (Marcus et al., 2000).  
However, as in the preceding chapter, the lack of a mediating effect and the erratic results 
may allude to weaknesses in operationalization.  The positive emotion index in the 
survey combined respondents’ hopeful and excited responses toward the two major 
parties, which was measured by enthusiasm about a government’s policy in the 
experiment.  Hence, the types as well as the objects of positive emotion exploited in the 
two research designs differed, and these inconsistencies may have produced vague results.  
Although relatively less attention has been paid to distinct ramifications of different types 
of positive emotion, future research can benefit from incorporating more diverse positive 
emotion items while assessing their specific causes and effects.  
Furthermore, the present study revealed little about the difference between anger 
and worry, which has received a great deal of scholarly attention lately.  In particular, 
many students of the cognitive appraisal theory have identified unique causes (Huddy et 
al., 2007; Lerner & Keltner, 2001; MacKuen et al., 2010) and effects (Lerner & Keltner, 
2001; Valentino et al., 2011; Weber, 2007) of fear (or worry) and anger (or aversion).  
With regard to deliberative behaviors, MacKuen et al. (2010) recently demonstarted that 
anger stemming from familiar threats tends to propel a biased search for supportive 
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information and resistance to accomodation, whereas anxiety evoked by unfamiliar 
circumstances promotes the balanced consideration of heterogeneous views and more 
willingness to compromise.  Hence, the following research questions should ignite 
further intellectual inquiries about the causes and effects of discrete emotions: What type 
of negative emotion is more likely following the consumption of late-night humor?  
What type of negative emotion encourages interpersonal talk more powerfully?  Do 
anger and worry promote different types of discussion (e.g., discussion with likeminded 
others or those with dissimilar views)? 
As with measures employed in the current research, the overall design is not 
without limitations.  Due to the limitation of the data, the causal relationships observed 
in the current research tend to address the short-term nature.  Although care was taken in 
both the experiment and survey to control for cognitive and attitudinal measures that 
could serve as alternative mediators between late-night comedy consumption and 
interpersonal talk, it is still plausible that emotions, in the long run, can influence an 
individual’s more stable cognitive attitudes or resources that could subsequently promote 
discursive activities.  In particular, it could well be that provoked negative emotions 
may spur further information search, thereby increasing the level of an individual’s hard 
knowledge.  Future study may exploit a time-series design (e.g., panel survey and 
pretest-posttest experiment) and investigate the long-term interrelatedness between 
emotions and other cognitive measures that could intervene between the reception and the 
final outcome.  
Incorporating a time-anchored study will also improve our understanding about 
the temporal precedence between emotions and interpersonal talk.  Even in the 
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experiment, emotions and structural features of interpersonal talk were measured 
simultaneously.  For instance, it is feasible that exposure to late-night comedy affect 
emotions and interpersonal talk, thereby leaving the observed link between these two 
spurious.  However, this alternative explanation for the relationship can be ruled out, 
when a post-hoc examination of correlation coefficients revealed that the index of 
negative emotions was highly correlated with all three structural measures of 
interpersonal talk (discussion frequency: r = .220, p < .001; heterogeneous discussion: r 
= .177, p < .01; and online interaction, r = .249, p < .001), even when the manipulation 
condition was held constant (i.e., within the late-night comedy group).   
Another more serious confounding issue is the reverse causal direction. It seems 
more plausible that manipulating the tone in the experiment immediately elicited 
emotions; respondents’ willingness to engage in talk was likely to follow.  However, 
over an extended period of time, emotion might also become the effect of interpersonal 
talk.  For instance, persistent engagement in interpersonal talk may reinforce or 
undermine prior emotional states depending upon the nature of discussion network (e.g., 
whether it is homogenous or heterogeneous).  Hence, future study needs to adopt a time-
series design (e.g., panel survey and pretest-posttest experiment) in order to fend off these 
reverse and reciprocal orders that may underlie the mundane relationships. 
Notwithstanding the shortcomings, the findings of this chapter contribute to our 
understanding of the relationship between mass media and interpersonal communication.  
In particular, the results indicate that late-night comedy viewing could encourage 
interpersonal talk about politics in an idiosyncratic manner clearly distinguished from the 
process for conventional news channels; consuming humor could indirectly spur 
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discursive activities among audiences by eliciting their negative emotion, whereas the 
comparable mechanisms for traditional news were mostly direct with little development 
of affective responses.  Moreover, the two employed research designs replicated the 
pattern of indirect associations between the various modes of news acquisition and the 
engagement in interpersonal talk, thereby cementing our confidence in the 
generalizability of the observed casual relationships.  
Indeed, the results clearly suggest that late-night comedy programs play no less 
significant role than traditional news sources in fostering interpersonal talk and that their 
motivational influence is primarily explained by negative emotions that may arise from 
exposure to widespread criticism of satire.  Frequent viewers of late-night comedy 
programs who are encouraged to participate in interpersonal talk by their emotional 
experiences should be distinguished from cynical citizens, who are tired of politics and 
opt to remain silent in a forum for public debate.  Thus, the findings of this chapter 
should alarm those who often downplay the value of late-night comedy in democratic 
discourse and criticize it for brewing cynicism among citizens while ultimately leading 
them into political inactivity.  At the very least, late-night comedy shows seem to 
encourage citizens’ meaningful discussion about politics and prompt more animated 
engagement in the public discourse by eliciting their emotional responses.  
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Chapter 5  
Communication Mediation Model of Late-Night Comedy 
The present chapter advances the communication mediation model (J. M. 
McLeod et al., 2001; Sotirovic & McLeod, 2001) as a theoretical and empirical 
framework to investigate the process wherein consuming satirical humor works in 
concert with interpersonal discussion to stimulate political engagement.  Recognizing 
the complementary relationships between mass media and interpersonal talk should shed 
light on indirect consequences that conventional direct effects models could not account 
for (Southwell & Yzer, 2007).  Mass communication scholars have long noted that one 
type of media use can influence another and that this joint relationship can shape political 
attitude and behavior (J. M. McLeod, Scheufele, & Moy, 1999).  Briefly, it will be 
argued that viewing late-night comedy can trigger interpersonal political talk, which 
would in turn spur political participation. 
 
Theoretical Model: Communication Mediation Model 
Although earlier perspectives tended to view news media and interpersonal 
communication as competing sources of information (Klapper, 1960), most scholars have 
now accepted them as complementary or convergent forces (Chaffee & Mutz, 1988).  
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The idea that interpersonal talk largely mediates between the consumption of news 
information and individual engagement stemmed from as early as Bryce’s (1973) four 
stages of the public opinion formation (i.e., reading newspapers; political talk, opinion 
formation; and participation) and it became widely published with the introduction of the 
two-step flow model (Katz & Lazarsfeld, 1955).  In recent decades, a growing body of 
literature (e.g., Cho et al., 2009; Holbert, 2005a; Shah et al., 2005; Shah et al., 2007) 
stressed that mass media work in conjunction with interpersonal networks to produce 
behavioral outcomes.  For instance, Scheufele (2002) showed that interpersonal 
discussion plays a role in the reception and processing of political news by translating 
mass-mediated messages into meaningful individual action.  Consequently, he 
concluded that people who are frequent hard news users are significantly more likely to 
engage in various forms of political action if they talk these issues through with others 
than are frequent news users who talk to others less often.  
Examination of the complementary relationships between mass media and 
interpersonal discussion culminated with the advent of the communication mediation 
model (J. M. McLeod et al., 2001; Sotirovic & McLeod, 2001), which theorizes 
deliberation among citizens as a critical intervening variable between news consumption 
and participatory behavior.  One of the implicit premises in the theory postulates that 
although the influence of mass media on participatory behavior is strong, it is mostly 
mediated by an individual’s discussion about politics.  Building upon the model, Shah et 
al. (2005) showed that citizens’ information seeking and communication, both online and 
offline, served as an intermediary channeling the effects of news consumption onto civic 
participation.  In addition, Shah et al. (2007) demonstrated that campaign ads exerted 
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direct influence on civic and political engagement to a lesser extent, yet political talk 
largely played a substantial mediating role, while reinforcing the effects of ad exposure 
on participatory behavior.  Further expanding the scope of the theoretical framework by 
synthesizing the communication mediation model with the cognitive mediation model 
(Eveland, 2001; Eveland, Shah, & Kwak, 2003), Cho et al. (2009) observed that 
campaign ad exposure and news consumption could produce indirect effects on political 
participation through face-to-face political conversation, online political messaging, and 
cognitive reflection. 
Explanations for the positive mediating effect of interpersonal talk on the 
association between news media exposure and political participation are twofold.  First, 
receiving news information offers resourceful subjects for political conversations (Delli 
Carpini & Williams, 1994), which could, in turn, underscore common issues, highlight 
opportunities for recruitments, and eventually ignite participatory motivation (Kwak et 
al., 2005; J. M. McLeod, Scheufele, & Moy, 1999).  Second, scholars understand the 
reinforcing mediating role in terms of the deliberative nature of interpersonal talk and 
accordingly conceptualize it as a reasoning behavior that facilitates mainly the influence 
of news exposure (Cho et al., 2009; Eveland, 2004; Shah et al., 2007).  In fact, there is 
some evidence illustrating that interpersonal discussion could facilitate individuals’ 
understanding of the news (Robinson & Levy, 1986).  Implied in this proposition is that 
individuals anticipating interpersonal talk tend to show more careful cognitive processing 
of information, which frequently involves elaboration and collective consideration (Jung 
et al., 2011).  
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By integrating mass and interpersonal information channels, the communication 
mediation model portrays a fuller process whereby news consumption yields various 
attitudinal and behavioral outcomes.  The present chapter aims to extend the scope of 
the communication mediation model.  To this end, late-night comedy will be introduced 
as an additional independent variable while exploring how various structural features of 
interpersonal talk mediate the effects of consuming humor on participating in politics.  
To set up this mediation model, the following sections will highlight the pivotal features 
of interpersonal communication and their roles in participatory democracy.  Then, I will 
discuss the potential effects of late-night comedy viewing on diverse elements of 
interpersonal talk.   
 
Structural Features of Interpersonal Talk and Their Effects on Participation 
Sufficient evidence has accumulated to confirm that interpersonal political 
discussion is an essential catalyst for political participation (e.g., Gastil, Deess, & Weiser, 
2002; J. Kim et al., 1999; Kwak et al., 2005; J. M. McLeod, Scheufele, & Moy, 1999; 
Pan et al., 2006; Scheufele, 2002).  Discussing politics provides citizens with resources 
that are conducive to political engagement such as civic virtues, participatory motivations 
(Brady, Verba, & Schlozman, 1995; Verba et al., 1995), and social networks (J. M. 
McLeod, Scheufele, & Moy, 1999).  In addition, political discussion affords citizens 
numerous benefits including exposure to diverse perspectives, opportunities for issue 
deliberation, and contact with civic recruitment (Shah et al., 2005).   
Indeed, the mobilizing effects of interpersonal talk have been advocated by a 
sizable body of empirical work.  For example, Gastil et al. (2002) found that participants 
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in jury deliberations were subsequently more likely to vote in elections.  Gastil (2000) 
observed that participating in the Kettering Foundation’s National Issues Forums 
augmented political activity.  In addition, Wuthnow (1994) showed that participants in 
“the small group movement” who deliberated were subsequently moved to pursue a range 
of political activities.  Recently, Jacobs, Cook, and Delli Carpini (2009) demonstrated 
that engagement in face-to-face forums exerted a considerable effect on elite contacting 
and civic participation. 
Meanwhile, as reviewed earlier in Chapter 4, communication scholars have 
identified a multitude of structural features entrenched in interpersonal discussion that 
may yield distinct ramifications such as discussion frequency, network size, 
heterogeneous discussion, and online interaction.  First, researchers have consistently 
found the significant effects of frequent conversations among family, friends, and co-
workers on political participation (e.g., J. Kim et al., 1999; Marques & Maia, 2010; Pan 
et al., 2006; Wyatt et al., 2000).  Mobilizing effects of frequent discussion may transpire 
by improving citizens’ efficacy and knowledge and by empowering them to share 
information, perceive common issues, and hear about recruiting opportunities (Eveland & 
Thomson, 2006; Gil de Zúñiga, 2009; Klofstad, 2007; Rojas et al., 2005; Walsh, 2004). 
The size of a discussion network is yet another important structural aspect that 
may prove beneficial to participatory democracy.  The significance of a larger network 
was recognized as early as in Granovetter’s (1973) idea of weak ties, which suggested 
that an extended network refers to the increased number of weak ties that could help 
citizens assimilate skills and resources they may find useful for their participation.  In 
line with this notion, numerous scholars observed that citizens entrenched in a more 
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extensive network tended to show greater participatory orientations, even after 
controlling for the frequency of political discussion (Gil de Zúñiga & Valenzuela, 2011; 
Kwak et al., 2005; J. M. McLeod, Scheufele, & Moy, 1999; Moy & Gastil, 2006; Rojas, 
2008; Scheufele et al., 2004).  For instance, Rojas (2008) found that network size was a 
strong predictor of active membership in voluntary organizations, including 
neighborhood and educational organizations.  Shah et al. (2005) demonstrated having 
more contacts can also increase individuals’ frequency of discussion about public affairs, 
which has been shown to have a direct effect on civic engagement.  Rojas, Shah, and 
Friedland (2011) have recently demonstrated that network size can intersect with news 
exposure (particularly, news attention) to spur civic engagement.   
In addition, explanations have been offered to substantiate the presumed link 
between network size and participation.  Huckfeldt et al. (1995) argued that network 
size should increase the likelihood of receiving non-redundant recruiting opportunities for 
participation, and Lake and Huckfeldt (1998) later found that citizens entrenched in a 
more extensive network tended to show greater participatory orientations, even after 
controlling for the frequency of political discussion.  As such, individuals with larger 
social networks are more likely to encounter politically active individuals, and interacting 
with them could stimulate greater participation (Leighley, 1990; Verba et al., 1995).  
The introduction of the Internet has led scholars to examine whether online 
interaction via web-based communication technologies such as e-mail, instant messaging, 
electronic bulletin boards, and online chats has the capability to promote participation in 
a manner that amplifies the benefits of offline discussion by reducing time and costs 
(Matei & Ball-Rokeach, 2002; Shah et al., 2007; Valenzuela et al., 2009).  Diverse 
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communication methods via the Internet permit citizens to freely exchange their 
perspectives, encounter more frequent opportunities for political engagement, and 
coordinate community activities with ease (Shah et al., 2005; Shah et al., 2007).  Indeed, 
empirical evidence supports the constructive role of communicative behaviors on the 
Internet in fostering political participation and community engagement (Bakker & de 
Vreese, 2011; Ho & McLeod, 2008; Jung et al., 2011; Shah et al., 2007).  Given that 
online communication tend to be more goal-oriented than offline talk (Berger, 2009), the 
former should produce no less strong mobilizing effects among citizens (Gil de Zúñiga & 
Valenzuela, 2011).  While evaluating the relative outcomes of these two (not necessarily 
competing but more complementary) deliberation modes, Min (2007) demonstrated under 
a controlled setting that online discussion evoked participants’ willingness to participate 
in politics to the comparable extent that face-to-face communication did. 
In addition, we may investigate the potential consequences of interpersonal 
communication in light of the extent to which individuals are engaged in heterogeneous 
discussion.  However, sharp inconsistencies arise surrounding the motivational role of 
heterogeneous discussion.  Most notably, Mutz (2002, 2006) argued that “cross-cutting 
exposure” should predict the lower level of political participation, and this claim has 
received some empirical support (Bélanger & Eagles, 2007; McClurg, 2006a, 2006b).  
In contrast, a sizable body of literature advocated the positive relationship between 
greater engagement in heterogeneous discussion and political participation (Ikeda & 
Boase, 2011; Leighley, 1990; Scheufele, Hardy, Brossard, Waismel-Manor, & Nisbet, 
2006).  To better understand this causal chain, others advanced more complex 
communication processes—e.g., mediating (Scheufele et al., 2004; Wojcieszak, Baek, & 
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Delli Carpini, 2010) or moderating (E. Kim et al., 2011; Kwak et al., 2005; Wojcieszak et 
al., 2010)—wherein heterogeneous discussion operates. 
Conflicting results surrounding the participatory effects of heterogeneous 
discussion might be reconciled when we consider two key underlying mechanisms, each 
of which could provide an account of either a negative dampening influence or a positive 
mobilizing role (Lee, in press).  First, greater engagement in heterogeneous discussion 
can exert detrimental effects on political participation by creating attitudinal ambivalence 
about complex issue stances, thereby leaving citizens rather apathetic (Huckfeldt et al., 
2004; Mutz, 2002, 2006).  In contrast, the second explanation refers to the positive role, 
suggesting that exposure to dissimilar viewpoints could spur participation indirectly by 
facilitating learning about politics.  According to this optimistic view, exposure to non-
congruent perspectives can force individuals to learn about alternatives and reflect more 
carefully upon their own opinions, and it could further promote information seeking via 
hard news channels (J. M. McLeod, Scheufele, Moy, et al., 1999; Scheufele et al., 2003; 
Scheufele et al., 2004).  Rather than being mutually exclusive, these two processes are 
likely to occur simultaneously in the actual communication environment.    
However, the relative importance of these two mechanisms may be determined in 
terms of an individual’s expertise such that one process prevails over the other among a 
particular group of people.  Specifically, ambivalence seems to provide an overriding 
explanation for the effects of encountering dissimilar viewpoints among less skillful 
citizens.  For the most part, ambivalence, as characterized by less firmly held viewpoints 
(Scheufele et al., 2004), is more prevalent among political novices.  On the other hand, 
learning provides a better account for the influence of heterogeneous discussion among 
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political experts.  After all, the central tenet of the knowledge gap hypothesis posits that 
those who are already savvy tend to learn more (Tichenor, Donahue, & Olien, 1970).  
Moreover, well-educated citizens are more likely to possess the cognitive skills 
facilitating them to comprehend and assimilate the intricacies of complex information 
(Rosenberg, 1988) frequently featured in clashes of heterogeneous opinions.  
Consequently, we should expect that rewards of factual knowledge gain from deliberation 
of heterogeneous views are greater for political experts.  Taken together, it is arguable 
that heterogeneous discussion demobilizes less skillful citizens by generating their 
ambivalence, whereas it could play a constructive role among well-educated counterparts 
by increasing their knowledge.  Although empirical evidence directly that would this 
claim is sparse, some recent studies have stressed that individual factors could moderate 
the extent to which heterogeneous discussion influences political participation (E. Kim et 
al., 2011; Wojcieszak et al., 2010).  Thus, it will be interesting to assess not only 
whether deliberation of dissimilar views can spur political participation, but also who is 
more prone to mobilization because of conversing with non-likeminded others. 
 
Late-Night Comedy and Structural Features of Interpersonal Talk 
Late-night comedy could spark critical debate by uncovering wrong doings and 
ills of the govnerment and by making poltical criticism more accessible (Caufield, 2008).  
Bolstering the constructive role of entertainment media in deliberative democracy, Delli 
Carpini and Williams (2001) observed that both informational and entertainment media 
sources could encourage political talk during a campaign.  In addition, Nabi, Moyer-
Guse, and Byrne (2007) demonstrated that consuming political comedy fostered 
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subsequent discussion about political humor, while concluding that the memorable nature 
of the message may have motivated individuals to ponder upon the content over time and 
eventually encouraged them to talk about it.  More bluntly, a handful of studies (e.g., J. 
Gray et al., 2009; Jones, 2010; Landreville et al., 2010; Moy et al., 2005a) revealed that 
late-night comedy viewing was associated with more frequent engagement in political 
talk.  Principally, political stories conveyed by late-night comedy programs, albeit less 
informative than the contents of hard news, provide conversation topics for what Baum 
(2003b) called ‘water cooler events’—i.e., the events one talks about around the water 
cooler at workplaces across the nation.  Hence, it is reasonable to expect that late-night 
comedy shows could serve as impetus for more frequent interpersonal talk. 
Furthermore, Jones (2010) observed that interactions among the followers of 
late-night comedy programs are not bound to their familiar communication network.  
Rather, viewers of late-night comedy continued their political discussion with strangers 
or virtual acquaintances they encounter in cyberspace.  In particular, he investigated the 
online discussion forum dedicated to one of the late-night political humor programs 
(Politically Incorrect) and found that forum visitors were engaged in extensive and 
substantive discussions out of their desire for argumentation, hope for information 
gathering, expression of various feelings, tapping into other pleasures and interests, 
participating in human relations, and being a political person.  Discussion topics among 
the participants of the forum included welfare, gun control, immigration, environment, 
taxation, free speech, education, race, crime, health care, and so on.  Jones (2010)  
opined that although the actual program may not have been the best forum for the wide 
exchange of ideas, engaged participants of the forum might hold a much more extensive 
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and reasoned argument than that hosted on the program.  Hence, evidence suggests that 
late-night political humor could be important as a spark for drawing viewers toward 
greater discursive participation in politics via the Internet.  Furthermore, given that 
consuming political humor seems to motivate individuals to exchange ideas with a wider 
range of people, late-night comedy viewing should also predict an increase in the size of 
a discussion network. 
However, it is less clear whether exposure to late-night comedy invigorates or 
dampens a viewer’s willingness to engage in heterogeneous discussion.  On the one 
hand, an alleged liberal nature of late-night comedy (see e.g., Baym, 2005; Coe et al., 
2008 for discussion about liberal bias in political satire) may facilitate selective exposure, 
which could subsequently lead to less cross-cutting exposure (Goldman & Mutz, 2011).  
Meanwhile, J. Kim et al. (1999) maintained, while elaborating on Noelle-Neumann’s 
spiral of silence theory (1993), that perceived opinion congruity could bolster an 
individual’s willingness to argue with those holding dissimilar viewpoints.  Then, it is 
arguable that the degree of heterogeneous discussion increases at least amongst those 
viewers whose views agree well with the climate of opinion as portrayed by political 
satire programs.  Hence, the present chapter first addresses whether late-night comedy 
use can promote the likelihood of heterogeneous discussion in general and then 
investigates whether a specific group of people is more willing to converse with non-
likeminded others. 
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Hypotheses and Research Questions 
Late-night comedy programs feature a wide range of political topics that could 
trigger meaningful interpersonal talk about politics (J. Gray et al., 2009; Jones, 2010; 
Landreville et al., 2010; Moy et al., 2005a).  In addition, audiences seem to continue 
their communicative activities with strangers or virtual acquaintances over the Internet 
(Jones, 2010), thereby further expanding their discussion network.  Accordingly, the 
present chapter postulates the following set of hypotheses concerning the relationships 
between exposure to late-night comedy and various structural components of 
interpersonal talk. 
Hypothesis 5.1a (H5.1a): Late-night comedy viewing will be positively 
associated with discussion frequency. 
Hypothesis 5.1b (H5.1b): Late-night comedy viewing will be positively 
associated with online interaction. 
Hypothesis 5.1c (H5.1c): Late-night comedy viewing will be positively 
associated with network size. 
However, the relationship between late-night comedy viewing and heterogeneous 
discussion is less clear.  As discussed earlier, the literature on selective exposure implies 
that late-night comedy viewing may be associated with a lower level of heterogeneous 
discussion (Goldman & Mutz, 2011), whereas the spiral of silence theory suggests that 
humor viewing can elicit a greater willingness to converse with non-likeminded others at 
least among those who believe that their views represent the majority opinion (J. Kim et 
al., 1999).  Accordingly, the present study poses the following research questions.  
Research Question 5.1a (RQ5.1a): Does late-night comedy viewing stimulate 
heterogeneous discussion? 
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Research Question 5.1b (RQ5.1b): Who is more likely to engage in 
heterogeneous discussion following the exposure to late-night comedy? 
As noted earlier, previous studies have endorsed the mobilizing effects of 
multiple facets of interpersonal talk (e.g., Bakker & de Vreese, 2011; Gastil et al., 2002; J. 
Kim et al., 1999; Kwak et al., 2005; Min, 2007; Rojas, 2008; Scheufele, 2002; Shah et al., 
2007). Hence, the current research predicts positive associations between key features of 
interpersonal talk and political participation.  
Hypothesis 5.2a (H5.2a): Discussion frequency will predict greater political 
participation. 
Hypothesis 5.2b (H5.2b): Online interaction will predict greater political 
participation. 
Hypothesis 5.2c (H5.2c): Network size will predict greater political participation. 
On the other hand, inconsistent research findings surrounding the consequences 
of heterogeneous discussion warrant an additional research question.  Furthermore, 
given the competing processes defining the effects of encountering dissimilar viewpoints, 
i.e., ambivalence and learning (Lee, in press), it is interesting to ask who is likely to 
extract greater mobilizing benefits from heterogeneous discussion. 
Research Question 5.2a (RQ5.2a): Does heterogeneous discussion spur political 
participation? 
Research Question 5.2b (RQ5.2b): Who is more likely to participate in political 
activities following heterogeneous discussion? 
While integrating the direct relationships summarized above and further building 
upon the well-established communication mediation model, the present study 
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hypothesizes that the association between exposure to late-night comedy and political 
participation is significantly and positively mediated by key structural features of 
interpersonal talk. 
Hypothesis 5.3a (H5.3a): Discussion frequency will positively mediate the 
relationship between late-night comedy viewing and political participation. 
Hypothesis 5.3b (H5.3b): Online interaction will positively mediate the 
relationship between late-night comedy viewing and political participation. 
Hypothesis 5.3c (H5.3c): Network size will positively mediate the relationship 
between late-night comedy viewing and political participation. 
However, it is unclear whether heterogeneous discussion mediates the effects of 
late-night humor.  As noted earlier, little has been said about the causal link between 
late-night comedy viewing and willingness to engage in heterogeneous discussion.  
Furthermore, research awaits a verdict on the motivational role of a heterogeneous 
network.  Even when assuming an indirect effect via exposure to dissimilar views, 
existing literature does not permit a clear prediction about the manner in which 
heterogeneous discussion translates the influence of late-night humor into meaningful 
behaviors.  On the one hand, deliberation of heterogeneous perspectives can mediate 
and reinforce the influence of the media on political behaviors, given that those who 
anticipate conversations with non-likeminded others tend to process mass mediated 
information more carefully to defend their views (Scheufele et al., 2004).  Conversely, 
the exposure to heterogeneous perspectives may counterbalance the effects of mass 
media (Godbold & Pfau, 2000; Pfau et al., 2003).  In short, current literatures remain 
equivocal about the mediating role of heterogeneous discussion.  A Accordingly, an 
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additional research question is advanced to assess the mediating effect of heterogeneous 
discussion. 
Research Question 5.3 (RQ5.3): How does heterogeneous discussion mediate the 
relationship between late-night comedy viewing and political participation? 
These formulated hypotheses and research questions will embody the mainstay 
of a communication mediation model of late-night comedy and Figure 5.1 summarizes 
the holistic framework detailing all the proposed causal links.  
 
Hypotheses and Research Question Regarding Mediating Effects of: Discussion 
Frequency (H5.3a); Online Interaction (H5.3b); Network Size (H5.3c); and 
Heterogeneous Discussion (RQ5.3) 
 
Discussion 
Frequency 
Online 
Interaction 
Network 
Size 
Political 
Participation 
Heterogeneous 
Discussion 
H5.1a 
H5.1b 
H5.1c 
RQ5.1a, 
RQ5.1b 
RQ5.2a, 
RQ5.2b 
H5.1a 
H5.2b 
H5.2c 
Late-Night 
Comedy 
Use 
Figure 5.1. Summary of hypotheses and research questions in the communication 
mediation model of late-night comedy 
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Methods 
As in the previous chapters, the online experiment and the mail survey were used 
to assess the proposed hypotheses and research questions.  First, experimental 
manipulation and randomization in a controlled setting allow us to disentangle the precise 
causal influence of consuming humor on interpersonal talk and political participation.  
Then, the representativeness of the sample in the survey enhances the generalizability of 
the observed associations among core variables in a real-world setting.  Ultimately, 
combining the results from the experiment and the survey increases the internal and 
external validity of the communication mediation model of late-night comedy. 
 
Study 1: The Online Experiment 
 
Measures 
Political Participation   
The statistical model in this chapter employs the political participation index 
introduced in Chapter 3 (M = 3.68, SD = 1.74, α = .88). 
 
Interpersonal Talk  
Acknowledging the multifaceted nature of interpersonal talk, the experiment 
includes measures of discussion frequency (M = 4.55, SD = 1.71, α = .92), online 
interaction (M = 4.08, SD = 1.79, α = .89), and heterogeneous discussion (M = 4.28, SD = 
1.55).  
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Results 
 
Effects of Late-night Comedy Viewing on Structural Features of Interpersonal Talk 
A one-way ANOVA on discussion frequency (H5.1a) found significant between-
group differences, F(2, 765) = 6.28, p < .01, η2 = .02.  Specifically, post-hoc Scheffe 
tests revealed the group exposed to late-night comedy (M = 4.67, SD = 1.71) reported a 
greater intent to engage in frequent discussion compared to the control group (M = 4.25, 
SD = 1.69), p < .05, but not compared to the hard news group (M = 4.73, SD = 1.69), p = 
n.s.  Meanwhile, supporting the H5.1b, the results indicated significant differences in 
the degree of online interaction, F(2, 765) = 5.01, p < .01, η2 = .01, with the late-night 
comedy group (M = 4.30, SD = 1.76) scoring significantly higher compared to the hard 
news (M = 4.15, SD = 1.83) and control (M = 3.81, SD = 1.76) groups.  A Scheffe test 
indicated that compared to the baseline, the late-night comedy viewing produced a 
significant increase in the intended online interaction (p < .01).   
Concerning RQ5.1a, evidence here suggests that consuming late-night humor 
exerted little influence on an individual’s tendency to engage in a discussion with non-
likeminded others, F(2, 765) = 1.30, p = n.s.  However, RQ5.1b asked whether a 
specific group is more likely to engage in heterogeneous discussion.  To address this 
question, an ANOVA was conducted separately for the three subsamples representing 
distinct perspectives.  The results indicated significant effect of the stimuli among those 
who supported the expansion, F(2, 381) = 5.48, p < .01, η2 = .03.  A post-hoc Scheffe 
test suggested that least the late-night comedy video increased the likelihood of 
heterogeneous discussion (M = 4.69, SD = 1.50) more amongst the proponents of the 
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stimulus plan than among those in the control video condition (M = 4.11, SD = 1.61), p 
< .05.  In contrast, late-night comedy viewing produced little effects among participants 
who were against the stimulus plan, F(2, 250) = 1.94, p = n.s., and among those who 
were ambivalent, F(2, 128) = .14, p = n.s.  Thus, these results suggest that late-night 
comedy prompted conversations with non-likeminded others primarily among the 
supporters of the stimulus plan (see Figure 5.2). 
Note. ANOVA was repeated for those who supported the expansions of the stimulus plan, 
those who supported it, and those who were ambivalent.  
 
Structural Features of Interpersonal Talk and Political Participation   
A host of hypotheses referred to the mobilizing effects of various structural 
features of interpersonal talk.  These hypotheses were tested by regressing the index of 
political participation on the measures of discussion frequency, online interaction, and 
heterogeneous discussion, after controlling for the independent variable (i.e., late-night 
comedy group dummy and hard news group dummy).  The findings indicated a positive 
F(2, 381) = 5.48, p < .01  
F(2, 250) = 1.94, p = n.s. 
 
F(2, 128) = .14, p = n.s. 
Figure 5.2. Effects of late-night comedy exposure on heterogeneous discussion among 
different opinion groups (Experiment, N = 768) 
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role of discussion frequency (H5.2a: b = .401, SE = .034, p < .001) and online interaction 
(H5.2b: b = .472, SE = .030, p < .001).  On the other hand, heterogeneous discussion 
predicted lower level of political participation, but the relationship was not significant 
(RQ5.2a: b = -.019, SE = .030, p = n.s.).9 
Note. Unstandardized regression coefficients and corresponding standard errors 
calculated by Preacher and Hayes’ (2008) indirect SPSS Macro are reported. 
#p < .10; *p < .05; **p < .01; ***p < .001 
 
Mediating Effects of Interpersonal Talk 
The present chapter hypothesized that the influence of late-night comedy on 
political participation is significantly mediated by diverse structural components of 
                                                 
9 As Lee (in press) has recently reviewed, we could either examine the separate main effects of discussion 
frequency and heterogeneous talk, or assess interactive workings of these two.  The present research 
adopts the former approach in that one of the primary goals involves estimating a unique mediating effect 
of each dimension controlling for the others.  Although it is beyond the scope of the current study, we 
acknowledge possible interactions among these features. 
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Figure 5.3. Mediation model of media exposure, interpersonal talk, and political 
participation (Experiment, N = 768) 
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interpersonal talk including discussion frequency (H5.3a) and online interaction (H5.3b). 
As in the previous chapters, Preacher and Hayes’ (2008) indirect SPSS macro was 
utilized to test these hypotheses.  Technically, the employed macro first regresses 
structural features of interpersonal talk on late-night comedy exposure and television 
news exposure, and then, regresses political participation on structural components of 
talk while controlling for late-night comedy exposure and television news exposure.  
The resulting regression coefficients and corresponding standard errors were reported in 
Figure 5.3.   
Table 5.1. Mediation of the association between late-night comedy exposure and political 
participation through structural features of interpersonal talk (Experiment, N = 768) 
Note. CIs are bias-corrected and -accelerated 95% confidence interval (Bootstrap N = 
5,000). 
#p < .10; *p < .05; **p < .01; ***p < .001 
 
Assessing the results in light of Baron and Kenny’s (1986) conditions yields a 
great deal of support for hypothesized meditation by diverse talk features.  First, 
findings present support for the (a) condition, when it was observed that exposure to late-
night comedy increased the intended level of discussion frequency and online interaction.  
Additionally, discussion frequency and online interaction predicted greater intent to 
participate, thereby advocating the (b) condition.  Moreover, as summarized in Table 5.1, 
the significant effects of late-night comedy exposure—i.e., (c) condition—became 
 Total, Direct, and  Formal Tests of 
 Indirect Effects  Indirect Effects 
 Total Direct Indirect  Sobel z CI 
Late-night  .475*** .078 .397***  
3.176 .150 to 645 
comedy exposure (.153) (.092) (.125)  
        
Television  .298# -.054 .352**  2.750 .100 to .607 news exposure (.153) (.092) (.128)  
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insignificant after accounting for the indirect influence via interpersonal talk—i.e., (c') 
condition.  For more rigorous testing of mediating effects, the current study employed 
the Sobel test (Sobel, 1982) and the bootstrap analysis (Hayes, 2009).  As Table 5.1 
presents, the Sobel test bolstered the indirect effects of late-night comedy exposure 
through various features of talk, and the mediation by interpersonal talk was further 
supported by the 95% confidence interval that did not include 0.  
Table 5.2. Individual mediating effects of structural features of interpersonal talk on the 
relationship between media exposure and political participation (Experiment, N = 768) 
Note. L: late-night comedy exposure; D: discussion frequency; O: online interaction; H: 
heterogeneous discussion; P: political participation; CIs are bias-corrected and -
accelerated 95% confidence intervals (Bootstrap N = 5,000).  
#p < .10; *p < .05; **p < .01; ***p < .001 
 
To assess a specific indirect effect through each component of talk controlling 
for the remaining features employed, the point estimates and corresponding confidence 
intervals were estimated separately for discussion frequency, online discussion, and 
heterogeneous discussion, and the results are summarized in Table 5.2.  Concerning 
H5.3a, the Sobel test and the bootstrap confidence interval indicated that discussion 
frequency significantly (and positively) mediated the influence of late-night comedy on 
political participation.  Findings also endorsed H5.3b, which proposed a significant 
mediating effect of online interaction.  However, results revealed that after controlling 
for the two prior aspects, the mediating role of heterogeneous discussion became small 
(RQ5.3). 
Individual Indirect Effect Point Estimate Boot SE Sobel z CI 
L → D → P .172** .065 2.646 .055 to .307 
L → O → P .229** .077 2.974 .080 to .383 
L → H → P -.004 .009 -.444 -.031 to .008 
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Study 2: The Mail Survey 
Measures 
 
Political Participation 
The analytical model in this chapter employed the political participation index, 
which combined responses on the four items (see Appendix Question Wording).  Each 
of which was measured on an 8-point scale (M = 1.33, SD = .70, α = .80). 
 
Interpersonal Talk 
Consistent with the experiment, the survey investigates multiple structural 
features of interpersonal talk.  Toward this end, the model incorporates indices of 
discussion frequency (M = 2.98, SD = 1.71, α = .84), heterogeneous discussion (M = 3.56, 
SD = 1.38), and network size (M = 5.00, SD = 4.55), which were introduced in Chapter 4.  
 
Late-Night Comedy Viewing  
Consistent with the previous chapters, late-night comedy consumption was 
operationalized by averaging responses on the two items measuring on a 5-point scale 
how often they viewed The Daily Show with Jon Stewart and The Colbert Report (M = 
1.33, SD = .76, α = .85). 
 
Conventional News Use.   
Parallel to the preceding chapters, the model incorporated measures of 
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conventional news uses: television news use (M = 3.73, SD = 1.26, α = .79) and 
newspaper use (M = 3.73, SD = 1.26, α = .79). 
 
Control Variables 
Analysis control for a host of demographic variables, including age (M = 51.86, 
SD = 13.25), gender (46% female), race (75% white), household income (Median: 
$55,000), and education (Median: ‘some college or associate degrees’).  The model also 
controlled for party affiliation (33% Republican, 31% Democrat).  In addition, political 
interest was included as a control variable (M = 3.50, SD = 1.71). 
 
Results 
 
Model Specification and Fit 
A path model was specified using AMOS to explore the hypothesized 
relationships.  Before fitting the model to the data, all variables in the model were 
residualized for the control variables mentioned above to avoid any confounding results 
(see Table 5.3).  Then, the analyses were conducted with the covariance matrix of 
unstandardized error terms that were obtained from this residualization procedure.  To 
identify the best fitting model, I started by fitting a saturated model and then trimmed the 
model by removing the paths that were far from significant (p > .10).  Figure 5.4 
presents unstandardized coefficients and corresponding standard errors from the path 
model of media uses, emotions, and political participation.  Overall, this model fits the 
data well, with a chi-square value of 3.59 with 2 degrees of freedom.  Other goodness-
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of-fit indices also provide evidence of the adequacy of the model (p = .17; RMSEA = .03; 
GFI = .99; AGFI = .98; and NFI = 0.99).  
 
Relationships between Late-night Comedy Consumption and Structural Features of 
Interpersonal Talk   
The results addressing H5.1a illustrate that exposure to late-night comedy was 
significantly associated with discussion frequency.  Although the strength was relatively 
weak, viewing late-night humor showed a marginally significant positive link to the size 
of discussion network (H5.1c).  The result concerning RQ5.1a illustrates that frequent 
viewers of late-night comedy were no more likely to discuss politics with non-likeminded 
others compared to less frequent viewers. 
Note. Unstandardized path coefficients are reported with standard errors in parentheses. 
Estimates were calculated by AMOS based on the Maximum Likelihood Estimation 
method.  The effects of demographics (age, gender, race, household income, education, 
and party affiliation) on endogenous and exogenous variables have been residualized. 
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Table 5.3. Results from regressing exogenous and endogenous variables of the path model on control variables (Survey, N = 777) 
Note. Unstandardized regression coefficients calculated by SPSS are reported along with corresponding standard errors in parentheses.   
#p < .10; *p < .05; **p < .01; ***p < .001 
 
 
  
Political Discussion Network Heterogeneous Late-Night Television Newspaper 
Participation Frequency Size Discussion Comedy Use News Use Use 
Age .005
*  
(.002) 
.011*  
(.004) 
.013  
(.012) 
.004  
(.004) 
-.005*  
(.002) 
.017***  
(.003) 
.018***  
(.004) 
Gender (female=1) .042  (.054) 
-.094  
(.122) 
-.768*  
(.318) 
-.066  
(.105) 
-.002  
(.057) 
.304**  
(.095) 
.064  
(.110) 
Race (White=1) -.121
#  
(.067) 
-.344*  
(.149) 
-.859*  
(.391) 
-.045  
(.128) 
.130#  
(.071) 
-.267*  
(.117) 
-.211  
(.134) 
Household income .000  (.001) 
.003*  
(.001) 
.009**  
(.003) 
.000  
(.001) 
-.001  
(.001) 
.000  
(.001) 
.002#  
(.001) 
Education .034  (.027) 
.104#  
(.061) 
.268#  
(.162) 
-.222***  
(.053) 
.118***  
(.029) 
-.118*  
(.048) 
.043  
(.055) 
Party ID (Dem=high) -.019  (.023) 
-.085#  
(.051) 
-.064  
(.135) 
.121**  
(.044) 
.125***  
(.024) 
.064  
(.040) 
.085#  
(.046) 
Political interest .123
***  
(.027) 
.307***  
(.035) 
1.030***  
(.093) 
-.005  
(.031) 
.067***  
(.017) 
.057*  
(.028) 
.012  
(.032) 
R2 (%) 10.6 15.9 21.4 4.4 8.4 6.8 4.1 
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Relationships between Structural Features of Interpersonal Talk and Political 
Participation  
As hypothesized, more frequent discussion (H5.2a) and larger discussion 
network (H5.2c) predicted greater political participation.  Meanwhile, heterogeneous 
discussion showed a significant inverse association with political participation (RQ5.2a).  
However, the observed relationship calls for more careful investigation, given that 
RQ5.2b lends plausibility to the idea that whether heterogeneous discussion exerts 
negative or positive influence may depend upon an individual’s political expertise, and 
further inquires about who is more likely to participate following the exposure to 
dissimilar perspectives.   
 
Table 5.4. Relationship between heterogeneous discussion and political participation 
moderated by education (Survey, N = 777) 
Education b SE CI 
Low -.188*** .029 -.247 to -.134 
Mean -.057* .026 -.108 to -.007 
High .146** .057 .035 to .261 
Note. bs are path coefficients estimating the relationships between heterogeneous 
discussion and political participation.  The output displays the coefficients at the 
following three levels of education: the mean, one standard deviation lower than the 
mean, and one standard deviation higher than the mean.  Consequently, the low group 
refers to those who have “high school education or less” (1 – 3), the mean group consists 
of those who attained “college education” (4 – 5), and the high group includes those who 
received “post-graduate education” (6).  CIs are bias-corrected 95% confidence intervals 
(Bootstrap N = 5,000).   
#p < .10; *p < .05; **p < .01; ***p < .001 
 
In line with this reasoning, the path model observed in the full sample was 
estimated within three levels of political expertise operationalized by education, i.e., high 
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school education or less (n = 214, one standard deviation below the mean), college 
education (n = 423, the mean), and post-graduate education (n = 96, one standard 
deviation above), while excluding those who did not answer (n = 43).10   
All structural paths were constrained to be equal across groups, freeing up only 
the path from heterogeneous discussion to political participation.  Then, path 
coefficients and confidence intervals (based on the bootstrapping of 5,000 samples) were 
computed for individual levels of education.  The findings, reported in Table 5.4, 
showed that the association between deliberation of heterogeneous views and 
engagement in political activities was contingent upon education such that the association 
between heterogeneous discussion and political participation was contingent upon 
education, indicating an inverse relationship for those with low education level.  This 
inverse relationship became weaker within the mean group.  For those who were highly 
educated, this relationship was significantly positive.  Moreover, the estimated 
confidence intervals did not overlap, clearly indicating that path coefficients from the 
three groups differed substantially and thus, education significantly moderated the 
relationship between heterogeneous discussion and participation.  This implies that the 
dampening role of heterogeneous discussion is mostly concentrated among poorly 
educated individuals.  In contrast, experts in politics seem capable of enjoying the 
benefits of conversations with heterogeneous people. 
 
Mediating Effects of Interpersonal Talk   
                                                 
10 Although some (e.g., Huckfeldt, 2001; Krosnick, 1990) argued for more nuanced operationalization of 
political expertise, the current study employed education as a proxy measure since education affords more 
advanced cognitive capacity to make sense of complex information (Rosenberg, 1988), which often 
characterizes heterogeneous discussion. 
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The findings of the survey showed that structural components of interpersonal 
talk significantly mediated the relationship between late-night comedy consumption and 
political participation.  Baron and Kenny’s (1986) first two requirements were supported 
by the relationship between late-night comedy consumption and interpersonal talk and 
the latter’s subsequent link to political participation (see Figure 5.4).  Additionally, 
Table 5.5 reports that adding mediating variables of interpersonal talk reduced the 
strength of the relationship between late-night comedy consumption and participation.  
Furthermore, the Sobel test as well as the bootstrap approach revealed the significant 
indirect effects of late-night comedy consumption via the conduit of interpersonal talk.  
 
Table 5.5. Mediation of the association between late-night comedy consumption and 
political participation through structural features of interpersonal talk (Survey, N = 777) 
Note. CIs are bias-corrected 95% confidence intervals (Bootstrap N = 5,000). 
#p < .10; *p < .05; **p < .01; ***p < .001 
 
In addition, a specific indirect effect was estimated for a respective talk 
component, and the results are summarized in Table 5.6.   
The computed Sobel z and confidence interval supported H5.3a in that discussion 
frequency significantly mediated the link between the independent and dependent 
variables.  On the other hand, the assessments pertaining to H5.3c presented partial 
support for the mediation by network size (p < .10).  However, network heterogeneity 
 Total, Direct, and  Formal Tests of 
 Indirect Effects  Indirect Effects 
 Total Direct Indirect  Sobel z CI 
Late-night  .098** .071* .027*  
1.929 .001 to .056 
comedy consumption (.035) (.032) (.014)  
        
Newspaper  .026*** — .026***  3.250 .010 to .041 use (.008)  (.008)  
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(RQ5.3) did not seem to play a mediating role, primarily due to the absence of a 
significant path from late-night comedy use. 
Table 5.6. Individual mediating effects of structural features of interpersonal talk on the 
relationship between media exposure and political participation (Survey, N = 777) 
Note. L: late-night comedy exposure; D: discussion frequency; N: network size 
discussion; P: political participation; CIs are bias-corrected 95% confidence intervals 
(Bootstrap N = 5,000). 
#p < .10; *p < .05; **p < .01; ***p < .001 
 
Discussion 
Concurrent assessments of the data from the experiment and the survey found 
considerable support for the proposed communication mediation model of late-night 
comedy.  First, the experiment conducted under a controlled setting demonstrated that 
exposure to late-night comedy increased the likelihood of political participation indirectly 
via the conduit of interpersonal talk.  In particular, consuming satirical humor produced 
greater discussion frequency (H5.1a) and online interaction (H5.1b), which subsequently 
predicted higher levels of political participation (H5.2a and H5.2b), the results clearly 
advocating the mediating role played by diverse aspects of interpersonal talk (H5.3a and 
H5.3b).  Second, the analysis of the survey displayed the mundane relationships among 
the core variables, with late-night comedy viewing associated significantly with 
discussion frequency (H5.1a) and marginally with network size (H5.1c), which in turn, 
predicted meaningful increases in political participation (H5.2a and H5.2c).  Taken 
together, it was observed that the relationship between late-night comedy consumption 
Individual Indirect Effect Point Estimate Boot SE Sobel z CI 
L → D → P .009* .004 2.250 .002 to .017 
L → N → P .018# .011 1.636 -.004 to .039 
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and participation was mediated significantly by discussion frequency (H5.3a) and 
marginally by network size (H5.3c). 
On the other hand, a careful examination of causes and effects of heterogeneous 
discussion produced highly dynamic and interesting results.  First, integrated findings 
from the two research designs implied that exposure to late-night comedy yielded a 
limited effect on an individual’s willingness to discuss with non-likeminded others 
(RQ5.1a).  Specifically, the survey failed to detect a meaningful connection between 
late-night comedy and heterogeneous discussion, which is in tune with the selective 
exposure thesis that the alleged liberal leaning of late-night comedy programs tends to 
create a community of likeminded viewers.  Admittedly, in the real world setting, 
individuals decide what they want to watch voluntarily; therefore, those who feel 
disturbed by the presumed bias of late-night comedy may opt out from viewing it.  
Echoing this view, Knobloch-Westerwick and Meng (2011) have recently demonstrated 
that audiences selectively search for attitude-consistent messages and avoid counter-
attitudinal information to reinforce their preexisting views and self-concept.   
In the experiment, randomly assigning participants to a late-night comedy 
condition prevented possible selective exposure.  Though the overall effect was weak in 
the experiment (RQ5.1a), the results indicated that exposure to late-night comedy 
significantly raised the intended level of heterogeneous discussion at least among those 
who supported the expansion of the stimulus plan (RQ5.1b).  Here, the perceived bias in 
satirical humor appears to be working again.  The liberal leaning of political satire (in 
the direction of supporting the expansion in this case) may have enhanced the perceived 
opinion congruity primarily among proponents of the stimulus plan, which in turn, 
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bolstered their willingness to discuss with non-likeminded others (J. Kim et al., 1999).  
All in all, late-night comedy viewing seemed to boost the intended level of heterogeneous 
discussion only among those who possessed the majority perception.11 
Meanwhile, the two exploited designs produced somewhat inconsistent results 
regarding the mobilizing effect of heterogeneous discussion (RQ5.2a).  Findings of the 
experiment seemed to indicate that deliberation of non-congruent views exerted little 
influence on political participation, yet it should be noted that the measure of 
heterogeneity here tapped into the respondents’ likelihood of exposure to heterogeneous 
views rather than their actual engagement.  In this regard, the survey is more suitable to 
capture the actual effect of heterogeneous discussion that tends to accumulate over time 
by virtue of repeated exposure to oppositional viewpoints.  The evidence from the 
survey demonstrated that discussion with non-likeminded others predicted decreased 
participation (RQ5.2a).  However, addressing RQ5.2b, additional assessments of 
conditional relationships suggested that poorly educated citizens tended to be vulnerable 
to demobilization, whereas perceptive counterparts seemed to participate even more.  
Thus, the observed relationships imply that encountering dissimilar views may widen the 
participation gap between different education groups.  
Although the present study failed to show a significant mediating role of 
heterogeneous discussion, findings above provide a couple of important implications 
                                                 
11 To measure the perceived opinion incongruity, respondents were asked to report their own issue position 
regarding the expansion of the stimulus plan as well as their estimate of other Americans’ position on the 
identical 7-point scale.  While exploiting Hwang et al’s (2008) incongruity scale, these two items were 
recoded into a 3-point scale (-1 = opposed, 0 = ambivalent, and 1 = supported).  Then, the self-majority 
difference was computed into a 3-point scale (0 = no difference, 1 = one-point difference, and 2 = two-
point difference; M = .33, SD = .65).  Mean on this incongruity scale was compared across different 
opinion groups, and findings showed that supporters of the stimulus plan (M = .27, SD = .63) perceived 
significantly less incongruity than those who opposed it (M = .41, SD = .76), t(635) = 2.47, p < .05, and a 
little less than those who were ambivalent (M = .34, SD = .47), t(513) = 1.09, p = n.s.  In short, the results 
indicate that proponents of the stimulus plan tended to possess greater perceived opinion congruity. 
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regarding RQ5.3.  First and broadly, combined results highlight multifaceted nature of 
interpersonal communication, and thus, suggest that the communication mediation model 
should now extend the scope of investigation to incorporate more diverse dimensions of 
talk.  Research in the communication mediation model so far has principally revolved 
around how the quantity of discussion (frequency in particular) augments the effects of 
the news media.  However, the examination of discussion heterogeneity illustrated that 
it is not just the amount or degree of conversation that could shift the influence of mass 
mediated messages; what they do when they discuss is an equally critical factor either to 
attenuate or reinforce the impact.  As shown above, conversing with non-likeminded 
others may exert harmful influence at least for some.  Thus, depending on the nature of 
discussion, it can play a suppressing mediating role between the reception and the 
response (see also Godbold & Pfau, 2000; Pfau et al., 2003).  
The second and more specific implication from the investigation of heterogeneity 
combines findings of the experiment as to who is more likely to engage in heterogeneous 
discussion following comedy viewing (RQ5.1b) and the survey results concerning who 
tends to participate more, given exposure to different views (RQ5.2b).  First, the 
experimental data showed that given all else is the same, individuals whose views 
resonated well with the perceived framing of late-night humor were more likely to 
engage in discussion with non-likeminded others.  Second, results of the survey 
suggested that when engagement in heterogeneous discussion is assumed, well-educated 
experts seemed to extract greater benefits from exposure to dissimilar perspectives. 
Taken together, findings imply that exposure to late-night comedy may 
disproportionately mobilize (or demobilize) a certain segment of the electorate indirectly 
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by stimulating discussion with non-likeminded others.  That is, late-night comedy can 
draw a higher level of political involvement from the liberals (by virtue of greater 
inclination for heterogeneous discussion) who are highly educated (due to their advanced 
ability to unravel and digest conflicting messages).12 
However, the current research reflects only an initial effort to examine how and 
why heterogeneous discussion produces distinct outcomes among different groups of 
people.  The observed contrast between political novices and experts might depend on 
which of the two competing communication processes—i.e., ambivalence (Huckfeldt et 
al., 2004; Mutz, 2002, 2006) and learning (J. M. McLeod, Scheufele, Moy, et al., 1999; 
Scheufele et al., 2003; Scheufele et al., 2004)—plays a dominating role in explicating the 
effects of heterogeneous discussion.  The findings in this chapter may have illustrated 
that heterogeneous discussion can discourage political behaviors of less skillful citizens 
by increasing their attitudinal ambivalence. On the other hand, experts in politics might 
be able to learn greatly from the exposure to diverse perspectives, thereby enhancing their 
desire to participate.  However, due to the data limitations, the current study did not 
examine these intervening processes.  
Another, perhaps more serious, concern of the current research involves the 
presumed causal ordering between interpersonal talk and political participation.  In 
analyzing the data, I assumed the causal flow from deliberative behaviors to political 
activities, yet these two forms of engagement were measured simultaneously in both 
experiment and survey.  For the most part, treating the former as the antecedent of the 
latter is consistent with a large body of previous work (e.g., Gastil et al., 2002; Gil de 
                                                 
12 Although the experiment did not directly measure an individual’s ideological attitude, being a Democrat 
was highly associated with the increased likelihood of support for the expansion of the stimulus plan (r 
= .34, p < .001). 
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Zúñiga & Valenzuela, 2011; J. Kim et al., 1999; J. M. McLeod, Scheufele, & Moy, 1999; 
Rojas, 2008; Scheufele, 2002).  Furthermore, some theorists showed that the casual flow 
from talk to participation survived even when accounting for the reverse or reciprocal 
relationships between these two (Jacobs et al., 2009; Shah et al., 2005).  These results 
are consistent with earlier research showing that information shared among citizens is a 
key driver of engagement (J. M. McLeod, Scheufele, Moy, et al., 1999; Verba et al., 
1995).  However, the current data could not rule out the reversed causal direction that 
discursive engagement leads to political participation.  It may well be that engagement 
in political activities could facilitate citizens’ interpersonal communication, especially if 
participation in such activities allows individuals to meet and get to know others with 
whom they have a common interest.  
Thus, future research needs to adopt a time-anchored design (e.g., longitudinal 
survey and pretest-posttest experiment) to address the temporal order between 
interpersonal talk and political participation.  This approach should be a powerful tool to 
estimate the precise causal influence.  Furthermore, employing sequential measures 
should be useful for disentangling embedded communication processes whereby 
heterogeneous discussion produces distinct outcomes among various groups of people.  
With improved understanding of sequential arrangement, we might be able to explain the 
contrasting behavioral consequences of heterogeneous discussion between political 
experts and novices in terms of different intervening causal routes.   
Notwithstanding the shortcomings, the findings of the present chapter contribute 
to our understanding of collaborative workings of mass media and interpersonal 
communication in fostering political participation.  After all, the results reaffirmed the 
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merit of the communication mediation model.  However, investigating multiple facets of 
interpersonal discussion that might have different implications for participatory 
democracy has further extended the purview of mediators that might be employed in the 
communication mediation model.  Most interestingly, the examination of discussion 
heterogeneity illustrated that not just the frequency of conversation could shift the 
influence of mass mediated messages, rather what individuals do during discussion is an 
equally critical factor that can attenuate or reinforce the effect of the media messages. 
Moreover, the two employed research designs that introduced another readily 
available independent variable in the theoretical and empirical framework largely 
replicated the pattern of indirect relationships between late-night comedy viewing and 
political participation through diverse components of interpersonal communication.  
Indeed, the results clearly showed that late-night comedy programs play no less important 
role than traditional news sources do in fostering political participation via the conduit of 
interpersonal talk.  Thus, findings of this study should alarm the critics of late-night 
humor who simply dismiss it as a distraction from substantive democracy.  At least 
within the growing body of audiences who rely on these programs for news, satire shows 
seem to provide sufficient political topics that could trigger meaningful discussion and 
promote more animated engagement in the public discourse.   
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Chapter 6  
Assessing the Omnibus Model 
The findings thus far have illustrated that late-night comedy viewing could exert 
indirect influence on an individual’s motivation to participate in politics by fostering 
emotions and further via diverse structural features of interpersonal talk.  In addition, it 
was found that emotions could be situated between the consumption of satirical humor 
and engagement in political talk.  The present chapter endeavors to integrate all the 
variables germane to discussion up to this point and synthesize an omnibus model, which 
postulates the following causal order: late-night comedy consumption, emotions, 
interpersonal talk, and political participation.  This model is assessed with the data from 
the online experiment and the mail survey that have been examined so far.  However, 
unlike the preceding chapters, Mplus was the platform of the choice for statistical 
analyses of this complex model, since it offers by far the most flexible options to partition 
total effects into manifold layers of direct and indirect components embedded in this type 
of multiple-step multiple mediator model (see Hayes et al., 2011).   
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Note. Unstandardized path coefficients are reported with standard errors in parentheses.  Estimates were calculated using Mplus. 
#p<.10; *p<.05; **p<.01; ***p<.001 
Late-Night 
Comedy 
Exposure 
Television 
News 
Exposure 
 
.501*** 
(.142) 
 
-.170 
(.137) 
 
-.197 
(.134) 
 
.227 
(.149) 
 
Negative 
Emotions 
R2 = .016 
Positive 
Emotions 
R2 = .003 
.267# 
(.142) 
.326* 
(.149) .129 
(.133) 
.059 
(.037) 
* 
 
.429** 
(.189) 
.221** 
(.039) 
.137** 
(.036) 
.122** 
(.040) 
.214*** 
(.039) 
.391*** 
(.040) 
.289# 
(.148) 
.367*** 
(.041) 
Discussion 
Frequency 
R2 = .135 
Online 
Interaction 
R2 = .146 
Heterogeneous 
Discussion 
R2 = .060 
.393*** 
(.042) 
 
.436*** 
(.038) 
 
 .030 
(.175) 
 
Political 
Participation 
R2 = .671 
 
.099*** 
(.026) 
 
.077 
(.091) 
 
-.029 
(.090) 
 
.154*** 
(.026) 
Figure 6.1. Multiple-step multiple mediator model of media exposure, emotions, interpersonal talk, and political participation 
(Experiment, N = 768) 
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Study 1: The Online Experiment 
As stated earlier, the two employed research designs have distinct foci.  The 
purpose of the experiment lies in investigating, under a controlled setting, every detailed 
consequence of manipulation.  Toward this goal, it seems more appropriable to look at 
all applicable casual links including those failing to reach statistical significance.  On 
the other hand, the goal of the survey revolves around identifying mundane relationships 
among the variables of interest.  To fulfill a respective purpose of each research design, 
analyses of the experiment examine the saturated model that include the exhaustive list of 
causal paths, whereas the structural model of the survey data removes insignificant paths 
that may suggest null relationships in the real world and investigate as to whether the 
proposed model as a whole fits the data well.  The following section discusses the 
results from the experiment first and the coefficients obtained from this indirect effects 
model are reported in Figure 6.1 along with their standard errors.  
 
Effects of Media Exposure 
Findings show that late-night comedy exposure elicited the audiences’ negative 
emotions (b = .501, SE = .142, p < .001).  In addition, late-night comedy viewing raised 
the intended levels of discussion frequency (H5.1a: b = .267, SE = .142, p < .10) and 
online interaction (H5.1b: b = .326, SE = .149, p < .05), although it was little associated 
with the extent to which individuals were willing to discuss with non-congruent others 
(RQ5.1a: b = .129, SE = .133, p = n.s.).  However, it is worth noting that direct effects 
of late-night comedy exposure on interpersonal talk have become noticeable smaller as 
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compared to the coefficients for discussion frequency and online interaction observed in 
Chapter 5 (.428 and .486, respectively), insinuating the considerable mediation of 
negative emotions between humor consumption and political discussion (H4.2).  Finally, 
the direct effect of late-night comedy watching on political participation was not 
significant, after accounting for indirect effects via emotional responses and various 
structural components of interpersonal talk (b = .077, SE = .091, p = n.s.).   
On the other hand, the results for television news watching painted a somewhat 
different picture than those for late-night comedy viewing.  Exposure to network 
television news stimulated negative emotions, but this effect failed to reach statistical 
significance (b = .227, SE = .149, p = n.s.).  However, it manifested equivalent 
relationships with discussion frequency (b = .429, SE = .189, p < .01) and online 
interaction (b = .289, SE = .148, p = <.10).  Combined findings suggest that the 
influence of television news viewing on interpersonal talk was mostly directly without 
involving significant indirect pathways through affective responses.  Additionally, the 
direct participatory effect was hardly noticeable (b = -.029, SE = .090, p = n.s.).   
 
Effects of Emotional Responses 
The results from the experiment clearly speak to the significance of emotions in 
providing fresh impetus for revitalizing democracy (not only in participatory but in 
deliberate nature as well).  First, findings support H4.1, while demonstrating that 
negative emotions predicted significant increases in discussion frequency, online 
interaction, and heterogeneous discussion.  As was observed in Chapter 4, positive 
emotions yielded significant associations with diverse component of political discussion.  
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Furthermore, negative emotions predicted greater intent to participate in political 
activities, even after simultaneously controlling for possible mediating influence of 
interpersonal talk (b = .099, SE = .026, p < .001).  Positive emotions played no less 
significant role in spurring individuals to participate more (b = .154, SE = .026, p < .001).  
These findings lend credence to the conclusion that citizens’ emotional responses are 
critical, substantially affecting engagement in participatory and deliberate democracy.   
 
Effects of Structural Features of Interpersonal Talk 
The omnibus model presents support for H5.2a and H5.2b, when it was found 
that discussion frequency and online interaction predicted more active political 
participation (b = .393, SE = .042, p < .001; and b = .436, SE = .038, p < .001, 
respectively) even after simultaneously controlling for the mediating effects of emotional 
responses.  In addition, heterogeneous discussion was inversely associated with political 
participation, though the relationship was not significant (RQ5.2a: b = -.027, SE = .032, p 
= n.s.).   
 
Indirect Effects on Political Participation 
The omnibus effects model advanced in the present chapter postulates that 
consuming late-night humor can affect political participation indirectly by eliciting 
viewers’ emotional responses, by prompting interpersonal discussion about politics, or 
via the mixture of these two intervening paths.  The Mplus model permits us to partition 
the effect into various specific indirect effects, and the significance of each individual 
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element can be assessed with the Sobel test (Sobel, 1982) and the bootstrap analysis 
(Hayes, 2009).  Table 6.1 summarizes the resulting estimates.   
 
Table 6.1. Specific indirect effects of media exposure on political participation through 
emotional responses and structural features of interpersonal talk (Experiment, N = 768) 
Note. L: late-night comedy exposure; NE: negative emotions; PE: positive emotions; F: 
discussion frequency; O: online interaction; H: heterogeneous discussion; P: political 
participation; CIs are bias-corrected 95% confidence intervals (Bootstrap N = 5,000).  
#p < .10; *p < .05; **p < .01; ***p < .001 
 
The analysis results indicate that exposure to late-night comedy yielded a 
considerable indirect effect on political participation via the conduit of negative emotions 
Individual Indirect Effect Point Estimate Boot SE Sobel z CI 
L → NE     → P .050* .020 2.502 .019 to .099 
L → PE     → P -.026 .022 -1.211 -.073 to .013 
L    →  F → P  .105# .057 1.831 -.004 to .200 
L    →  O → P  .142* .067 2.122 .011 to .276 
L    →  H → P  -.004 .007 -.510 -.028 to .004 
L → NE → F → P .072** .024 2.956 .032 to .129 
L → NE → O → P .085** .026 3.230 .040 to .144 
L → NE → H → P -.003 .004 -.777 -.013 to .003 
L → PE → F → P -.009 .008 -1.166 -.030 to .003 
L → PE → O → P -.016 .013 -1.214 -.045 to .008 
L → PE → H → P .001 .001 .532 .000 to .005 
T → NE     → P .022 .017 1.339 -.004 to .064 
T  → PE     → P -.030 .022 -1.391 -.079 to .007 
T     →  F → P  .169** .057 2.969 .064 to .289 
T     →  O → P  .126# .066 1.922 .006 to .262 
T     →  H → P  -.002 .006 -.262 -.023 to .006 
T  → NE → F → P .033 .022 1.471 -.007 to .079 
T  → NE → O → P .039 .026 1.487 -.009 to .094 
T  → NE → H → P -.001 .002 -.623 -.009 to .001 
T  → PE → F → P -.011 .008 -1.347 -.031 to .001 
T  → PE → O → P -.018 .013 -1.406 -.048 to .004 
T  → PE → H → P .001 .001 .580 .000 to .005 
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(H3.3).  The Sobel z score suggests that the degree of mediation by negative emotions is 
significant at the p = .05 level.  Moreover, the 95% confidence interval that lies beyond 
0 confirms that negative emotions played a reinforcing mediating role between watching 
late-night comedy programs and participating in political activities.   
Meanwhile, the degree of mediation by structural components of interpersonal 
talk has markedly diminished, when the statistical model concurrently incorporated the 
indirect paths through emotions.  The specific indirect effect of humor consumption on 
political participation through discussion frequency became marginally significant 
(H5.3a: b = .105, SE = .057, p < .10, CI = -.004 to .200) and the corresponding indirect 
effect through online interaction was significant at the p = .05 level (H5.2b: b = .142, SE 
= .067, p < .05, CI = .011 to .276).  However, the magnitude of mediation has become 
noticeably smaller as compared to the estimates that were observed in the earlier 
proposed communication mediation model (compare with .172 for discussion frequency 
and .229 for online interaction).  These decreased effects imply that the association 
between late-night comedy consumption and interpersonal talk (i.e., L-F and L-O links) 
can be partitioned into the direct effect and the indirect effects through emotional 
responses.  Echoing this view, the results in Chapter 4 showed that the effects of humor 
viewing on discussion frequency as well as those on online interaction were significantly 
mediated by negative emotions (H4.2).   
Taken together, it can be inferred that the indirect effects of comedy 
consumption on political participation via the conduit of interpersonal talk (i.e., L-F-P 
and L-O-P links) can be further partitioned into the single-step specific indirect pathways 
through talk components (i.e., L-F-P and L-O-P links) and the multiple-step intervening 
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routes, which encompass humor consumption, negative emotions, discussion, and 
participation (i.e., L-NE-F-P and L-NE-O-P).  Indeed, the specific indirect effect that 
progresses first through negative emotions and then through discussion frequency before 
ending at political participation was highly significant (b = .072, SE = .024, p < .01, CI = 
.032 to .129).  Additionally, exposure to late-night comedy manifested sizable 
mobilizing influence through both negative emotions and online interaction (b = .085, SE 
= .026, p < .01, CI = .040 to .144).   
In sum, findings plainly documented the importance of negative emotions in the 
indirect effects model of late-night comedy.  Consuming late-night comedy exerted a 
significant indirect effect on political participation through negative emotions (i.e., L → 
NE → P), whereas the indirect effects through interpersonal talk could be partitioned into 
the specific indirect effects of their own (i.e., L → F → P and L → F → P) and the 
multiple-step indirect effects via negative emotions as well as features of talk (i.e., L → 
NE → F → P and L → NE → O → P). 
Conversely, findings suggest that emotional responses exerted marginal 
mediating influence in stipulating the implications of traditional news consumption.  
The specific indirect effect of television news exposure on political participation was 
positive, but it was not significant (b = .022, SE = .017, p = n.s., CI = -.004 to .064).  
Moreover, none of the multiple-step indirect effects either through negative emotions and 
discussion frequency (b = .033, SE = .022, p = n.s., CI = -.007 to .079) or through 
negative emotions and online interaction (b = .039, SE = .026, p = n.s., CI = -.009 to 
.094) was significant.  Instead, hard news use yielded substantial indirect effects via the 
conduit of interpersonal talk.  The more frequent discussion tendency significantly 
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reinforced the stimulating effects of hard news exposure (b = .169, SE = .057, p < .01, CI 
= .064 to .289).  The specific indirect effect through intended online interaction was 
marginally significant according to the Sobel test (b = .085, SE = .026, p < .10), but the 
quantified 95% confidence interval that did not include 0 corroborated the statistical 
significance of this indirect path (CI = .006 to .262).  Hence, combined findings 
illustrate that the use of traditional news takes predominantly deliberative pathways 
toward political participation, whereas the motivational effects of late-night comedy 
viewing are intertwined with both affective and deliberative intervening mechanisms.  
 
Disentangling Emotions 
Based on the cognitive appraisal approach stressing the differences between 
anger and anxiety (e.g., Huddy et al., 2007; Valentino et al., 2011; Weber, 2007) as well 
as on the Dunlop et al.’s (2008) typology classifying diverse referents of emotion, one of 
the structural models employed in Chapter 3 investigated the effect of each emotion item.  
Adding significantly to this procedure, the present chapter advances a supplementary 
structural model wherein discrete emotion components that were further differentiated by 
referents constitute the second variable block in lieu of the two composite affective 
indices.  Coefficients for direct paths in conjunction with corresponding standard errors 
are reported in Figure 6.2, while the results for specific indirect effects are summarized in 
Table 6.1.  For the sake of simplicity, only significant results are shown, although the 
model estimated all applicable relationships—i.e., the model was saturated.  
First, Figure 6.2 shows that exposure to late-night comedy elicited all six 
components of negative emotions.  Subsequently, message-referent anger predicted 
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higher levels of online interaction (b = .141, SE = .081, p < .10) and heterogeneous 
discussion (b = .157, SE = .078, p < .05), whereas message-referent worry was positively 
associated with discussion frequency (b = .218, SE = .092, p < .05) and online interaction 
(b = .195, SE = .081, p < .05).  In light of these findings, Dunlop et al. (2008) suggested 
that the mobilizing effects of message-referent and plot-referent emotions were mostly 
indirect via an intervening route through promoting interpersonal discussion about the 
message.  They posited that these types of emotional responses provided a basis for 
social sharing with others, thereby triggering conversations about the message.  In turn, 
interpersonal talk could prompt the individuals’ motivation to take action.   
The results summarized in Table 6.2 vindicate this view.  Above all, late-night 
comedy viewing produced increases in features of interpersonal talk primarily through 
message-referent emotions.  In particular, late-night comedy exposure raised the 
intended level of heterogeneous discussion through message-referent anger (i.e., the L-
MA-H link); this indirect route was marginally significant according to the Sobel test (z 
= .1.790), but the more powerful confidence interval approach indicated that it was 
statistically significant at the p = .05 level (95% CI = .008 to .248).  Likewise, although 
message-referent worry did not seem to yield a significant mediating effect between 
comedy consumption and interpersonal talk in terms of the conventional standard, the 
confidence intervals that lie beyond 0 demonstrated that encountering satirical humor 
added significantly to the degrees of discussion frequency (95% CI = .004 to .206) and 
online interaction (95% CI = .003 to .181) by virtue of stimulated message-referent worry.  
Moreover, consuming late-night humor propelled the respondents’ willingness to 
participate indirectly through message-referent worry, which, in turn, seemed to 
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encourage more frequent discussion (i.e., the L-MW-F-P link: 95% CI = .002 to .082).  
In a similar vein, the motivational effects of message-referent worry that was provoked 
by comedy exposure were further mediated by online interaction (i.e., the L-MW-O-P 
link: 95% CI = .001 to .079).  In short, message-referent emotions that are likely to 
follow the use of late-night humor tend to influence political participation rather 
indirectly via the conduit of interpersonal talk.   
On the other hand, Dunlop et al. (2008) argued that self-referent emotion would 
contribute directly to behavior change, as the emotional response is closely linked to 
perceived risk (i.e., an individual’s thought about the likelihood and the magnitude of the 
negative outcome), which has been shown to translate into behavioral outcome (see, for 
instance, Becker, 1974; Fishbein & Ajzen, 1975).  In the context of political 
communication, it could be that self-referent emotion could produce an immediate effect 
on the citizen’s motivation to participate as the self-referent emotional response may be 
tantamout to an increase in perceived risk (e.g., the perceived costs of non-participation).  
Findings lend credence to this line of reasoning, while illustrating that self-referent anger 
directly influenced political participation (b = .146, SE = .047, p < .05) without engaging 
any significant indirect paths through interpersonal talk (see Figure 6.2).  Furthermore, 
Table 6.2 showed that self-referent anger alone intervened and substantially multiplied 
the participatory influence of late-night comedy exposure (b = .088, SE = .036, p < .05, 
CI = .030 to .177).  However, self-referent worry was not directly associated with an 
increase in political participation (see Figure 6.2) nor did it mediate the mobilizing effects 
of humor consumption (see Table 6.2).  First, these muffled impacts of self-referent 
worry can be explained by the cognitive appraisal approach that highlights the greater 
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mobilizing role of anger as compared to anxiety due to the former’s enhanced appraisal 
of control and certainty (see e.g., Huddy et al., 2007; Valentino et al., 2011; Weber, 
2007).  Second, it is also plausible that self-referencing might have intensified the 
inherent avoiding tendency of worry (see e.g., Heatherton & Baumeister, 1991; 
Heatherton et al., 1998; Sherman & Cohen, 2002).  In any case, it is important to note 
that neither of the self-referent negative emotions involved features of interpersonal talk.  
As Dunlop et al. (2008) reasoned, some of the self-referent emotions could impede 
interpersonal talk, since they may yield embarrassment. 
Table 6.2. Specific indirect effects of media exposure on political participation through 
discrete emotions and structural features of interpersonal talk (Experiment, N = 768) 
Note. L: late-night comedy exposure; MA: message-referent anger; PA: plot-referent 
anger; SA: self-referent anger; MW: message-referent worry; F: discussion frequency; O: 
online interaction; H: heterogeneous discussion; P: political participation; CIs are bias-
corrected 95% confidence intervals (Bootstrap N = 5,000).  Insignificant indirect effects 
are not shown here 
#p < .10; *p < .05; **p < .01; ***p < .001 
 
Individual Indirect Effect Point Estimate Boot SE Sobel z CI 
L → PA     → P -.069* .035 -1.972 -.157 to -.016 
L → SA     → P .088* .036 2.436 .030 to .177 
L  → MA → H  .108# .061 1.790 .008 to .248 
L  → MW→ F .069 .049 1.424 .004 to .206 
L  → MW→ O .062 .044 1.417 .003 to .181 
L    →  F → P  .109# .058 1.872 -.002 to .229 
L    →  O → P  .151* .067 2.248 .024 to .288 
L → MW→ F → P .027 .019 1.411 .002 to .082 
L → MW→ O → P .027 .019 1.413 .001 to .079 
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Note. Path coefficients and standard errors in parentheses were computed using Mplus.  Insignificant paths are not shown here. 
#p<.10; *p<.05; **p<.01; ***p<.001 
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Figure 6.2. Significant paths from the model of late-night comedy exposure, discrete emotions, structural features of interpersonal talk, 
and political participation (Experiment, N = 768) 
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Nonetheless, the structural model also produced some unexpected results.  In 
particular, Figure 6.2 shows that plot-referent anger predicted even lower level of 
political participation (b = -.125, SE = .052, p < .05).  As an extension, Table 6.2 
indicates that plot-referent anger played the significant mediating role undermining the 
mobilizing effects of late-night comedy consumption (b = -.069, SE = .035, p < .05, CI = 
-.157 to -.016).  It could be that anger may thwart an individual’s willingness to 
participate unless it is complemented by self-referencing.  Alternatively, those who hold 
plot-referent anger (i.e., angry about the way that the government’s bailout of big 
companies affects middle class Americans) may be led to consider more overarching 
negative implications of the government’s policy and consequently, they may end up 
with heightened cynicism, subsequently dampening their participatory intentions.  
However, these post-hoc explanations would need additional empirical testing before we 
could be confident about them.  Furthermore, these explications leave unexamined the 
process as to why plot-referent worry did not yield parallel deleterious influence.  Thus, 
future study can benefit by assessing dissimilar ramifications that are embedded in plot-
referencing of anger and worry.   
Moreover, findings from this supplementary structural model revealed less about 
non-monolithic effects of anger and worry on distinct patterns of deliberative behaviors.  
Specifically, MacKuen et al. (2010) argued that anger triggered by familiar threats tended 
to propel a lopsided search for confirming information and resistance to accomodation, 
whereas anxiety elicited by unfamiliar circumstances encouraged the balanced 
consideration of heterogeneous views and more willingness to compromise.  Similarly, 
Valentino, Hutchings, Banks, and Davis (2009) illustrated that anxiety could decrease 
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selective exposure.  They also observed in their earlier work that anger could limit the 
scope of political information seeking (Valentino, Hutchings, Banks, & Davis, 2008).  
Cast in light of deliberative behavior, these studies may suggest that angry responses are 
more likely to trigger conversations within a familiar network circle among neighbors, 
friends, and family members.  Accordingly, anger should be closely intertwined with 
discussion frequency, which was operationalized by the composite index measuring the 
respondents’ willingness to discuss the government policy with neighbors, friends, and 
family.  Conversely, worried citizens being faced with unfamiliar threats should pursue 
more balanced search for opposing information.  Thus, worried reactions could 
encourage people to engage in deliberation with strangers and virtual acquaintances they 
encounter online, while increasing their opportunities for heterogeneous discussion. 
Nevertheless, the results lend little support for the unique contributions of anger 
and worry to diverse deliberative patterns.  Figure 6.2 shows that message-referent 
anger was associated with online interaction and heterogeneous discussion, whereas 
message-referent worry predicted significant increases in discussion as well as in online 
interaction.  These incongruent findings may suggest patterns of information seeking 
may be conceptually different from conversing activities.  Further, inconsistencies may 
allude to inappropriate operationalization of interpersonal talk delicate enough to 
distinguish homogenous and heterogeneous discussion.  That is, the indices of 
interpersonal talk in this study were employed to tap into diverse structural dimensions of 
discussion, but it was of less interest to classify conversations into two contrasting forms.  
Hence, future studies can employ more diversified measures of interpersonal talk that 
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could highlight the clear polarity between homogeneous and heterogeneous conversations, 
and investigate as to how discrete emotions affect these discussion types differently.    
 
Study 2: The Mail Survey 
A multiple-step multiple mediator model comprised with four core variable 
blocks—i.e., media uses, emotional responses, components of interpersonal talk, and 
political participation—was assessed with the survey data using Mplus.  Before fitting 
the model to the data, all variables in the model were residualized for demographic 
variables (age, gender, race, household income, education, and party affiliation) and the 
measures of cognitive and attitudinal factors (political interest, knowledge, and internal 
efficacy).  Then, the covariance matrix of unstandardized residuals was entered in the 
structural model.  To identify the best fitting model, a saturated model was assessed 
with all structural paths freed up to be estimated.  As suggested by standard refinement 
approaches of structural equation models (Bollen, 1989; Kline, 2005), the model was 
trimmed by removing non-significant paths (p > .05).   
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Note. Unstandardized path coefficients are reported with standard errors in parentheses.  Estimates were calculated by Mplus.  The 
effects of demographics (age, gender, race, household income, education, and party affiliation) and cognitive and attitudinal factors 
(internal efficacy, political interest and knowledge) on endogenous and exogenous variables have been residualized. 
#p < .10; *p < .05; **p < .01; ***p < .001 
Figure 6.3. Multiple-step multiple mediator model of media uses, emotional responses, interpersonal talk, and political participation 
(Survey, N = 777) 
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Figure 6.3 presents unstandardized coefficients from this multiple-step multiple 
mediator model consisting of media uses, emotional responses, structural features of 
interpersonal talk, and political participation.  Overall, this model fits the data well, with 
a chi-square value of 17.783 with 14 degrees of freedom.  Other goodness-of-fit indices 
also provide evidence of the adequacy of the model (p = .217; RMSEA = .019, 90% CI 
for RMSEA = .000 to .042; SRMR = .022, CFI = .991, and TLI = .979). 
 
Effects of Media Uses 
The results from the survey demonstrate that frequent use of late-night comedy 
was attached to viewers’ negative emotions (b = .252, SE = .069, p < .001).  In addition, 
late-night comedy viewing was directly related to more animated political participation (b 
= .082, SE = .031, p < .001).  However, the significant relationships between humor 
consumption and interpersonal talk found in Chapter 5 have disappeared after 
simultaneously controlling for the possible mediating influence of emotional responses.  
Implied is that negative emotions substantially mediated the direct pathways from 
comedy consumption to interpersonal talk to the extent that the links between these two 
became insignificant.  Resonant with this view, negative emotions that are likely to 
follow the use of late-night humor predicted more frequent discussion (b = .215, SE = 
.037, p < .001), enlarged network size (b = .219, SE = .099, p < .05), and greater exposure 
to heterogeneous views (b = .139, SE = .031, p < .001), the results lending support for 
H4.1.  Admittedly, late-night comedy watching seems to affect diverse features of 
interpersonal talk rather indirectly by provoking audiences’ negative emotions (H4.2).   
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Meanwhile, the results for traditional media uses painted a somewhat different 
picture.  Television news use was significantly attached to positive emotions (b = .063, 
SE = .022, p < .01).  More importantly, newspaper use yielded significant direct 
relationships with discussion frequency (b = .242, SE = .037, p < .001), network size (b = 
.314, SE = .099, p < .01), and heterogeneous discussion (b = .081, SE = .032, p < .05).  
Taken together, the survey results illustrated that newspaper use bypassed affective 
pathways toward various components of interpersonal talk, whereas negative emotions 
played the pivotal role translating the deliberative effects of late-night comedy 
consumption.  
 
Effects of Emotional Responses 
The omnibus model for the survey produced highly dynamic results pertaining to 
the effects of emotional responses.  First, findings confirmed the nontrivial role of anger 
and worry in promoting more lively deliberative democracy, when it was shown that 
negative emotions predicted sizable increases in diverse structural features of 
interpersonal talk (H4.1).  However, while countering the mobilizing influence observed 
in the experiment, prima facie evidence from the survey suggests that negative emotions 
may thwart political participation (H3.2: b = -.059, SE = .016, p < .01).  Nevertheless, 
this unexpected finding could be reconciled in terms of the conditional indirect 
relationship proposed in Chapter 3, which clearly demonstrated that negative emotions 
could yield opposing effects (either motivating or dampening) depending upon an 
individual’s level of education.  Rather than manifesting pandemic harmful effects, 
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negative emotions seemed to exert only limited demobilizing influence primarily among 
those who attained high school education or less.   
 
Effects of Structural Features of Interpersonal Talk 
While advocating the constructive role of interpersonal talk, findings of the 
survey revealed that political participation was predicted by discussion frequency (H5.2a: 
b = .057, SE = .017, p < .01) and network size (H5.2c: b = .050, SE = .006, p < .001), 
even after simultaneously controlling for emotional responses.  In contrast, 
heterogeneous discussion yielded a significant inverse correlation with political 
participation (RQ5.2a: b = -.072, SE = .018, p < .001).  However, the analysis of the 
conditional relationship inspired by RQ5.2b illustrated that the link between 
heterogeneous discussion and political participation was moderated by education such 
that encountering dissimilar views may unevenly mobilize citizens with post-graduate 
education, while it could suppress poorly educated counterparts, thereby widening the 
participation gap between haves and have-nots.  
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Table 6.3. Specific indirect effects of media exposure on political participation through 
emotional responses and structural features of interpersonal talk (Survey, N = 777) 
Note. L: late-night comedy consumption; N: newspaper news use; NE: negative 
emotions; PE: positive emotions; P: political participation; F: discussion frequency; S: 
network size; H: heterogeneous discussion; CIs are 95% confidence intervals that were 
estimated based on the Monte Carlo Method, while exploiting the Selig and Preacher’s 
(2008) web utility (Bootstrap N = 5,000).  
#p < .10; *p < .05; **p < .01; ***p < .001  
 
Indirect Effects on Political Participation 
The Mplus model enables us to tease out the exact underlying mechanism and 
assess the statistical significance of the specific indirect effect for each mediating route.  
However, when the covariance matrix is entered as the input data as in the analyses of the 
survey data employed in the current study, the Mplus model does not permit the 
estimation of confidence intervals.  As an alternative method, confidence intervals were 
computed based on the Monte Carlo Method, while exploiting the Selig and Preacher’s 
(2008) web utility.  MacKinnon, Lockwood, and Williams (2004) showed that this 
method for assessing mediation did not perform as well as the bias-corrected bootstrap, 
but did perform better than the conventional Sobel test (Sobel, 1982).  For more precise 
testing of specific mediating effects, the present section adopts both methods, and Table 
6.3 summarizes the results from the Sobel test and the bootstrap approach.    
Individual Indirect Effect Point Estimate Boot SE Sobel z CI 
L → NE     → P -.015* .006 -2.560 -.003 to -.004 
L → NE → F → P .003* .001 2.283 .001 to .006 
L → NE → S → P .003# .001 1.847 .000 to .006 
L → NE → H → P -.003* .001 -2.294 -.005 to -.001 
N     →  F → P  .014** .005 2.996 .005 to .024 
N     →  S → P  .016** .005 2.938 .006 to .027 
N     →  H → P  -.006* .003 -2.157 -.012 to -.001 
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Findings show that late-night comedy was indirectly associated with decreased 
political participation via the conduit of negative emotions (b = -.015, SE = .006, p < .05, 
CI = -.003 to -.004).  However, as suggested by the conditional indirect relationship 
found in Chapter 3, the indirect demobilizing effects of late-night humor use through 
anger and worry seemed to exist only among those who had high school education or less 
(H3.4b).  In addition, the multiple-step indirect route that progresses from comedy 
consumption, then through negative emotions and further through heterogeneous 
discussion before ending at political participation (i.e., the L-NE-H-P link) was highly 
significant according to the results from the Sobel test and the bootstrap analysis (b = -
.003, SE = .001, p < .05, CI = -.005 to -.001).  However, this specific indirect pathway 
wherein consuming satirical humor seemed to thwart political participation should be 
qualified, given that previous findings demonstrated that education significantly 
moderated the effects of negative emotions as well as heterogeneous discussion.  
Consequently, this specific indirect link is likely to manifest itself predominantly among 
poorly educated citizens.  
Aside from these inverse relationships, late-night comedy consumption showed 
some motivational influence via multiple-step intervening routes, which encompass 
humor consumption, negative emotions, discussion, and participation (i.e., L-NE-F-P and 
L-N-S-P).  Consistent with the result of the experiment, increased comedy viewing 
predicted the higher degree of political participation indirectly first through negative 
emotions and then through discussion frequency (b = .003, SE = .001, p < .05, CI = .001 
to .006).  In addition, the multiple-step mediating path via the combined link between 
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negative emotions and network size was marginally significant (b = .003, SE = .001, p 
< .10, CI = .000 to .006).   
In short, findings of the survey paralleled those of the experiment, while stressing 
the significance of negative emotions in assessing specific mechanisms that may underlie 
the effects of late-night comedy consumption, although some observed relationships were 
contingent upon education.  Indeed, comedy consumption was significantly intertwined 
with political participation through anger and worry (i.e., L → NE → P).  Moreover, 
consuming satirical humor produced highly dynamic relationships with political 
participation first through negative emotions and then through various structural features 
of interpersonal talk (i.e., L → NE → F → P; L → NE → S → P; and L → NE → H → 
P).  
Further in accordance with the results of the experiment, emotions find little 
place in situating the effects of traditional media uses.  Television news use did not yield 
any significant indirect links to political participation.  Additionally, the relationships 
between newspaper use and political participation were exclusively mediated by diverse 
components of interpersonal talk such as discussion frequency (b = .014, SE = .005, p 
< .01, CI = .005 to .024), network size (b = .016, SE = .005, p < .01, CI = .006 to .027), 
and heterogeneous discussion (b = -.006, SE = .003, p < .01, CI = -.012 to -.001) with no 
comparable indirect paths through emotional responses.  In short, findings of the survey 
assured the conclusion drawn from the experiment that reliance on traditional news 
sources tends to promote greater engagement with public affairs mainly by prompting 
interpersonal talk, whereas the mobilizing effects of late-night comedy consumption are 
likely to entail deliberative as well as affective indirect routes.  
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Chapter 7  
Conclusion 
It has been one of the foci of traditional media research that media content (e.g., 
television news, newspaper articles, and political advertisements) could provide political 
knowledge and mobilize citizen engagement in public affairs.  Following this 
conventional approach, many believe that exposure to late-night comedy could inform 
citizens, which would in turn encourage political engagement.  However, the extant 
literature has been highly inconsistent thus far about the impact of consuming late-night 
humor on political knowledge.  Hence, the indirect mobilizing influence of late-night 
comedy through its effects on political knowledge might be modest.  
Echoing this pessimistic view, late-night comedy programs may be insufficiently 
substantive, thus unable to inform citizens.  However, the lack of political knowledge is 
well known, and information is but one component in rehabilitating the democratic 
citizen (Delli Carpini & Keeter, 1996).  Furthermore, the democratic ideal of an 
informed citizenry has been challenged both theoretically and empirically.  Many (e.g., 
Lupia, 1994; Popkin, 1994; Sniderman et al., 1991) have demonstrated that even poorly 
informed citizens are capable of sophisticated political thought and rational decision 
making, as long as informational shortcuts and heuristics are available.  In support of 
  178 
this proposition, Kaufhold et al. (2010) argued that new forms of user-driven media could 
spur political participation even with little increase of substantive knowledge.   
Motivated by this direction, I examined the indirect influence of late-night 
comedy viewing on political engagement (both participatory and deliberative) through 
emotional responses.  To investigate the more complex communication processes 
whereby late-night comedy viewing can produce significant indirect effects on citizen 
engagement in political life, I developed a theoretical framework, which synthesized 
Affective Intelligence theory (Marcus et al., 2000) and the Orientation-Stimulus-
Orientation-Response (O-S-O-R) approach (Markus & Zajonc, 1985; J. M. McLeod et 
al., 1994), and the Communication Mediation Model (J. M. McLeod et al., 2001; 
Sotirovic & McLeod, 2001).  With the introduction of a series of indirect effects models, 
I strived to address the following two interrelated questions:  
1. What are the impacts of entertainment journalism on political engagement?  
2. How do the impacts of entertainment-oriented programs on citizen attitudes 
and behaviors differ from those derived from more conventional news sources?  
In searching for the answers, I pursued the methodological triangulation of 
blending experimental and survey research.  First, manipulating the exposure to late-
night comedy in an experiment enabled me to examine under a controlled setting the 
precise causal effects of consuming humor on citizen attitude and behavior.  Then, 
employing a secondary analysis of a national survey assessed whether the observed 
associations are generalizable to the real-world setting.  By integrating the results 
attained from the experiment and the survey, I sought to uncover the precise causal 
mechanisms through which late-night comedy affects democracy and also examine 
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whether the observed cause-effect processes were generalizable to an actual real-world 
setting. 
Numerous significant findings were obtained pertaining to the impacts of 
entertainment journalism on political engagement.  First, I found that late-night comedy 
viewing could promote citizens’ engagement in political life indirectly by eliciting their 
anger and their worry about a circumstance or an issue.  Moreover, these findings 
remained significant even after controlling for conventional mediating accounts that 
included internal efficacy, cynicism, political interest, and knowledge.  In addition, 
findings highlighted the key source of mediation demonstrating that late-night comedy 
viewing exerted a significant indirect effect on the likelihood of political participation 
mostly through self-referent anger.  Considering the cognitive appraisal dimension of 
emotions, the results suggested that anger played a greater motivational role mediating 
between exposure to late-night comedy and political participation (Huddy et al., 2007; 
Valentino et al., 2011; Weber, 2007), and further that self-referencing tended to boost the 
mobilizing effect of anger (Dunlop et al., 2008), whereas it could augment the inherent 
avoiding tendency of worry (Heatherton & Baumeister, 1991; Heatherton et al., 1998; 
Sherman & Cohen, 2002). 
Second, I investigated the impacts of late-night comedy on citizen engagement in 
interpersonal talk, while extending the already well-established research tradition that 
examined the link between mass media and interpersonal communication.  At an 
intersection of the results from the experiment and the survey, I observed that consuming 
humor could mobilize potential discursive activities for citizens by provoking their 
negative emotions.  Particularly interesting in this project was that the influence of late-
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night comedy on deliberative engagement was not limited to the simple frequency of talk; 
exposure to political satire also exerted significant influence on other structural features 
of potential interpersonal talk, such as the size of the discussion network, the degree of 
online interactions, and the extent to which people discuss politics with non-likeminded 
others. 
Third, I applied the Communication Mediation Model (J. M. McLeod et al., 2001; 
Sotirovic & McLeod, 2001) to examine the process wherein the act of consuming 
satirical humor works in concert with interpersonal discussion to spur political 
participation.  Findings suggested that more frequent discussion, a larger discussion 
network, and greater engagement in online communication activities could mediate and 
reinforce the mobilizing effects of late-night comedy viewing.  However, discussion 
with heterogeneous others seemed to exert limited positive influence primarily among 
political experts.  Hence, this study called for the extension of the Communication 
Mediation Model to acknowledge non-monolithic effects that diverse structural 
components of interpersonal talk could produce.  
Aside from examining the influence of late-night comedy viewing, this 
dissertation aimed to compare the impacts of entertainment-oriented programs on citizen 
attitudes and behaviors with those derived from more conventional news sources.  To 
this end, I integrated the results of these research efforts and sought to identify particular 
causal mechanisms that could account for the effects of satirical humor programs on 
democracy.  Specifically, the indirect paths through which late-night comedy shows 
influenced citizens’ political engagement were juxtaposed with the parallel causal 
processes for traditional news sources.  The major difference between these new forms 
  181 
of journalism and traditional news channels lied in their elicitation of affective responses.  
In explaining the impacts of exposure to late-night comedy programs on individuals’ 
deliberative and participatory behaviors, emotions (particularly anger and worry) played 
a critical mediating role boosting the constructive influence.  Further, findings aligned 
well with the Dunlop et al.’s (2008) typology classifying diverse referents of emotion in 
that exposure to late-night comedy produced an immediate effect on on the citizen’s 
intent to participate, whereas message-referent emotions elicited by the consumption of 
satirical humor tended to promote interpersonal talk first.  In contrast, newspaper and 
television news consumption tended to promote citizen participation in political activities 
and engagement in interpersonal discussion rather directly with little elicitation of 
emotional responses involved in their causal models.   
On a somewhat different note, though, findings of the current research provided a 
caveat against overly optimistic views regarding the unique role of late-night comedy in 
revitalizing democracy.  Specifically, the results showed that the indirect effect of late-
night comedy viewing on political participation through negative emotions will be 
conditional upon education such that the effect is stronger for those who are highly 
educated.  Specifically, the evaluation of conditional indirect effect in the survey 
indicated that the observed inverse association between late-night comedy consumption 
and political participation via the conduit of negative emotions existed only among 
poorly educated citizens, whereas the equivalent assessment in the experiment showed 
that well-educated experts seemed to extract greater benefits from negative emotions 
stirred by satirical humor.  Moreover, the investigation of diverse structural features of 
discussion suggested that engagement in heterogeneous discussion rendered poorly 
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educated citizens vulnerable to demobilization, whereas it mobilized politically savvy 
counterparts.  Taken together, these findings implied that exposure to late-night comedy 
may draw a higher level of political involvement from experts, while demobilizing 
political novices.  These results bolstered the argument that those with greater cognitive 
resources and processing skills were more likely to gain value from late-night comedy 
since understanding humor itself might require a certain level of expertise (Moy et al., 
2005a; Young, 2008; Young & Tisinger, 2006).  Hence, findings may illustrate that late-
night comedy viewing could widen the participation gap between haves and have-nots.   
Based on these important findings, I am confident that the present work provided 
a range of insights that could be used to explore the role of newly emerging media that 
are presumably of less enlightening value and yet more emotionally amusing and 
provocative.  Primarily, these findings contributed to our understanding of various 
mediation models anchored in the O-S-O-R framework (Markus & Zajonc, 1985; J. M. 
McLeod et al., 1994), including the Cognitive Mediation Model (Eveland, 2001; Eveland 
et al., 2003) and other approaches that may be contingent upon cognitive and attitudinal 
elements (J. M. McLeod, Scheufele, & Moy, 1999; Scheufele et al., 2004).  By 
incorporating emotion as a viable mediator (the second O) between the reception of a 
message (S) and its ensuing response (R), the proposed indirect effects models enlarged 
the scope of the mediation model, while also capturing the dynamic intervening 
mechanisms that could lie above and beyond more conventional cognitive accounts.  
Further, education was introduced as a first O and showed that the mobilizing effect of 
late-night comedy viewing was stronger for political sophisticates.  Taken together, the 
current research fully exploited the O-S-O-R framework in assessing the impact of 
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political entertainment by introducing the following causal chain: education (first O) - 
late-night comedy viewing (S) - negative emotions (second O) - political participation 
(R).  Moreover, I believe that investigating multiple facets of interpersonal discussion, 
which harbor distinct implications for participatory democracy, has further extended the 
purview of mediators that might be employed in the Communication Mediation Model (J. 
M. McLeod et al., 2001; Sotirovic & McLeod, 2001). 
Notwithstanding the significance of the current research effort, it should be 
understood as only the beginning of an effort to examine the rise of entertainment media 
in the public discourse and its social and political implications, given the shortcomings in 
research methods and the limited scope of inquiries.  Perhaps the most serious concern 
of the present study involves the presumed causal orderings among media use, emotion, 
interpersonal talk, and political participation.  In particular, the current research left 
unexamined the precise temporal order among the possible consequences of late-night 
comedy viewing, including emotion, interpersonal talk, and political participation.  
Furthermore, the design was not sensitive enough to capture long-term cumulative effects 
from repeated exposure to satirical humor.  Given that the consequences of media use 
can also determine the selection of and attention to specific media content, the attitudinal 
and behavioral outcomes examined in the present study can constitute not only the results 
of exposure to late-night comedy shows, but also important antecedents to the selection 
of and attention to these programs, thereby creating a reinforcing spiral effect (Slater, 
2007).  A carefully designed time-based model with multiple measures of both reception 
and response will enable us to define the precise causal direction and further to capture 
the cumulative effects from repeated exposure to late-night humor.  
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As with the overall design, measures employed in the current research are not 
without limitations.  Specifically, the failure to detect the hypothesized mediating 
effects of positive emotions may reflect weak operationalization of the measures.  
Although these results may lend credence to the studies suggesting that individuals tend 
to pay greater attention to negative and threatening information (e.g., Baumeister et al., 
2001; Rozin & Royzman, 2001; Taylor, 1991) and further that positive emotions are less 
effective than negative responses (e.g., Coleman & Wu, 2010; Miller, 2007; Petty & 
Wegener, 1998), one can investigate subtle distinctive consequences that may arise from 
different types of positive emotions by employing a greater number of positive emotion 
items while specifying their respective causes and effects.  Perhaps, future scholarship 
needs to revisit the theoretical foundation for the link between late-night comedy viewing 
and arousal of positive emotions, while clearly specifying the target of positive emotions.  
After all, people may not be so enthusiastic about a political issue following the 
consumption of satirical humor, but rather it could be a joke and a show host that make 
audiences amused.   
In addition, the examination of the influence of heterogeneous discussion left 
unexamined how and why it produced contrasting results for political novices and experts.  
Future studies can examine the complex processes wherein heterogeneous discussion 
could yield divergent outcomes by examining potential intervening mechanisms, such as 
ambivalence (Huckfeldt et al., 2004; Mutz, 2002, 2006) and learning (J. M. McLeod, 
Scheufele, Moy, et al., 1999; Scheufele et al., 2003; Scheufele et al., 2004).  
Finally, the limited scope of the current research should be noted.  I found that 
traditional news media did not elicit emotions in the same powerful way that late-night 
  185 
comedy did.  However, it could well be that some news topics (e.g., 9/11) would clearly 
generate powerful emotions.  Brader, Valentino, and Suhay (2008) showed that news 
stories about the immigration issue could have powerful emotional effects and that these 
could encourage participation.  Thus, the proposed indirect effects models should be 
tested on more diverse issues in a multitude of contexts.  Further, entertainment 
journalism in the current research was limited to late-night comedy programs, but future 
study can extend the scope of inquiries by incorporating other politically influential 
contents in the entertainment genre such as pop music and movies.   
In closing, I remain fascinated by the rise of entertainment media in the public 
discourse, and I will continue to pursue future work in this line of research, while more 
closely investigating the multifaceted communication processes of political 
entertainment.  Yet my intellectual endeavors range far beyond a limited domain.  My 
long-term vision encompasses the examination of the role of growing news channels in 
cross-national and cross-cultural contexts.  Of particular emphasis is how the complex 
interplay between political, economic, and cultural conditions moderates the impacts of 
new forms of journalism, including entertainment media.  To this end, I hope to extend 
my research to East Asian landscapes in a comparison of the U.S. and Korean cases.  
Underlying all these efforts, my central attention will be directed toward emerging media 
practices, their influence on democracy, and how the mix of individual and social factors 
responds to and shapes the future environment for news provision. 
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Appendices 
Appendix A1 
Question Wording and Descriptive Statistics of Variables in the Online Experiment 
 
Political Participation 
For each activity, please tell us how likely you are to take part in that activity. There are 
seven numbers from 1 – 7 where each number represents the following: 1. Extremely 
unlikely; 2. Very unlikely; 3. Somewhat unlikely; 4. Neither unlikely nor likely; 5. 
Somewhat likely; 6. Very likely; or 7. Extremely likely. 
• Attend a political meeting, rally, or speech (PPE1: M = 3.59, SD = 1.84, Mdn = 4) 
• Contact a public official or a political party (PPE2: M = 4.00, SD = 1.92, Mdn = 4) 
• Display a bumper sticker or yard sign on a political issue (PPE3: M = 3.46, SD = 
2.06, Mdn = 3) 
 
Interpersonal Talk 
Discussion frequency 
For each activity, please tell us how likely you are to take part in that activity. There are 
seven numbers from 1 – 7 where each number represents the following: 1. Extremely 
unlikely; 2. Very unlikely; 3. Somewhat unlikely; 4. Neither unlikely nor likely; 5. 
Somewhat likely; 6. Very likely; or 7. Extremely likely. 
• Talk about the government’s bailout of big companies with neighbors (DFE1: M = 
4.10, SD = 1.90, Mdn = 4) 
• Talk about the government’s bailout of big companies with friends (DFE2: M = 
4.71, SD = 1.82, Mdn = 5) 
• Talk about the government’s bailout of big companies with family (DFE3: M = 
4.84, SD = 1.80, Mdn = 5) 
Online interaction 
For each activity, please tell us how likely you are to take part in that activity. There are 
seven numbers from 1 – 7 where each number represents the following: 1. Extremely 
unlikely; 2. Very unlikely; 3. Somewhat unlikely; 4. Neither unlikely nor likely; 5. 
Somewhat likely; 6. Very likely; or 7. Extremely likely. 
• Read or post a comment about the government’s bailout of big companies (OIE1: 
M = 4.28, SD = 1.98, Mdn = 5) 
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• Discuss the government’s bailout of big companies online with people over email, 
in chat rooms, using message boards, forums or instant messaging services (OIE2: M 
= 3.76, SD = 1.99, Mdn = 4) 
• Forward any emails, audio or video concerning the government’s bailout of big 
companies (OIE3: M = 4.21, SD = 1.99, Mdn = 4) 
Heterogeneous discussion 
Now, we would like to ask you to express your own opinion on the government’s 
economic stimulus plan.  Please indicate the extent to which you would agree or 
disagree with the same statement. There are seven numbers from 1 – 7 where each 
number represents the following: 1. Strongly disagree; 2. Disagree; 3. Somewhat 
disagree; 4. Neither agree nor disagree; 5. Somewhat agree; 6. Agree, or 7. Strongly 
agree. 
• The government should expand the economic stimulus plan in order to address the 
current recession. 
Suppose that a friend you know very well (or a stranger you encounter at a social 
gathering) is arguing that the government should (or should not) expand the economic 
stimulus plan in order to address the current recession. How likely are you to have a 
discussion with that friend (or that stranger) on this matter? (HFS: M = 4.70, SD = 1.57, 
Mdn = 5; HSS: M = 4.06, SD = 1.72, Mdn = 4; HFO: M = 4.74, SD = 1.60, Mdn = 5; 
HSO: M = 4.00, SD = 1.73, Mdn = 4) There are seven numbers from 1 – 7 where each 
number represents the following: 1. Extremely unlikely; 2. Very unlikely; 3. Somewhat 
unlikely; 4. Neither unlikely nor likely; 5. Somewhat likely; 6. Very likely; or 7. Extremely 
likely. 
 
Emotional Responses 
We’d like to know how angry (worried, or enthusiastic) you are about the government’s 
bailout of big companies. For each question below, please indicate how angry (worried, 
or enthusiastic) you are. There are seven numbers from 1 – 7, where 1 means Not at all 
angry (worried, or enthusiastic), and 7 means Extremely angry (worried, or enthusiastic). 
• Message-referent: How angry (worried, or enthusiastic) are you about the 
government’s bailout of big companies? (MAE: M = 5.23, SD = 1.71, Mdn = 6; 
MWE: M = 4.89, SD = 1.83; Mdn = 5, MEE: M = 2.17, SD = 1.54, Mdn = 1) 
• Plot-referent: How angry (worried, or enthusiastic) are you about the way that the 
government’s bailout of big companies affects middle class Americans? (PAE: M = 
5.38, SD = 1.62, Mdn = 6; PWE: M = 5.15, SD = 1.76, Mdn = 6; PEE: M = 2.26, SD 
= 1.57, Mdn = 2) 
• Self-referent: How angry (worried, or enthusiastic) are you about the way that the 
government’s bailout of big companies affects you? (SAE: M = 5.01, SD = 1.82, 
Mdn = 5; SWE: M = 4.89, SD = 1.86, Mdn = 5; SEE: M = 2.25, SD = 1.59, Mdn = 2) 
 
Internal Efficacy 
For each statement listed, we would like to know whether you personally agree or 
disagree with the statement. There are seven numbers from 1 – 7 where each number 
represents the following: 1. Strongly disagree; 2. Disagree; 3. Somewhat disagree; 4. 
Neither agree nor disagree; 5. Somewhat agree; 6. Agree, or 7. Strongly agree. 
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• People like me have considerable influence on politics. (IES1: M = 3.22, SD = 1.69, 
Mdn = 3) 
• I know a lot about the policies of political candidates I support. (IES2: M = 5.47, 
SD = 1.65, Mdn = 5) 
• I know a lot about the policies of political candidates I don’t support. (IES3: M = 
4.09, SD = 1.65, Mdn = 4) 
 
Willingness to Know 
We would like to ask how much you are interested in learning more about the 
government’s economic stimulus plan. There are seven numbers from 1 – 7 where each 
number represents the following: 1. Extremely unwilling; 2. Very unwilling; 3. Somewhat 
un willing; 4. Neither unwilling nor willing; 5. Somewhat willing; 6. Very willing; or 7. 
Extremely willing. 
• Thinking about what you have seen, how willing are you to learn more about the 
ideas supporting the government’s economic stimulus plan? (WKE1: M = 4.84, SD = 
1.57, Mdn = 5) 
• How willing are you to learn more about the ideas opposing the government’s 
economic stimulus plan? (WKE2: M = 5.03, SD = 1.41, Mdn = 5) 
• More generally, how willing are you to learn more about the government’s 
economic stimulus plan? (WKE3: M = 5.15, SD = 1.38, Mdn = 5) 
 
Cynicism 
For each statement listed, we would like to know whether you personally agree or 
disagree with the statement. There are seven numbers from 1 – 7 where each number 
represents the following: 1. Strongly disagree; 2. Disagree; 3. Somewhat disagree; 4. 
Neither agree nor disagree; 5. Somewhat agree; 6. Agree, or 7. Strongly agree. 
• Politicians don’t realize how badly they come across. (CYE1: M = 5.25, SD = 1.46, 
Mdn = 5) 
• Most politicians are boring. (CYE2: M = 4.73, SD = 1.51, Mdn = 5) 
• Corruption is always present in American politics. (CYE3: M = 5.64, SD = 1.35, 
Mdn = 6) 
• No matter which party is in power, it seems like our government is run by a few 
big interests. (CYE4: M = 5.64, SD = 1.25, Mdn = 6) 
 
Political Interest 
We would like to know whether you personally agree or disagree with the following 
statement. There are seven numbers from 1 – 7 where each number represents the 
following: 1. Strongly disagree; 2. Disagree; 3. Somewhat disagree; 4. Neither agree nor 
disagree; 5. Somewhat agree; 6. Agree, or 7. Strongly agree. 
• I am very interested in politics. (PIE: M = 4.29, SD = 1.80, Mdn = 4) 
 
Age 
What was your age on your last birthday? (AGE: M = 47.27, SD = 14.13, Mdn = 49, Min 
= 18, Max = 80) 
 
Education 
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Which of the following best describes the highest level of education you attained? 1. 
Elementary school; 2. Some high school or less; 3.High school diploma; 4. Some college 
or associate degree; or 5. Post-graduate education. (EDE: M = 3.87, SD = .83, Mdn = 4) 
 
Household Income 
What was the total income for your family last year? Less than $15K, $15K to $34,999, 
$35K to $59,999, $60K to $89,999, or $90K and over. (HIE: Mdn = $35,000-$59,999) 
 
Gender 
What is your gender? (GEE: 51% female) 
 
Party Affiliation 
Generally speaking, do you think of yourself as a Republican, a Democrat, an 
Independent, or what? If Democrat or Republican, would you call yourself a strong or a 
weak Democrat or Republican? If Independent, are you closer to the Republican Party or 
the Democratic Party? Strong Democrat, Weak Democrat, Independent Democrat, 
Independent, Independent Republican, Weak Republican, or Strong Republican. (PAE: 
14.5% Strong Democrat, 10.3% Weak Democrat, 12.5% Independent Democrat, 29.0% 
Independent, 12.4% Independent Republican, 7.3% Weak Republican, 14.1% Strong 
Republican) 
 
Note. M: mean; SD: standard deviation; Mdn: median; Min: minimum; Max: maximum 
 
Appendix A2 
Question Wording and Descriptive Statistics of Variables in the Mail Survey 
 
Political Participation 
For each activity listed, please indicate your frequency of engagement during the past two 
months. There are eight numbers from 1 – 8 where each number represents the following: 
1. None in last 2 months; 2. About once in last 2 months; 3. Once or twice a month;4. 
Every other week; 5. Once a week; 6. Two-three times a week; 7. Almost every day; or 8. 
Every day.  
• Attended a political meeting, rally, or speech (PPS1: M = 1.21, SD = .69, Mdn = 1) 
• Contacted a public official or a political party (PPS2: M = 1.33, SD = .82, Mdn = 1) 
• Circulated a petition for a candidate or issue (PPS3: M = 1.12, SD = .59, Mdn = 1) 
• Worked on behalf of a social group or cause (PPS4: M = 1.59, SD = 1.24, Mdn = 1) 
 
Interpersonal Talk 
Discussion frequency 
For each activity listed, please indicate your frequency of engagement during the past two 
months. There are eight numbers from 1 – 8 where each number represents the following: 
1. None in last 2 months; 2. About once in last 2 months; 3. Once or twice a month;4. 
Every other week; 5. Once a week; 6. Two-three times a week; 7. Almost every day; or 8. 
Every day. 
• Talked about politics with neighbors (DFS1: M = 2.16, SD = 1.63, Mdn = 1) 
• Talked about politics with friends (DFS2: M = 3.14, SD = 2.00, Mdn = 3) 
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• Talked about politics with family (DFS3: M = 3.58, SD = 2.21, Mdn = 3) 
Network size 
Outside your immediate family, how many people do you often talk with about politics or 
public affairs? (NSS: M = 5.00, SD = 4.55, Mdn = 4) 
Heterogeneous discussion 
I’d like to know whether you personally agree or disagree with this statement.  There are 
six numbers from 1 – 6, where 1 means Definitely disagree and 6 means Definitely agree.  
• Most people I talk to have different political views than my own. (HDS: M = 3.56, 
SD = 1.38, Mdn = 3) 
 
Emotional Responses 
For each statement listed, I’d like to know whether you personally agree or disagree with 
this statement. There are six numbers from 1 – 6, where 1 means Definitely disagree and 
6 means Definitely agree.  
• When I think of the Republican Party, I feel angry (worried, hopeful, or excited). 
(RAS: M = 3.18, SD = 1.68, Mdn = 1; RWS: M = 3.37, SD = 1.68, Mdn = 3; RHS: M 
= 3.13, SD = 1.69, Mdn = 3; RES: M = 2.87, SD = 1.55, Mdn = 1) 
• When I think of the Democratic Party, I feel angry (worried, hopeful, or excited). 
(DAS: M = 2.95, SD = 1.68, Mdn = 3; DWS: M = 3.37, SD = 1.80, Mdn = 3; DHS: 
M = 3.23, SD = 1.81, Mdn = 3; DES: M = 2.82, SD = 1.68, Mdn = 3) 
 
Late-Night Comedy Viewing 
Below are media you may/may not use. Please indicate how often you use. There are 
eight numbers from 1 – 5 where each number represents the following: 1. Never; 2. Once 
in a while; 3. Sometime; 4. Often; or 5. Regularly. 
• The Daily Show with Jon Stewart (LCS1: M = 1.39, SD = .87, Mdn = 1) 
• The Colbert Report (LCS2: M = 1.28, SD = .75, Mdn = 1) 
 
Conventional News Use 
Below are media you may/may not use. Please indicate how often you use. There are 
eight numbers from 1 – 5 where each number represents the following: 1. Never; 2. Once 
in a while; 3. Sometime; 4. Often; or 5. Regularly. 
• National Nightly News on ABC, CBS, or NBC (TVS1: M = 3.50, SD = 1.48, Mdn 
= 4) 
• Local television news programs (TVS2: M = 3.95, SD = 1.29, Mdn = 5) 
• Daily newspapers (NPS: M = 3.78, SD = 1.42, Mdn = 4) 
 
Internal Efficacy 
I’d like to know whether you personally agree or disagree with this statement. There are 
six numbers from 1 – 6, where 1 means Definitely disagree and 6 means Definitely agree. 
• People like me have considerable influence on politics. (IES1: M = 2.59, SD = 1.43, 
Mdn = 2) 
• I know a lot about politics. (IES2: M = 3.06, SD = 1.45, Mdn = 3) 
 
Political Knowledge 
Do you happen to know… Democratic Party; Republican Party; and Don’t Know. 
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• Which political party will hold a majority in the U.S. House next year? (PKS1: 
76% correct) 
• Nancy Pelosi belongs to which political party? (PKS2: 58% correct) 
• Dennis Hastert belongs to which political party? (PKS3: 30% correct) 
• Which party argues more strongly for a phased redeployment of U.S. troops out of 
Iraq over the next to 12 to 18 months? (PKS4: 61% correct) 
 
Political Interest 
I’d like to know whether you personally agree or disagree with this statement. There are 
six numbers from 1 – 6, where 1 means Definitely disagree and 6 means Definitely agree. 
• I am interested in politics. (PIS: M = 3.50, SD = 1.48, Mdn = 4) 
 
Age 
What was your age on your last birthday? (AGS: M = 51.86, SD = 13.25, Mdn = 52, Min 
= 18, Max = 88) 
 
Education 
Which of the following best describes the highest level of education you attained? 1. 
Grade school, 2. Some high school or less; 3. High school grad; 4. Some college or 
associates; 5. College grad; or 6. Post-graduate education. (EDS: M = 4.07, SD = 1.09, 
Mdn = 4) 
 
Household Income 
What was the total income for your family last year in thousands? (GES: Mdn = $55,000) 
 
Gender 
What is your gender? (GES: 46% female) 
 
Race 
Which of the following best describes your ethnicity? White, Hispanic, Black, Asian, 
American Indian, Pacific Islander, or Other. (RCS: 75% White, 2.2% Hispanic, 2.7% 
Black, .9% Asian, .3% American Indian, .0% Pacific Islander, 1.4% Other) 
 
Party Affiliation 
Generally speaking, do you think of yourself as a Republican, a Democrat, an 
Independent, or what? If Democrat or Republican, would you call yourself a strong or a 
weak Democrat or Republican? Strong Democrat, Weak Democrat, Independent, Weak 
Republican, or Strong Republican. (PAS: 11.7% Strong Democrat, 19.7% Weak 
Democrat, 34.6% Independent, 21.6% Weak Republican, 11.9% Strong Republican) 
 
Note. M: mean; SD: standard deviation; Mdn: median; Min: minimum; Max: maximum 
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